Risk Governance Deficits. An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance by Graham, John D. et al.
Report
international risk governance council
Risk Governance Deficits
An analysis and illustration of the most 
common deficits in risk governance
P 2
international risk governance council Risk Governance Deficits
AIDS	 	 Acquired	Immune	Deficiency	Syndrome
BSE	 	 Bovine	Spongiform	Encephalopathy
CFC	 	 Chlorofluorocarbon	
CJD	 	 Creutzfeldt-Jacob	Disease
CO2	 	 Carbon	Dioxide
DH	 	 Department	of	Health	(UK)
DHS	 	 Department	of	Homeland	Security	(US)
DWD	 	 Drinking	Water	Directive	(EU)
EMF	 	 Electromagnetic	Field
EPA	 	 Environmental	Protection	Agency	(US)
EU	 	 European	Union
FDA	 	 Food	and	Drug	Administration	(US)
FEMA	 	 Federal	Emergency	Management	Agency	(US)
FQPA	 	 Food	Quality	Protection	Act	(US)
GM	 	 Genetically	Modified
GMO		 	 Genetically	Modified	Organism
GURT	 	 Genetic-Use	Restriction	Technology
HIV	 	 Human	Immunodeficiency	Virus
IARC	 	 International	Agency	for	Research	on	Cancer
IRGC	 	 International	Risk	Governance	Council
ITQ	 	 Individual	Transferable	Quota
LLRW	 	 Low-Level	Radioactive	Waste
MAFF	 	 Ministry	of	Agriculture,	Fisheries	and	Food	(UK)
MMR	 	 Measles,	Mumps	and	Rubella	Vaccine
MTBE	 	 Methyl	Tertiary-Butyl	Ether
NGO	 	 Non-Governmental	Organisation
OECD	 	 Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development
OSHA	 	 Occupational	Health	and	Safety	Administration	(US)	
PES	 	 Payment	for	Environmental	Services
REDD	 	 The	Reduced	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	Forest	Degradation	scheme
RIA	 	 Regulatory	Impact	Assessment
SARS		 	 Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome
SBO	 	 Specified	Bovine	Offal
SVS	 	 State	Veterinary	Service	(UK)
TSO	 	 Transmission	Service	Operator
TURFs	 	 Territorial	Use	Rights	in	Fishing
UCTE	 	 Union	for	the	Coordination	of	Transmission	of	Electricity
UK	 	 United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland
UN	 	 United	Nations	
UNESCO		 United	Nations	Educational	Scientific	and	Cultural	Organization
UNFCCC		 United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	
US	 	 United	States	of	America
vCJD	 	 Variant	Creutzfeldt-Jacob	Disease
WHO	 	 World	Health	Organization
Cover	picture:	
Satellite	image	of	Hurricane	Katrina	approaching	the	Gulf	Coast	of	the	United	States
Copyrights:
MTBE		 	 p.16	©	Bill	Cutts
Brent	Spar		 p.24	©	Greenpeace/David	Sims
AIDS	ribbon		 p.28	©	Jonathan	Sullivan
Fisheries			 p.40	©	Hugi	Olafsson
Pesticides		 p.41	©	Bill	Hunter
Subprime	crisis		 p.49	©	Alec	Muc
©	All	rights	reserved,	International	Risk	Governance	Council,	Geneva,	2009
ISBN	978-2-9700631-9-3
Abbreviations used in the text:
P 3
international risk governance councilRisk Governance Deficits
Contents AbbreviationsPreface
Summary
I Introduction
II Cluster A: Assessing and understanding risks
A1  Early warning systems
A2  Factual knowledge about risks
A3  Perceptions of risk, including their determinants and consequences
A4  Stakeholder involvement
A5  Evaluating the acceptability of the risk
A6  Misrepresenting information about risk
A7  Understanding complex systems
A8  Recognising fundamental or rapid changes in systems
A9  The use of formal models 
A10  Assessing potential surprises
III Cluster B: Managing risks
B1  Responding to early warnings
B2  Designing effective risk management strategies
B3  Considering a reasonable range of risk management options
B4  Designing efficient and equitable risk management policies
B5  Implementing and enforcing risk management decisions
B6  Anticipating side effects of risk management 
B7  Reconciling time horizons
B8  Balancing transparency and confidentiality
B9  Organisational capacity
B10  Dealing with dispersed responsibilities
B11  Dealing with commons problems and externalities
B12  Managing conflicts of interests, beliefs, values and ideologies 
B13  Acting in the face of the unexpected
IV How to work with the risk governance deficits as identified in this report
V  Conclusion and outlook
VI Overview 
Annex: Case studies (Summaries)
EMF: Mobile phones and power lines
The response to Hurricane Katrina
Fisheries depletion and collapse
Risk governance of genetically modified crops in Europe
The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic in the UK
The subprime crisis of 2007-08 in the United States
Glossary
References and bibliography
Acknowledgements
About IRGC
02
04
05
09
11
12
14
17
19
21
22
25
27
29
32
34
35
37
39
42
43
45
46
48
49
51
53
55
57
60
62
64
66
66
68
70
72
74
76
80
82
90
91
P 4
international risk governance council Risk Governance Deficits
The	International	Risk	Governance	Council	(IRGC)	is	an	independent	organisation	whose	purpose	is	to	aid	in	the	
understanding	and	management	of	emerging	global	risks.	It	does	so	by	developing	concepts	of	risk	governance,	
anticipating	major	risk	issues	and	providing	risk	governance	policy	recommendations	for	key	decision-makers.
IRGC	defines	risk governance	as	the	identification,	assessment,	management	and	communication	of	risks	in	a	
broad	context.	It	includes	the	totality	of	actors,	rules,	conventions,	processes	and	mechanisms	concerned	with	how	
relevant	risk	information	is	collected,	analysed	and	communicated,	and	how	and	by	whom	management	decisions	
are	taken	and	implemented.
One	of	IRGC’s	tasks	is	the	improvement	of	concepts	and	tools	for	the	understanding	and	practice	of	risk	governance	
itself.	Good	risk	governance	should,	IRGC	upholds,	enable	societies	to	benefit	from	change	while	minimising	its	
negative	consequences.
This	report	on	deficits	in	the	risk	governance	process	is	a	continuation	of	the	development	of	IRGC’s	approach	to	
risk	governance.	Central	to	this	approach	is	the	IRGC	Risk	Governance	Framework,	intended	to	help	policymakers,	
regulators	and	risk	managers	in	industry	and	elsewhere	both	understand	the	concept	of	risk	governance	and	apply	
it	to	their	handling	of	risks.	A	detailed	description	of	IRGC’s	Risk	Governance	Framework	was	published	in	IRGC’s	
White	Paper	“Risk	Governance	–Towards	an	Integrative	Framework”	in	2005	[IRGC,	2005].
IRGC’s	approach	emphasises	that	risk	governance	is	context-specific.	A	range	of	factors	–	including	the	nature	of	
the	risk	itself,	how	different	governments	assess	and	manage	risks,	and	a	society’s	level	of	acceptance	or	aversion	
to	risk,	among	others	–	means	that	there	can	be	no	single	risk	governance	process.	The	framework	is	therefore	
deliberately	intended	to	be	used	flexibly.	
The	framework	is	central	to	IRGC’s	work	–	from	it	stems	the	distinction	made	in	this	report	between	understanding	
and	managing	risks.	However,	 in	this	report	on	risk	governance	deficits,	IRGC	is	not	assuming	that	readers	are	
familiar	with	 the	 framework.	All	explanations	 in	 this	 report	are	hence	self-explanatory	and	do	not	presume	prior	
knowledge	of	the	IRGC	framework	or	terminology.	
In	developing	recommendations	for	improving	the	risk	governance	of	such	issues	as	nanotechnology,	bioenergy,	
critical	infrastructures,	and	carbon	capture	and	storage,	it	became	clear	to	IRGC	that	many	deficits	are	common	
to	 several	 risk	 types	 and	 organisations;	 they	 recur,	 often	 with	 serious	 health,	 environmental	 and	 economic	
consequences,	across	different	organisational	types	and	in	the	context	of	different	risks	and	cultures.	
Identifying	 deficits	 in	 existing	 risk	 governance	 structures	 and	 processes	 is	 now	 another	 significant	 element	 of	
IRGC’s	methodology.	The	concept	of	risk	governance	deficits	–	which	can	be	either	deficiencies	or	failures	within	
risk	 governance	processes	or	 structures	–	 complements	 the	use	of	 the	 framework	 itself	with	 an	analytical	 tool	
designed	to	 identify	weak	spots	in	how	risks	are	assessed,	evaluated	and	managed.	These	weak	spots	are	the	
focus	of	this	report.	
The	purpose	of	this	report	is	to	introduce	to	managers	in	government	and	industry	the	concept	of	risk	governance	
deficits,	to	list	and	describe	the	most	common	deficits,	to	explain	how	they	can	occur,	to	illustrate	them	and	their	
consequences,	and	to	provide	a	catalyst	for	their	correction.	
Preface
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IRGC	defines	risk	governance	deficits	as	deficiencies	
(where	 elements	 are	 lacking)	 or	 failures	 (where	
actions	are	not	 taken	or	 prove	unsuccessful)	 in	 risk	
governance	structures	and	processes.	They	hinder	a	
fair	and	efficient	risk	governance	process.
The	 deficits	 described	 by	 IRGC	 have	 recurred	 over	
time	and	have	affected	risk	governance	in	many	types	
of	private	and	public	organisations,	and	 for	different	
types	of	risks.	While	deficits	may	be	relevant	for	both	
simple	and	systemic	risks,	in	this	report	we	focus	on	
the	latter.	This	is	because	systemic	risks	–	defined	as	
those	risks	that	affect	the	functionality	of	systems	upon	
which	society	depends	and	that	have	impacts	beyond	
their	geographic	and	sector	origins	–	provide	a	greater	
challenge	for	risk	governance	and	thus	greater	scope	
for	the	occurrence	of	deficits.
The	 potential	 consequences	 of	 risk	 governance	
deficits	can	be	severe	in	terms	of	human	life,	health,	
the	 environment,	 technology,	 financial	 systems	 and	
the	economy	as	well	as	social	and	political	institutions.	
There	may	 be	 a	 failure	 to	 trigger	 necessary	 action,	
which	 may	 be	 costly	 in	 terms	 of	 lives,	 property	 or	
assets	 lost;	 or	 the	 complete	 opposite	 –	 an	 over-
reaction	or	 inefficient	action	which	 is	costly	 in	 terms	
of	 wasted	 resources.	 Consequences	 of	 deficits	
can	 also	 discourage	 the	 development	 of	 new	
technologies,	 as	 they	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 suffocation	 of	
innovation	 (through	 over-zealous	 regulation)	 or	 to	
unintended	consequences	(through	failing	to	account	
for	secondary	 impacts).	Loss	of	public	 trust	 in	 those	
responsible	 for	 assessing	 and	 managing	 risk	 or	 an	
unfair	(or	inequitable)	distribution	of	risks	and	benefits	
are	other	possible	adverse	outcomes.
By	 identifying	 and	 describing	 these	 important	
deficits,	this	report	aims	to	help	risk	decision-makers	
in	 government	 and	 industry	 understand	 both	 the	
causes	of	deficits	 in	 risk	governance	processes	and	
their	 capacity	 to	 aggravate	 the	 adverse	 impacts	 of	
a	 risk.	With	 this	 understanding,	 it	 is	 hoped	 that	 risk	
practitioners	 will	 be	 able	 to	 identify	 and	 take	 steps	
to	 remedy	 significant	 deficits	 in	 the	 risk	 governance	
structures	 and	 processes	 in	which	 they	 play	 a	 part,	
including	 those	 that	 may	 be	 found	 within	 their	 own	
organisations.
Although	 presented	 in	 this	 report	 as	 distinct	
phenomena,	 with	 their	 respective	 causes,	 drivers,	
properties	and	effects,	deficits	can	be	inter-related	(for	
example,	 a	 deficit	 in	 risk	 assessment	may	 increase	
the	chances	of	another,	linked	deficit	occurring	during	
the	management	phase)	and	a	single	risk	issue	may	
be	subject	to	multiple	deficits.
As	with	the	design	of	its	risk	governance	framework,	
IRGC	has	grouped	the	deficits	to	reflect	the	distinction	
between	assessing	risk	and	managing	risk.	Those	in	the	
assessment	sphere	(cluster	A)	relate	to	the	collection	
and	 development	 of	 knowledge,	 understanding	 and	
evaluation	of	risks.	Those	in	the	management	sphere	
(cluster	 B)	 concern	 the	 acceptance	 of	 responsibility	
and	the	taking	of	action	in	order	to	reduce,	mitigate	or	
avoid	the	risk.	Each	deficit	is	illustrated	by	examples	
from	the	risk	governance	of	past	or	current	risk	issues	
–	 for	 example,	 the	 outbreak	 of	 “mad	 cow	 disease”,	
Bovine	 Spongiform	 Encephalopathy	 (BSE),	 in	 the	
United	 Kingdom	 (UK),	 Hurricane	 Katrina,	 fisheries	
depletion	 or	 genetically	 modified	 crops	 in	 Europe	
–in	order	 to	demonstrate	 the	severity	and	variety	of	
material	and	immaterial	impacts	they	can	have.
Cluster A: Assessing and understanding risks
Risk	 governance	 deficits	 can	 occur	 during	 risk	
assessment.	 Such	 deficits	 arise	 when	 there	 is	
a	 deficiency	 of	 either	 scientific	 knowledge	 or	 of	
knowledge	about	the	values,	interests	and	perceptions	
of	individuals	and	societies.	They	can	also	be	caused	
by	 problems	 within	 the	 processes	 by	 which	 data	 is	
collected,	analysed	and	communicated	as	knowledge,	
or	 result	 from	 the	complexity	and	 interdependencies	
within	the	system	at	risk.	Complexity,	uncertainty	and	
ambiguity	are	thus	key	challenges	for	risk	assessment	
and	underlie	all	of	the	deficits	in	cluster	A.	
IRGC	has	identified	10	deficits	in	risk	assessment.
Summary
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The	first	few	deficits	address	difficulties	involving	the	
gathering	 and	 interpreting	 of	 knowledge	 about	 risks	
and	perceptions	of	risks:	
•	 (A1)	 the	 failure	 to	 detect	 early	 warnings	 of	 risk	
because	 of	 erroneous	 signals,	 misinterpretation	
of	 information	 or	 simply	 not	 enough	 information	
being	gathered;	
•	 (A2)	 the	 lack	 of	 adequate	 factual	 knowledge	 for	
robust	risk	assessment	because	of	existing	gaps	
in	scientific	knowledge	or	 failure	 to	either	source	
existing	 information	 or	 appreciate	 its	 associated	
uncertainty;	and	
•	 (A3)	 the	 omission	 of	 knowledge	 related	 to	
stakeholder	risk	perceptions	and	concerns.	
The	following	three	deficits	have	to	do	with	disputed,	or	
potentially	biased	or	subjective,	knowledge,	and	have	
the	effect	of	making	it	difficult	to	judge	whether	a	risk	
needs	specific	attention	or	action.	They	comprise:	
•	 (A4)	the	failure	to	consult	the	relevant	stakeholders,	
as	their	 involvement	can	improve	the	information	
input	 and	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 risk	 assessment	
process	 (provided	 that	 interests	 and	 bias	 are	
carefully	managed);	
•	 (A5)	the	failure	to	properly	evaluate	a	risk	as	being	
acceptable	or	unacceptable	to	society;	and	
•	 (A6)	 the	 misrepresentation	 of	 information	 about	
risk,	 whereby	 biased,	 selective	 or	 incomplete	
knowledge	 is	 used	 during,	 or	 communicated	
after,	 risk	 assessment,	 either	 intentionally	 or	
unintentionally.
A	further	three	deficits	focus	on	knowledge	related	to	
systems	and	their	complexity:	
•	 (A7)	a	failure	to	understand	how	the	components	
of	a	complex	system	 interact	or	how	 the	system	
behaves	as	a	whole,	thus	a	failure	to	assess	the	
multiple	 dimensions	 of	 a	 risk	 and	 its	 potential	
consequences;	
•	 (A8)	 a	 failure	 to	 recognise	 fast	 or	 fundamental	
changes	to	a	system,	which	can	cause	new	risks	
to	emerge	or	old	ones	to	change;	and	
•	 (A9)	the	inappropriate	use	of	formal	models	as	a	
way	 to	 create	 and	 understand	 knowledge	 about	
complex	 systems	 (over-	 and	 under-reliance	 on	
models	can	be	equally	problematic).
The	final	deficit	in	cluster	A	addresses	how	knowledge	
and	understanding	are	never	complete	or	adequate.	At	
the	core	of	this	deficit	(A10)	is	the	acknowledgement	
that	 understanding	 and	 assessing	 risks	 is	 not	 a	
neat,	 controllable	 process	 that	 can	 be	 successfully	
completed	by	following	a	checklist.	Rather,	this	deficit	
is	about	assessing	potential	surprises.	It	occurs	when	
risk	 assessors	 or	 decision-makers	 fail	 to	 overcome	
cognitive	 barriers	 to	 imagining	 that	 events	 outside	
expected	paradigms	are	possible.	
Cluster B: Managing risks
Risk	 governance	 deficits	 can	 also	 occur	 during	 risk	
management.	These	deficits	concern	responsibilities	
and	 actions	 for	 actually	managing	 the	 risk	 and	 can	
be	sub-grouped	as	relating	to:	a)	the	preparation	and	
decision	process	for	risk	management	strategies	and	
policies;	b)	formulating	responses	and	taking	actions;	
and	c)	the	organisational	capacities	for	implementing	
risk	 management	 decisions	 and	 monitoring	 their	
impacts.
Those	deficits	related	to	the	preparation	and	decision	
process	for	risk	management	strategies	and	policies	
derive	from	failures	or	deficiencies	on	the	part	of	risk	
decision-makers	to	set	goals	and	thoroughly	evaluate	
the	available	options	and	their	potential	consequences.	
They	are:	
•	 (B2)	a	failure	to	design	effective	risk	management	
strategies.	Such	failure	may	result	from	objectives,	
tools	or	 implementation	plans	being	 ill-defined	or	
absent;	
•	 (B3)	a	failure	to	consider	all	reasonable,	available	
options	before	deciding	how	to	proceed;	
•	 (B4)	not	conducting	appropriate	analyses	to	assess	
the	 costs	 and	 benefits	 (efficiency)	 of	 various	
options	and	how	these	are	distributed	(equity);	
•	 (B6)	 a	 failure	 to	 anticipate	 the	 consequences,	
particularly	 negative	 side	 effects,	 of	 a	 risk	
management	decision,	and	to	adequately	monitor	
and	react	to	the	outcomes;	
•	 (B7)	an	inability	to	reconcile	the	time-frame	of	the	
risk	issue	(which	may	have	far-off	consequences	
and	 require	 a	 long-term	 perspective)	 with	
decision-making	pressures	and	incentives	(which	
may	 prioritise	 visible,	 short-term	 results	 or	 cost	
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reductions);	and,	lastly,
•	 (B8)	a	failure	to	adequately	balance	transparency	
and	 confidentiality	 during	 the	 decision-making	
process,	 which	 can	 have	 implications	 for	
stakeholder	trust	or	for	security.	
Each	of	 these	deficits	has	 the	capacity	 to	derail	 the	
risk	management	process	–	even	if	other	deficits	are	
avoided.	 For	 example,	 no	 matter	 how	 successfully	
an	 organisation	 coordinates	 its	 resources	 to	 quickly	
implement	 a	 strategy	 or	 enforce	 a	 regulation,	 the	
results	 will	 be	 inadequate	 if	 the	 original	 strategy	 or	
regulation	was	flawed	from	the	beginning.	
The	 deficits	 which	 relate	 to	 formulating	 responses,	
resolving	conflicts	and	deciding	to	act	derive	from	an	
inability	on	the	part	of	the	risk	manager	to	identify	the	
most	appropriate	response	given	the	context	or	even	
to	properly	understand	 the	context	of	 the	 risk	 issue,	
which	 inevitably	 must	 guide	 the	 response.	 These	
deficits	are:	
•	 (B1)	 a	 failure	 to	 respond	 adequately	 to	 early	
warnings	of	risk,	which	could	mean	either	under-	
or	over-reacting	to	warnings;	
•	 (B11)	a	failure	to	deal	with	the	complex	nature	of	
commons	problems,	 resulting	 in	 inappropriate	or	
inadequate	decisions	to	mitigate	commons-related	
risks	(e.g.,	risks	to	the	atmosphere	or	oceans);	
•	 (B12)	a	failure	to	resolve	conflicts	where	different	
pathways	 to	 resolution	 may	 be	 required	 in	
consideration	of	 the	nature	of	 the	conflict	and	of	
different	stakeholder	interests	and	values;	and	
•	 (B13)	insufficient	flexibility	or	capacity	to	respond	
adequately	 to	 unexpected	 events	 because	 of	
bad	 planning,	 inflexible	 mindsets	 and	 response	
structures,	 or	 an	 inability	 to	 think	 creatively	 and	
innovate	when	necessary.
Finally,	there	are	the	deficits	related	to	organisational	
capacities	for	responding	or	monitoring.	These	occur	
because	 of	 shortcomings	 in	 terms	 of	 resources,	
willpower	or	coordination:	
•	 (B5)	 a	 failure	 to	 implement	 risk	 management	
strategies	or	policies	and	to	enforce	them;	
•	 (B9)	 a	 lack	 of	 adequate	 organisational	 capacity	
(assets,	 skills	 and	 capabilities)	 and/or	 of	 a	
suitable	 culture	 (one	 that	 recognises	 the	 value	
of	 risk	 management)	 for	 ensuring	 managerial	
effectiveness	when	dealing	with	risks;	and,	finally,	
•	 (B10)	 a	 failure	 of	 the	 multiple	 departments	 or	
organisations	responsible	for	a	risk’s	management	
to	act	individually	but	cohesively,	or	of	one	entity	to	
deal	with	several	risks.
Risk governance deficits: a real-world example
The	 emergence	 of	 BSE	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 early	
handling	of	the	epidemic	in	British	cattle	was	certainly	
an	example	of	inadequate	risk	governance.	This	case	
is	used	in	the	report	to	illustrate	several	of	the	above	
deficits	 from	both	 the	assessment	and	management	
clusters.
BSE	is	a	neurodegenerative	disease	affecting	cattle,	
transmissible	to	humans	via	consumption	of	infected	
beef.	As	a	novel	disease	in	1986,	it	gave	no	obvious	
early	 warning	 signals	 of	 its	 emergence;	 cattle	 were	
sick,	 but	 there	 was	 no	 clear	 cause.	 Additionally,	
risk	 assessors	 did	 not	 possess	 adequate	 scientific	
knowledge	 of	 its	 epidemiology	 or	 pathology	 to	
confidently	evaluate	what	sort	of	risk	it	posed	to	animal	
or	human	health	(A2).	Expert	groups	convened	to	study	
the	disease	and	to	advise	on	whether	BSE	could	have	
implications	for	human	health	could	only	conclude	that	
negative	 implications	 were	 “unlikely”.	 However,	 the	
uncertainty	associated	with	 the	available	 knowledge	
meant	that	public	health	risks	could	not	be	ruled	out.	
Nevertheless,	authorities	did	not	take	into	account	this	
uncertainty	 and	 repeatedly	 assured	 the	 public	 that	
British	beef	was	safe	to	eat.	Even	as	evidence	of	BSE’s	
transmissibility	 to	 other	 species	 (such	 as	 cats	 and	
pigs)	began	to	mount,	authorities	gave	the	public	the	
impression	that	BSE	was	not	transmissible	to	humans.	
The	 importance	 and	 implications	 of	 precautionary	
public	health	measures	taken	by	the	government	were	
also	downplayed	in	the	public	domain.	These	actions	
constituted	a	misrepresentation	of	 information	about	
the	true	risks	of	BSE	(A6)	and	contributed	to	what	was,	
on	the	whole,	a	serious	failure	in	risk	communication.	
The	government’s	efforts	 to	 reassure	 the	public	 that	
there	was	no	risk	from	BSE	actually	ended	up	creating	
more	risk	and	contributing	to	the	scale	of	the	negative	
economic	and	social	consequences.	
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With	regard	to	the	precautionary	regulations	that	were	
eventually	put	in	place,	here	the	dominant	deficit	was	
the	failure	to	implement	and	enforce	risk	management	
measures	(B5).	Two	of	the	most	important	regulations	
introduced	 during	 the	 BSE	 epidemic	 –	 the	 ban	 on	
feeding	ruminant	animals	meat	and	bone	meal	made	
from	animal	carcasses,	and	the	ban	on	incorporating	
specified	bovine	offal	(SBO)	into	human	food	–	were	
neither	implemented	nor	enforced	as	effectively	as	they	
could	have	been.	Concern	for	the	economic	health	of	
industry	led	to	a	five	week	delay	in	the	implementation	
of	the	ruminant	feed	ban	and	to	very	lax	enforcement	
of	the	SBO	ban.
Dispersed	 responsibilities	 (B10)	 also	 caused	 a	
number	 of	 problems	 throughout	 the	 handling	 of	 the	
crisis.	 Communication	 and	 collaboration	 were	 slow	
or	 non-existent	 between	 the	 Department	 of	 Health	
(responsible	 for	 public	 health)	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture,	Fisheries	and	Foods	(MAFF,	responsible	
for	 animal	 health	 and	agricultural	 interests).	 Internal	
divisions	 and	 contradictions	 within	 MAFF	 further	
complicated	matters.
Overall,	 dealing	 with	 BSE	 and	 its	 consequences	
is	 estimated	 to	 have	 cost	 the	 UK	 government	 £4.4	
billion	by	2001	and	(to	September	2009)	165	people	
had	died	from	the	human	form	of	the	disease,	Variant	
Creutzfeldt-Jakob	Disease	(vCJD).
BSE	 and	 the	 other	 illustrations	 used	 in	 this	 report	
demonstrate	the	impact	of	risk	governance	deficits	on	
past	risk	issues.	They	also	show	how	the	underlying	
concept	 of	 deficits	 reflects	 the	 interactive	 process	
between	 risk	assessment	and	management,	as	well	
as	 that	 between	 risk	 generators	 and	 those	 affected	
by	it.
Overall,	 this	 report	 can	 be	 used	 by	 organisations	
as	a	checklist	 to,	 first,	evaluate	 the	 risk	governance	
processes	of	which	they	are	a	part	and,	then,	prioritise	
those	which	are	most	in	need	of	improvement.
IRGC	will	 provide	 further	guidance	on	acting	on	 the	
concepts	described	in	this	report	in	a	policy	brief	to	be	
published	in	late	2009.	
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Risk	 governance	 deficits	 are	 deficiencies	 or	 failures	
in	 the	 identification,	 assessment,	 management	 or	
communication	 of	 risks,	 which	 constrain	 the	 overall	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 risk	 governance	 process.	
Understanding	 how	 deficits	 arise,	 what	 their	
consequences	can	be	and	how	their	potential	negative	
impact	can	be	minimised	is	a	useful	starting	point	for	
dealing	 with	 emerging	 risks	 as	 well	 as	 for	 revising	
approaches	to	more	familiar,	persistent	risks.		
The	aim	of	 this	document	 is	 to	provide	guidance	on	
identifying	 risk	 governance	 deficits	 and	 to	 improve	
understanding	 of	 the	 causes	 of	 failures	 in	 risk	
governance	processes	as	 they	occurred	 in	 the	past,	
occur	 now	 and	 will	 probably	 recur	 in	 the	 future	 if	
institutions	 and	 processes	 are	 unaware	 of	 these	
problems	or	do	not	develop	appropriate	strategies	to	
avoid	 them.	 It	also	aims	 to	 improve	 the	skills	of	 risk	
managers	 in	 judging	 which	 deficits	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
relevant	to	particular	circumstances	and	in	recognising	
which	 deficits	 can	 be	 eliminated	 or	 mitigated.	 The	
audience	 for	 the	 report	 includes	 policymakers,	
regulators,	industry,	scientists	and	non-governmental	
organisations	 (NGOs):	 in	short,	all	 those	 involved	 in	
assessing	and	managing	risk.
The	 potential	 consequences	 of	 risk	 governance	
deficits	 can	 include,	 for	 example,	 lost	 opportunities	
and	 unrealised	 benefits,	 diminution	 of	 technological	
innovation	and	diffusion,	and	the	loss	of	public	trust.	
Many	 consequences	of	 deficits	may	not	 be	 clear	 or	
quantifiable	at	 the	 time	of	 their	occurrence,	but	 they	
can	 nonetheless	 be	 severe.	 One	 result	 of	 the	 BSE	
crisis	is	that	it	has	taken	years	for	the	UK	government	
to	rebuild	public	confidence	in	the	UK	and	around	the	
world	 in	 the	British	 food	supply.	Another	example	 is	
asbestos,	which	was	recognised	as	harmful	to	health	
as	early	as	1898,	but	 the	 regulation	of	which	 is	 still	
incomplete	 (or	 non-existent)	 in	 some	 countries.	 It	 is	
estimated	that	in	the	European	Union	(EU)	alone,	the	
total	 disease	 burden	 of	 asbestos	 could	 be	 between	
250,000	and	400,000	deaths	over	the	next	30	years	
[Gee	and	Greenberg,	2002].	
There	are	many	existing	and	emerging	risks	of	natural	
or	 human	 origin,	 including	 natural	 catastrophes,	
pandemics/epidemics,	risks	arising	from	lack	of	clean	
water,	 climate	 change,	 pollution,	 biodiversity	 loss,	
poverty,	 drug	 abuse,	 obesity,	 violence,	 geo-political	
risks,	 technology-based	 risks,	 infrastructure	 risks	 or	
financial	risks.	Together	they	harm	millions	of	people	
every	 year,	 but	 some	 are	 more	 widespread	 and	
serious	than	others.	It	would	be	unrealistic	to	believe	
that	all	risks	can	be	anticipated	or	managed,	but	many	
gaps	in	their	governance	could	be	remedied.
When	 risks	 derive	 (at	 least	 in	 part)	 from	 the	
interconnectedness	of	the	modern	world,	challenging	
key	functions	of	society,	we	refer	to	them	as	systemic	
risks.	The	term	systemic	risk	is	more	familiarly	used	to	
describe	financial	risks	which	affect	an	entire	market	
rather	 than	a	 few	 individual	participants.	 In	 line	with	
the	definition	given	by	the	Organisation	for	Economic	
Cooperation	and	Development	(OECD)	[OECD,	2003],	
IRGC	has	defined	systemic	risks	as:	“Those	risks	that	
affect	the	systems	on	which	society	depends	–	health,	
transport,	energy,	telecommunications,	etc.	Systemic	
risks	 are	 at	 the	 crossroads	between	natural	 events;	
economic,	 social	 and	 technological	 developments;	
and	 policy-driven	 actions,	 both	 at	 the	 domestic	 and	
international	level”	[IRGC,	2005].	The	rapid	spread	of	
Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome	(SARS)	to	many	
countries,	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 trade,	 tourism	 and	 the	
economy	as	well	as	on	public	health,	is	one	example	
of	 a	 systemic	 risk;	 others	 include	 the	 cascading	
failures	 of	 interconnected	 electricity	 grids	 and	 how	
climate	change	will	affect,	in	various	ways,	almost	all	
of	the	world’s	populations	and	ecosystems.	Systemic	
risks	typically	have	impacts	beyond	their	geographic	
and	sector	origins	and	may	affect	 the	systems	–	 for	
instance,	financial	or	ecological	–	on	which	the	welfare	
of	 the	 planet	 depends.	 IRGC	 focusses	 on	 systemic	
risks	 because	 they	 may	 be	 quite	 intractable	 and	
devastating	yet	require	cooperation	among	countries	
–	or	even	a	formal	process	of	global	collective	action	
–	to	be	effectively	addressed.
Risk	 governance	 deficits	 operate	 at	 various	 stages	
of	 the	governance	process,	 from	 the	early	warnings	
of	possible	 risk	 to	 the	 formal	stages	of	assessment,	
I Introduction
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management	 and	 communication.	 Both	 under-
estimation	 and	 over-estimation	 can	 be	 observed	 in	
risk	assessment,	which	may	lead	to	under-reaction or	
over-reaction	 in	 risk	management.	 Even	when	 risks	
are	 assessed	 in	 an	 adequate	 manner,	 managers	
may	 under-	 or	 over-react	 and,	 in	 situations	 of	 high	
uncertainty,	this	may	become	clear	only	after	the	fact.	
Human	 factors	 influence	 risk	 governance	 deficits	
through	 an	 individual’s	 values	 (including	 appetite	
for	 risk),	 personal	 interests	 and	 beliefs,	 intellectual	
capabilities,	 the	 prevailing	 regulations	 or	 incentives,	
but	 also	 sometimes	 through	 irrational	 or	 ill-informed	
behaviour.	The	report	illustrates	the	impact	of	human	
factors	on	 risk	governance,	 for	example	 in	 the	case	
of	 fraud	 (Enron),	or	 the	adoption	by	well-intentioned	
regulators	of	an	over-zealous	or	apathetic	approach	
to	new	risks.	
For	 each	 risk	 governance	 deficit,	 this	 report	 first	
provides	 a	 brief	 generic	 description,	 giving	 short	
explanations	 of	 some	 of	 the	 conceptual	 challenges	
facing	risk	managers.	The	sequence	of	deficits	does	
not	imply	an	order	of	priority.	Each	deficit	description	is	
followed	by	one	or	more	examples	of	how	the	deficit	has	
occurred	during	the	handling	of	past	and	current	risk	
issues	and	what	the	consequences	have	been	on	the	
organisations	involved.	As	will	be	seen,	diagnoses	of	
the	causes	of	deficits	and	their	resulting	consequences	
are	not	always	straightforward,	even	with	the	benefit	
of	 years	 of	 hindsight.	 Thus,	 we	 have	 focused	 on	
illustrations	of	deficits	where	some	consensus	exists	
or	where	it	is	feasible	to	describe	a	range	of	opinions	
about	their	causes	and	consequences.
In	addition,	case	studies	have	been	written	to	reflect	
as	much	of	a	consensus	as	possible,	although	there	
will	always	be	a	subjective	element	to	such	analyses.	
The	case	studies	are:
•	 The	 regulation	 of	 genetically	 modified	 crops	 in	
Europe
•	 The	response	to	Hurricane	Katrina
•	 Electromagnetic	fields	and	radiation
•	 Fisheries	management	and	depletion	
•	 The	BSE	epidemic	in	the	UK
The	 full	 text	 of	 these	 case	 studies	 can	 be	 obtained	
from	IRGC.	Summaries,	plus	a	brief	overview	of	 the	
subprime	crisis	in	the	United	States	(US),	have	been	
added	in	an	annex	to	this	report.	
In	 considering	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 most	 frequently	
occurring	 risk	 governance	 deficits,	 this	 report	
is	 organised	 into	 two	 clusters	 related	 to	 (A)	 the	
assessment and understanding of risks	 (including	
early	 warning	 systems),	 and	 (B)	 the	 management 
of risks (including	 issues	 of	 conflict	 resolution).	
Deficiencies	 or	 failures	 in	 communication	 related	 to	
risk	assessment	and	management,	including	how	the	
dialogue	with	stakeholders	is	organised,	are	relevant	
to	multiple	deficits	in	both	clusters.	Therefore,	in	this	
report	 risk	communication	 issues	are	 integrated	 into	
many	of	the	deficit	descriptions	rather	than	addressed	
separately.	This	integrative	role	of	risk	communication	
is	 also	 emphasised	 in	 the	 IRGC	 Risk	 Governance	
Framework	 in	a	way	 that	distinguishes	 it	 from	many	
conventional	 concepts	 in	 which	 risk	 communication	
is	 either	 a	 separate	 category	 or	 only	 a	 part	 of	 risk	
management.
• Cluster A describes	10	deficits	that	can	arise	when	
there	is	a	deficiency	of	either	scientific	knowledge	
or	 knowledge	 about	 the	 values,	 interests	 and	
perceptions	of	individuals	and	organisations.	
• Cluster B describes	13	deficits	related	to	the	role	
of	 organisations	 and	 people	 in	 managing	 risks,	
showing	 the	 need	 for	 adequate	 risk	 cultures,	
structures	and	processes.
This	 report	 can	 serve	 as	 guidance	 for	 policymakers	
and	 practitioners	 in	 the	 public,	 private	 and	 non-
governmental	sectors	concerned	with	fair	and	efficient	
risk	 governance	 and	 interested	 in	 avoiding	 risk	
governance	deficits	and	their	impacts.	The	guidance	is	
therefore	intended	to	promote	thinking	about	whether	
an	organisation	has	 the	 right	procedures	 in	place	 to	
deal	with	risks	as	they	are	recognised,	even	risks	that	
are	 only	 vaguely	 known	 or	 the	 full	 ramifications	 of	
which	are	not	yet	understood.
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Accurate	knowledge	and	understanding	are	essential	
for	effective	risk	governance.	Knowledge	is	needed	to	
reduce	complexity	and	uncertainty	and	to	understand	
ambiguity.	 It	 is	needed	 to	clarify	 the	often	confusing	
interactions	between	multiple	sources	of	harm,	what	
causes	 them	 to	 become	 risks,	 and	 their	 potential	
physical,	 social	 and	 economic	 consequences.	
Knowledge	 can	 also	 help	 to	 quantify	 the	 levels	 of	
risk	 to	 be	 experienced	 by	 different	 individuals	 and	
communities.	
Understanding	 is	 equally	 important.	 If	 knowledge	
exists	 but	 is	 not	 understood	 by	 decision-makers,	
stakeholders	and	the	public,	risk	governance	becomes	
highly	vulnerable	to	error	and	unpredictability.		
Two	types	of	knowledge	are	relevant	here:
1. Scientific knowledge	about	the	physical	properties	
of	 a	 risk,	 such	 as:	 hazards,	 exposure	 and	
vulnerabilities;	the	probability	of	the	risk	occurring;	
and,	the	potential	impacts	and	consequences	if	it	
does;	and	
2. Knowledge of risk perceptions	 and	 their	
underlying	 determinants	 and	 consequences,	
such	 as:	 stakeholders’	 interests	 and	 values;	
recent	coverage	of	risk	in	the	mass	media;	and,	
the	social,	economic	and	political	consequences	
of	 conflict	 between	 experts’,	 decision-makers’	
and	lay-peoples’	perceptions	of	risk.
Disagreement	 in	 risk	 governance	 may	 arise	 from	
“conflicting	values	as	well	as	conflicting	evidence,	and,	
in	particular,	from	the	inadequate	blending	of	the	two”	
[IRGC,	2005].	Risk	governance	deficits	thus	emerge	
when	the	knowledge	base	 is	deficient	or	 inadequate	
as	the	result	of:
•	 A	 lack	 of	 scientific	 evidence	 about	 the	 risk	
itself,	 or	 of	 the	 perceptions	 that	 individuals	 and	
organisations	have	of	the	risk;
•	 Application	 of	 inappropriate	methods,	models	 or	
scenarios	to	derive	this	evidence;
•	 Failure	to	understand	or	take	account	of	available	
knowledge;	and/or
•	 Misuse	 of	 available	 knowledge,	 intentionally	 or	
unintentionally.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 there	 will	 never	
be	 sufficient	 capacity	 to	 assess	 all	 the	 information	
relevant	 to	 a	 systemic	 risk.	 Thus	 a	 crucial	 skill	 of	
the	 risk	 assessor,	 and	 responsible	 managers,	 is	
deciding	what	 information	 can	 be	 ignored	 and	what	
simplifications	can	be	made.	For	 risks	of	a	systemic	
nature,	a	holistic	approach	to	risk	assessment	would	
be	 ideal,	 encompassing	 the	 full	 scope	 and	 scale	 of	
the	risk,	but	this	is	not	practicable.	Conclusions	need	
to	be	drawn	 from	analyses	with	more	 limited	scope.	
Furthermore,	 the	 key	 information	 may	 undermine	
particular	 interests,	 intentions	or	plans,	or	contradict	
deeply-held	 ideological	or	moral	values	 [Tetlock	and	
Oppenheimer,	2008].	Decision-makers	may	prioritise	
information	based	on	expediency	or	 other	 personal,	
economic	or	political	considerations.	
In	 dealing	 with	 these	 challenges,	 IRGC’s	 approach	
to	 risk	 governance	 highlights	 the	 related	 knowledge	
requirements.	IRGC	applies	the	term	complex	to	risks	
for	which	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 identify	and	quantify	causal	
interactions	 among	many	 potential	 agents	 and	 thus	
to	 determine	 specific	outcomes.	Complexity	 is	 often	
inherent	in	natural	and	man-made	phenomena	and	is	
not	 just	 a	 deficit	 of	 understanding	 or	measurement.	
The	 term	 uncertainty	 is	 used	 by	 IRGC	 to	 refer	 to	
a	 state	 of	 knowledge	 in	 which	 the	 likelihood	 of	
any	 adverse	 effect,	 or	 indeed	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
effects	 themselves,	 cannot	 be	 precisely	 described.	
Ambiguity	occurs	when	 there	are	several	alternative	
interpretations	 of	 risk	 assessment	 information.	 For	
simple	risks	(e.g.,	the	risk	of	fire	in	a	residential	home),	
a	promising	regulatory	action	may	be	straightforward	
(e.g.,	 required	 installation	 of	 smoke	 detectors	 and	
sprinklers).	However,	for	the	complex, uncertain	and/
or	ambiguous	 risks	described	here,	 risk	assessment	
is	 considerably	more	 demanding	 and	 the	 scope	 for	
deficits	is	correspondingly	greater.
Complexity,	uncertainty	and	ambiguity	are	prevalent	in	
our	interconnected	and	fast-changing	world.	Innovation	
and	 globalisation	 in	 information	 and	 communication	
II Cluster A: Assessing and understanding risks
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technologies	 have	 created	 more	 interdependencies	
between	regions	of	the	planet.	No	sector	of	society	–	
economic,	 environmental,	 technological,	 religious	 or	
socio-political	–	is	isolated	from	this	interdependence.	
Complexity,	uncertainty	and	ambiguity	make	precise	
risk	 assessment	 more	 challenging	 and	 demand	
both	 analytical	 and	 organisational	 innovation	 from	
participants	in	risk	governance.
These	problems	apply	 in	both	the	public	and	private	
sectors.	 While	 governments	 have	 the	 primary	
responsibility	for	the	security	and	safety	of	their	citizens,	
there	are	many	risks	where	the	private	sector	has	to	
take	responsibility	(e.g.,	product	safety).	Furthermore,	
many	 systemic	 risks	 can	 be	 successfully	 assessed	
only	by	including	a	combination	of	perspectives	from	
public	 and	private	actors.	Some	examples	might	 be	
the	security	of	the	energy	supply	(with	many	countries	
now	having	 privatised	 the	 supply	 and	distribution	 of	
gas	and	electricity,	while	energy	policy	remains	in	the	
hands	of	the	government)	or	assessing	the	potential	
impact	 of	 a	 pandemic	 disease	 outbreak	 (for	 which	
governments	will	assume	responsibility	through	public	
health	plans,	while	business	will	deal,	for	example,	with	
aspects	such	as	business	continuity	or	the	production	
of	vaccines	–	see	cluster	B).
This	 cluster	 describes	 deficits	 in	 risk	 governance	
relating	 to	 the	 research,	 analysis,	 interpretation	 and	
communication	 of	 knowledge	 about	 systemic	 risks.	
Each	deficit	is	accompanied	by	real-world	illustrations	
of	 how	 the	 deficit	 has	 affected	 past	 or	 current	 risk	
governance	activities.
A1 Early warning systems
Missing, ignoring or exaggerating early 
signals of risk 
The	 basic	 problem	 is	 simple:	 how	 do	 we	 look	 for	
something	 that	 we	 do	 not	 yet	 know	 about	 or	 fully	
understand?	Early	warning	systems	as	a	 foundation	
of	 risk	 governance	 may	 be	 formal	 (as	 in	 the	 radar	
systems	used	 to	 detect	 Luftwaffe	missions	 in	World	
War	 II)	 or	 informal	 (as	 in	 the	 discovery	 by	 Turkish	
haematologists	 that	shoemakers	who	used	benzene	
as	 a	 solvent	 for	 adhesives	 contracted	 aplastic	
anaemia	and	other	blood	abnormalities).	When	early	
warning	 systems	 are	 perfect,	 they	 prevent	 serious	
harm	without	causing	any	false	alarms.
A	 signal	 from	 the	 warning	 system	may	 be	 weak	 or	
strong.	It	typically	exists	long	before	a	risk	comes	to	the	
attention	of	decision-makers	or	the	public,	especially	
in	cases	of	very	slow	changes	within	a	system.	The	
warning	 system	 accumulates	 information	 until	 a	
determination	 is	made	 (based	on	human	 judgement	
and/or	a	computer	algorithm)	as	to	whether	something	
is	 significant	 enough	 to	 trigger	 further	 action	 (e.g.,	
develop	risk	scenarios	and	risk	mitigation	strategies).	
The	warning	system	may	itself	be	considered	a	form	
of	risk	assessment,	or	the	system	may	produce	data	
that	are	subsequently	used	by	risk	assessors	in	more	
in-depth	analyses.
False	 negatives	 (no	 indication	 of	 a	 risk	 when	 one	
is	 actually	 present)	 and	 false	 positives	 (erroneous	
signals	indicating	something	is	present	when	it	is	not)	
in	 early	 warning	 systems	 are	 unfortunate	 realities.	
When	a	system	is	too	insensitive,	it	fails	to	detect	an	
emerging	 risk	 (e.g.,	 the	signal-to-noise	 ratio	may	be	
too	small,	causing	the	system	to	miss	the	worrisome	
evidence).	False	negatives	are	harmful	because	they	
allow	 an	 emerging	 risk	 to	 unfold	 without	 in-depth	
risk	 assessment	 or	 preventive	 action	 being	 taken	
by	decision-makers	before	any	damage	occurs.	For	
example,	if	a	new	technology	increases	the	risk	of	a	
common	 disease,	 clinicians	 may	 not	 recognise	 the	
early	cases	among	their	patients,	and	epidemiologists	
may	have	difficulty	detecting	 the	statistical	elevation	
among	the	large	number	of	cases	of	the	disease.		
False	 positives	 can	 also	 be	 a	 serious	 problem	 if	
decision-makers	expend	resources	needlessly,	leaving	
fewer	 resources	 available	 to	 address	 genuine	 risks.	
False	positives	–	especially	 if	 they	occur	 repeatedly	
–	can	also	create	a	potential	crisis	of	confidence	(or	
mistrust)	 that	 can	 lead	 to	 future	 accurate	 warnings	
being	discounted	or	ignored	(“cry	wolf”	syndrome).		
History	teaches	us	that	false	alarms	are	costly	in	both	
human	and	economic	terms.	A	series	of	false	alarms	
helped	 create	 a	 climate	 of	 complacency	 at	 Pearl	
Harbour	prior	to	the	Japanese	attack	at	the	onset	of	
World	 War	 II’s	 Pacific	 engagement.	 More	 recently,	
concerns	have	been	raised	that	over-reliance	on	high-
dose	 animal	 experiments	may	 have	 produced	 false	
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positives	 in	 chemical	 regulation.	 For	 example,	 the	
artificial	 sweetener	 saccharin	 was	 shown	 to	 cause	
bladder	tumours	when	huge	doses	were	administered	
to	 rodents	 in	 the	 laboratory	 and	 the	 United	 States	
Food	 and	Drug	Administration	 (FDA)	 sought	 to	 ban	
the	sweetener.	Further	scientific	evidence	from	biology	
and	 large-scale	epidemiology	demonstrated	 that	 the	
high-dose	rodent	tests	on	saccharin	were	not	relevant	
to	human	experience.
Advances	in	science	and	technology	are	both	helpful	
and	 problematic.	 Creative	 innovations	 in	 warning	
systems	may	cause	a	 reduction	 in	 the	 rates	of	both	
types	of	error.	However,	advances	in	warning	systems	
may	also	permit	the	detection	of	minute	perturbations	
that	are	not	indicators	of	real	risk.	For	example,	new	
blood	monitoring	systems	have	detected	a	surprising	
number	of	man-made	chemicals	 in	 the	human	body	
but	 it	 is	not	yet	clear	whether	 the	presence	of	 these	
chemicals	in	small	quantities	is	an	indicator	of	potential	
harm.	
Human	 judgement	 in	 the	 design	 of	 early	 warning	
systems	 and	 the	 subjective	 interpretation	 of	 their	
results	 are	 unavoidable.	 Therefore,	 expert	 groups	
involved	in	making	such	judgements	should	ideally	be	
composed	of	 individuals	with	varied	experience	and	
educational	and	cultural	backgrounds.	Those	involved	
with	 warning	 systems,	 whether	 engaged	 in	 horizon	
scanning	 for	 governments	 or	 risk	 management	 in	
business,	need	to	be	both	rigorous	and	open-minded	
as	to	the	interpretation	of	signals,	which	means	being	
attentive	 to	 low-level	 or	 subtle	 signals	without	 over-
reacting	to	random	noise	in	data.	
The subprime crisis in the United States
- The risks of home foreclosures were spread to investors throughout the world without transparency about what those 
risks actually were, while the few experts expressing concern were ignored.
The	subprime	crisis	that	began	in	2007	originated	in	the	US,	had	major	adverse	impacts	
on	the	international	financial	system	and	rapidly	grew	into	a	global	economic	crisis.	Some	
banks	and	other	 important	financial	 institutions	 failed,	others	made	 large	write-offs	and	
write-downs,	and	commodity	and	stock	markets	fell	sharply	as	investors	lost	confidence;	
the	global	credit	market	froze.	In	turn,	many	of	the	world’s	economies	went	into	recession	
and	millions	of	people	lost	their	jobs.
It	appears	that	numerous	factors	contributed	to	the	housing	bubble	and	financial	meltdown:	 the	 loose	monetary	
policy	(as	the	US	Federal	Reserve	Board	exerted	a	downward	influence	on	interest	rates)	encouraged	lending	by	
banks;	political	pressure	on	lenders	increased	rates	of	home	ownership	among	lower-income	households,	especially	
in	Hispanic	and	African-American	communities;	the	sale	of	“subprime	mortgages”	to	people	whose	income,	assets	
and	 credit	 history	were	 insufficient	 to	meet	 standard	 (“prime”)	 qualification	 thresholds;	 the	 creation	and	 sale	 to	
investors	 of	 increasingly	 complex	 financial	 products	 (securities)	 linked	 to	 these	 subprime	mortgages,	 products	
with	risks	that	were	not	 transparent	 in	financial	markets;	a	herd	mentality	of	participants	 in	the	financial	market;	
and	a	lack	of	adequate	regulation	of	financial	markets.	The	system-wide	risks	arising	from	these	factors	were	not	
predicted	by	the	standard	risk	models	used	by	financial	analysts	on	Wall	Street	and	around	the	world.		
Although	few,	if	any,	experts	anticipated	(or	were	even	able	to	imagine)	a	crisis	of	this	magnitude,	there	were,	with	
the	benefit	of	hindsight,	some	early	warning	signs	that	the	risk	models	were	too	simplistic	and	that	the	market	was	
deeply	unsound.	 In	 fact,	 some	concerns	were	voiced	by	prominent	economists,	financial	experts	and	 reporters	
long	before	the	crisis	occurred.	For	example,	as	early	as	2000,	the	former	Federal	Reserve	governor,	Dr	Edward	
M.	Gramlich,	warned	the	then	chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Board,	Dr	Alan	Greenspan,	about	what	Gramlich	
considered	to	be	“abusive”	behaviour	in	the	subprime	mortgage	markets	[Soros,	2008].	Several	years	later,	in	August	
2003,	journalists	with	The	Economist	published	a	lengthy	article	warning	of	the	“unpredictable	and	possibly	painful	
consequences”	of	credit-risk	 transfer	 (a	driving	 force	 for	 the	sale	of	derivatives	based	on	subprime	mortgages)	
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Tsunami early warning system in South-East Asia
- Lessons learned from a past failure led to the development of a promising new early warning system.
The	 tsunami	 that	hit	South-East	Asia	on	December	26,	2004	killed	more	 than	140,000	people	 in	Banda	Aceh,	
Indonesia,	and	approximately	230,000	people	 in	total.	Despite	Indonesia’s	vulnerability	to	earthquakes	and	tidal	
waves	(because	of	its	position	on	the	Sunda	Arc,	a	subduction	zone	where	three	tectonic	plates	meet),	there	was	
no	tsunami	early	warning	system	in	place,	nor	was	there	adequate	communications	infrastructure	to	issue	timely	
warnings.	A	 tsunami	warning	 system	 for	 the	Pacific	Ocean	 had	 existed	 since	 1965.	The	 effectiveness	 of	 such	
systems	has	been	proven	[IOC,	2008]	and	the	lack	of	one	for	the	Indian	Ocean	was	a	major	contributing	factor	to	
the	many	deaths	in	this	case.
Following	the	2004	disaster,	a	framework	for	an	Indian	Ocean	tsunami	warning	system	
was	 launched	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 Educational,	 Scientific	 and	
Cultural	Organisation	(UNESCO)	and	its	Intergovernmental	Oceanographic	Commission	
in	2005	[UNESCO,	2005].	Indonesia	has	since	been	developing	and	installing	a	tsunami	
warning	 system	 in	 partnership	with	Germany	 –	 the	German-Indonesian	Tsunami	Early	
Warning	System	[GITEWS,	2008]	–	that	uses	new	scientific	procedures	and	technologies	
to		optimise		the		system		for		Indonesia’s			unique		geological			situation.		Even		though		it	
was	only	partially	operational	(the	system	was	officially	launched	on	November	11,	2008),	it	successfully	detected	
an	earthquake	of	8.4	magnitude	off	Sumatra	on	September	17,	2007,	allowing	Indonesian	authorities	to	issue	a	
tsunami	warning	15-20	minutes	before	the	wave	hit	[Helmholtz	Association	of	German	Research	Centres,	2008;	
Normile,	2007].
A2 Factual knowledge about risks 
The lack of adequate knowledge about a hazard, 
including the probabilities of various events 
and the associated economic, human health, 
environmental and societal consequences
This	deficit	arises	when	there	is	inadequate	knowledge	
about	 a	 hazard,	 about	 the	 probabilities	 of	 adverse	
events,	 about	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 people	 or	 other	
targets	are	exposed	or	about	the	extent	of	damages	
that	 may	 result.	 The	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 may	 occur	
because	of	insufficient	or	misdirected	scientific	efforts,	
or	 the	 requisite	 knowledge	 may	 be	 very	 difficult	 to	
obtain.	This	period	of	inadequate	knowledge	may	be	
temporary	or	it	may	persist	for	a	long	time.	If	adequate	
knowledge	exists	but	 is	 ignored	or	resisted,	 this	can	
lead	to	important	deficits	in	management	(see	cluster	
B).		
Lack	of	knowledge	about	a	risk	–	its	physical	or	other	
properties	–	is	most	likely	to	occur	when	risks	are	in	
their	 emergent	 phase,	 a	 period	 when	 fundamental	
risk	 drivers	 or	 cause-effect	 relationships	 are	 not	 yet	
established	and	scientific	understanding	 is	 limited	or	
spotty.	Often,	rather	than	being	totally	absent,	relevant	
data	 are	 of	 poor	 quality	 or	 incomplete,	 particularly	
when	 complex	 processes	 of	 change	 are	 underway	
(e.g.,	 climate	 change),	 when	 new	 technologies	 are	
introduced	 (e.g.,	 xenotransplantation)	 [OECD,	2003]	
or	 when	 sudden	 disruptions	 take	 place	 (e.g.,	 the	
and	 improper	 regulation	of	 the	 credit	 securitisation	market	 [Economist,	 2003].	These	early	warnings,	 based	on	
professional	 judgement,	were	swept	aside	as	incorrect	or	alarmist	assumptions	concerning	market	dynamics.	In	
effect,	 the	supreme	confidence	that	housing	prices	would	continue	to	rise,	coupled	with	 the	drive	 for	short-term	
profit	and	a	fragmented	regulatory	system,	prevented	controlling	authorities	from	taking	any	serious	action	to	avert	
the	crisis.
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2007	 collapse	 of	 housing	 prices	 in	 the	US,	UK	and	
elsewhere,	and	the	associated	global	financial	crisis).	
Sometimes	 inadequate	 knowledge	 can	 be	 traced	 to	
insufficient	 funding	of	 scientific	 research	 (this	was	a	
serious	 problem	at	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 acquired	
immune	 deficiency	 syndrome,	AIDS,	 epidemic).	 But	
inadequate	 knowledge	 can	 also	 result	 when	 well-
funded	 scientists	 cling	 to	 outmoded	 theories,	 apply	
the	wrong	or	one-sided	methods	when	 investigating	
a	 new	 risk	 or	 fail	 to	 investigate	 a	 subpopulation	 (of	
people,	communities	or	wildlife)	which	 is	particularly	
vulnerable	to	an	emerging	risk.	Additionally,	scientists	
or	 decision-makers	 may	 simply	 fail	 to	 ask	 the	
important	questions,	or	they	may	even	ask	the	wrong	
questions.	
Scientific	 evidence	will	 be	 seen	 as	more	 robust	 if	 it	
is	 confirmed	by	 results	 from	more	 than	one	 source.	
Evidence	 based	 on	 anecdotal	 reports,	 though	
sometimes	 perfectly	 valid,	 is	 treated	 with	 greater	
scepticism	 than	 evidence	 from	 well-designed,	
large-scale	 statistical	 studies.	 Early	 clinical	 reports	
suggested	 that	silicone	breast	 implants	were	related	
to	auto-immune	disorders	but	these	reports	were	not	
confirmed	by	large-scale	epidemiological	studies.		
Once	 relevant	 scientific	 data	 have	 been	 collected,	
deficits	 can	 also	 occur	 in	 the	 process	 of	 analysis	
and	 interpretation.	When	analysis	 and	 interpretation	
occur	 without	 rigorous	 peer	 review	 by	 qualified	
experts,	 errors	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 occur.	 Based	 on	
this	 experience,	 scientists	 give	more	weight	 to	 data	
that	have	been	published	in	the	open,	peer-reviewed	
literature.	 This	 can	 prove	 to	 be	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	
private	 sector,	 as	 early	 publication	 can	 undermine	
sources	of	competitive	advantage.
Difficult	 tasks	 for	 risk	 assessors	 are	 appreciating	
the	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 associated	 with	 available	
knowledge	 (including	 any	 biases	 in	 how	 data	
are	 generated)	 and	 evaluating	 the	 impact	 of	 this	
uncertainty	 on	 the	 precision	 and	 robustness	 of	 the	
findings	of	a	risk	assessment.	Inadequate	knowledge	
will	 be	 used	 by	 some	 to	 argue	 that	 a	 risk	 has	 not	
been	 proven.	 Others	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 uncertainty	
means	 that	 an	 acceptable	 degree	 of	 safety	 has	 not	
been	established.	Given	the	imperfections	of	scientific	
and	 societal	 knowledge	 and	 understanding,	 risk	
governance	strategies	and	policy	choices	will	often	be	
made	in	the	absence	of	reliable	evidence.
Much	 of	 the	 available	 knowledge	 about	 hazards,	
including	 the	 probabilities	 and	 loss	 estimates	 in	
risk	 assessments,	 can	 be	 fully	 understood	 only	 by	
experts.	Yet	scientists	and	risk	assessors	may	fail	to	
communicate	their	knowledge	to	the	decision-making	
bodies,	let	alone	the	general	public.	At	the	same	time,	
public	debates	about	risk	may	be	complicated	by	the	
introduction	 of	 pseudoscientific	 claims,	 sometimes	
called	 “junk”	 science.	 The	 confusion	 resulting	 from	
pseudoscience	may	lead	to	exaggeration	of	risk	(e.g.,	
early	false	alarms	that	drinking	coffee	causes	bladder	
cancer)	 or	 false	 assurances	 of	 safety	 (e.g.,	 early	
claims	 that	 breathing	 environmental	 tobacco	 smoke	
is	harmless).
Radio-frequency electromagnetic fields 
- The tendency to confuse the lack of evidence of risk with a demonstration that no risk exists.
Radio-frequency	electromagnetic	 fields	 (EMFs)	have	been	present	 since	 the	early	20th	
century	and	human	exposure	to	them	has	grown	rapidly	in	recent	years.	Produced	primarily	
by	 radio,	 television,	mobile	phones,	 radar	and	microwaves,	 radio-frequency	EMFs	have	
frequencies	between	10MHz	and	300GHz	[WHO,	1999]	and,	if	the	radiation	is	of	sufficient	
intensity,	can	cause	biological	tissue	to	heat	up	[SAEFL,	2005].	However,	in	daily	life,	we	
are	not	exposed	to	radio-frequency	EMFs	of	sufficient	 intensity	 to	cause	thermal	effects	
that	are	harmful	to	human	health	[SAEFL,	2005].	
Nevertheless,	questions	remain	as	to	the	health	hazards	of	possible	non-thermal effects	of	radio-frequency	EMFs.	
Despite	numerous	studies,	scientific	knowledge	remains	unclear	or	equivocal	[NRPB,	2003].	The	collection	of	studies	
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Replacing one gasoline additive with another
- Failure to fully utilise existing knowledge in risk assessment and to undertake further scientific investigation into a 
chemical additive’s risks.
Methyl	tertiary-butyl	ether	(MTBE)	has	been	used	as	a	gasoline	additive	in	the	US	since	the	late	1970s,	when	it	
began	to	replace	tetra-ethyl	lead	as	an	octane	enhancer.	Since	1992,	MTBE	has	been	used	in	higher	concentrations	
by	refiners	in	order	to	meet	the	requirements	of	the	US	Clean	Air	Act	Amendments,	as	MTBE	reduces	the	level	
of	 harmful	 carbon	monoxide	 and	 some	 other	 pollutants	when	 gasoline	 is	 combusted.	While	 alternative	 octane	
enhancers	exist	(e.g.,	ethanol),	MTBE	was	preferred	because	of	its	favourable	blending	properties	in	pipelines	and	
its	low	production	cost	[US	EPA,	2008].		
It	 was	 also	 well-known	 that	 MTBE	 had	 some	 negative	 properties.	 Laboratory	 studies	
suggested	 that,	 because	 of	 its	 limited	 biodegradability,	 MTBE	 was	 highly	 mobile	 and	
persistent	 in	 surface	 and	 groundwater	 [Barker	 et	 al.,	 1990].	 Some	 comfort	 was	 taken	
from	the	fact	that	MTBE	has	a	distinctive	odour	and	taste	that	is	detectable	at	very	low	
concentrations	 in	water.	 In	 other	words,	 people	would	 object	 to	 drinking	 it	 before	 they	
became	sick	from	it.	Nevertheless,	no	risk	assessment	was	performed	on	a	key	question:	
“What	will		happen	if	the	MTBE		leaks	from	underground		storage	tanks		into	groundwater	
at	numerous	locations	around	the	country?”	In	fact,	without	adequate	assessment,	some	environmental	groups	and	
regulators	joined	MTBE	producers	in	avid	support	of	MTBE	as	a	gasoline	additive	in	their	pursuit	of	improved	air	
quality.		
In	 the	mid-1990s,	 it	was	discovered	 that	MTBE	had	 leaked	 from	underground	petroleum	storage	 systems	and	
pipelines	into	numerous	bodies	of	surface	and	groundwater.	Drinking	water	supplies	were	contaminated	in	several	
communities,	including	Santa	Monica,	California.	Questions	about	the	safety	of	MTBE	led	to	hundreds	of	lawsuits	
being	 brought	 by	 water	 suppliers	 and	 users	 against	 oil	 companies	 and	MTBE	 producers	 [Wilson,	 2008].	 The	
groundwater	contamination	problem	has	since	become	widespread	(24	US	states	report	finding	MTBE	at	least	60%	
of	the	time	when	sampling	groundwater).	Large	amounts	of	drinking	water	became	unusable	because	of	the	odour	
and	taste	of	MTBE.
The	adverse	human	health	effects	of	MTBE	exposure	were	never	established	with	certainty	[GAO,	2002].	Much	
of	 the	 standard	 toxicology	 of	MTBE	 is	 reassuring	 (i.e.,	MTBE	 is	 not	 acutely	 toxic)	 but	 the	 long-term	 safety	 of	
continuous	MTBE	exposure	is	not	well	understood,	and	a	risk	of	cancer	is	possible	[Toccalino,	2005;	Krayer	von	
Krauss	and	Harremoes,	2002].	
to	 date	 shows	 some	weak	 positive	 results	 (presence	 of	 detrimental	 effects),	 but	 results	 are	 often	 inconsistent	
between	studies	and	cannot	be	replicated	[WHO,	1999;	SAEFL,	2005].	The	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	has	
thus	concluded	that	“current	evidence	does	not	confirm	the	existence	of	any	health	consequences	from	exposure	
to	low	level	EMF”	[WHO,	1999].	Absence	of	evidence	is	not	necessarily	the	same	as	evidence	of	absence,	and	
often	does	not	suffice	to	allay	public	fears.	For	example,	“although	studies	do	not	suggest	a	raised	risk	of	cancer,	
they	do	not	rule	one	out,	especially	in	relation	to	large	cumulative	exposures	to	mobile	phones	and	possible	effects	
occurring	many	years	after	their	use”	[NRPB,	2003].	More	research,	including	studies	with	a	longer	latency	period,	
will	be	necessary	to	improve	scientific	knowledge	in	this	field,	but	will	be	challenging	to	carry	out	because	of	rapid	
changes	in	technology	[Kheifets	et	al.,	2008].
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A3 Perceptions of risk, including 
their determinants and 
consequences  
The lack of adequate knowledge about values, 
beliefs and interests, and therefore about how 
risks are perceived by stakeholders
Deficit	 A2	 (above)	 is	 related	 to	 knowledge	 about	
probabilities	 and	 consequences	 of	 adverse	 events,	
whereas	 this	 deficit	 focusses	 on	 knowing	 and	
understanding	 how	 risks	 are	 perceived	 by	 non-
scientific	publics,	including	ordinary	citizens,	business	
managers,	representatives	of	stakeholder	groups	and	
politicians.	 Since	 a	 variety	 of	 values,	 interests,	 and	
cultural,	 familial,	 economic	 and	 ideological	 factors	
help	 shape	 perceptions,	 social	 scientists	 contend	
that	 perceptions	 of	 risk	 are	 “socially	 constructed”	
[Bradbury,	 1989].	Effective	 risk	 governance	 requires	
consideration	 of	 both	 the	 factual	 aspects	 of	 risk	
assessment	 (A2)	 and	 the	 socially	 constructed	 (A3)	
aspects	of	perceived	risk.
Individual	 risk	 perceptions	 may	 be	 based	 on	 a	
person’s	 economic	 situation,	 personality,	 education,	
experience,	 religion,	 group	 allegiances,	 and	 social	
and	cultural	environment.	Organised	groups	may	form	
based	on	risk	perceptions	(e.g.,	anti-nuclear	advocacy	
groups),	or	members	of	pre-established	groups	(e.g.,	
gun	owners)	may	tend	to	possess	similar	perceptions	
of	a	wide	range	of	risks.		
Risk	 perceptions	 are	 not	 always	 constant.	 They	
can	 change	as	 a	 result	 of	 information,	 experiences,	
dramatic	 portrayals	 in	 the	 press	 or	 entertainment	
media,	 and	 incentives,	 although	 changes	 are	 less	
likely	to	take	place	if	the	original	perception	is	based	
on	 deeply-felt	 individual	 values	 or	 group	 ideology	
[Tait,	2001].	When	perceptions	are	diffuse	or	tentative,	
they	 may	 be	 susceptible	 to	 substantial	 influence.	
Once	perceptions	have	hardened,	 they	can	be	quite	
difficult	to	modify,	even	with	compelling	evidence	–	for	
example,	when	perceptions	of	certain	societal	groups	
are	so	strong	that	they	eventually	lead	to	widespread	
stigmatisation	of	a	new	technology,	as	has	been	the	
case	 in	 many	 countries	 with	 nuclear	 power	 and	 in	
Europe	with	genetically	modified	(GM)	food.
Differences	 in	 perceptions	 are	 often	 studied	 at	 the	
level	of	individuals	but	variations	also	occur	between	
communities,	 countries	 and	 regions	 of	 the	 globe	
[OECD,	2003].	Terrorism	is	more	salient	in	the	Middle	
East	than	in	Australia.	The	same	risk	will	be	assessed	
as	 safer	 or	 more	 dangerous	 in	 some	 communities	
or	 countries	 than	 in	 others.	 Historically,	 Europeans	
have	 been	 more	 concerned	 than	 Americans	 about	
global	 climate	 change,	 while	Americans	 have	 been	
more	concerned	than	Europeans	about	diesel	engine	
exhaust	 and	 environmental	 tobacco	 smoke.	 Over	
time,	some	of	these	differences	diminish,	but	societies	
do	engage	 in	a	practice	–	albeit	an	 implicit	one	–	of	
selecting	which	risks	to	worry	about.		
Risk	 perceptions	may	 also	 be	 influenced	 by	 factors	
related	 to	personal	experience,	 such	as	 the	amount	
(or	distribution)	of	associated	benefits,	 the	 likelihood	
of	the	risk	affecting	identifiable	rather	than	anonymous	
victims,	 the	 familiarity	of	 the	risk	source	or	 the	state	
of	 personal	 or	 scientific	 familiarity	 with	 the	 risk	
issue.	These	factors	will	also	have	an	impact	on	the	
acceptability	of	the	risk	(see	A5).	
Economists	 contend	 that	 risk	 perceptions	 are	
influenced	by	wealth	and	health	status,	including	how	
consumers	 value	 future	 gains	 or	 losses	 compared	
to	 present-day	 welfare.	 For	 example,	 investors	 in	
the	 stock	 market	 vary	 enormously	 in	 terms	 of	 their	
propensity	 to	assume	near-term	 losses	 in	exchange	
for	a	potentially	high	return	on	investment	in	the	future.	
In	retrospect,	although	many	of	the	physical	properties	of	MTBE	were	known	when	it	was	first	blended	in	gasoline,	
more	in-depth	risk	assessments	of	MTBE	should	have	been	conducted	prior	to	its	widespread	use	as	a	gasoline	
additive.	A	 panel	 established	 by	 the	US	Environmental	 Protection	Agency	 (EPA)	 in	 1998	 to	 address	 concerns	
related	 to	MTBE	water	contamination	concluded	 that	 “in	order	 to	prevent	 future	such	 incidents	 […]	EPA	should	
conduct	a	full,	multi-media	assessment	(of	effects	on	air,	soil	and	water)	of	any	major	new	additive	to	gasoline	prior	
to	introduction”	[Blue	Ribbon	Panel,	1999].
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Some	people	are	fascinated	by	casinos;	others	avoid	
them.		
Perceived	 risks	 can	 be	 very	 different	 from	 the	
estimates	 derived	 from	 evidence-based	 scientific	
assessment.	For	example,	chemical	additives	to	food	
(e.g.,	preservatives)	are	often	perceived	by	consumers	
and	activist	groups	to	be	more	risky	than	is	indicated	
by	 scientific	 assessments,	 while	 pathogens	 in	 food	
are	 often	 judged	 by	 the	 public	 as	 less	 risky	 than	
scientific	 assessments	 suggest.	 A	 risk	 assessment	
deficit	 can	 result	 from	 the	 inadequate	 handling	 of	 a	
situation	 where	 the	 predominant	 public	 perceptions	
diverge	from,	or	even	contradict,	assessments	based	
on	scientific	evidence.
A	 concern	 assessment	 by	 social	 scientists	 as	
suggested	in	the	IRGC	framework	[IRGC,	2005]	can	
be	 of	 great	 assistance	 to	 policymakers	 by	 helping	
them	to	understand	social	claims	and	positions	and	to	
place	concerns	in	a	larger	cultural	context.	However,	
measuring	 how	 risks	 are	 perceived	 can	 be	 quite	
complicated.	When	risk	perceptions	are	studied,	 the	
work	should	be	conducted	by	qualified	social	scientists	
who	are	knowledgeable	about	research	methods	and	
validation	procedures,	and	have	sufficient	resources	to	
undertake	informative	surveys.	Erroneous	information	
about	 risk	perceptions	 can	mislead	decision-makers	
as	much	as	erroneous	factual	information	about	risks.	
In	fact,	inappropriate	understanding	of	risk	perceptions	
may	exacerbate	social	mobilisation	and	this	may	itself	
influence	the	acceptability	of	the	risk	(A5).
Genetically modified foods
 - An example of how different risk perceptions can influence risk governance around the world.
In	Europe,	risk	perception	of	genetically	modified	organisms	(GMOs)	involves	moral	considerations	(ethical	aspects,	
“interfering	 with	 nature”),	 democratic	 considerations	 (mistrust	 of	 multinational	 companies	 and	 governments),	
economic	 considerations	 (Who	 benefits	 from	 the	 technology?)	 and	 uncertainty	 (possible	 unpredicted	 adverse	
consequences)	[Ebbesen,	2006].	Risk	perceptions	vary	significantly	within	and	between	EU	countries:	overall	 in	
2005,	58%	of	Europeans	were	opposed	to	GM	foods;	42%	were	supportive	[Eurobarometer	64.3,	2006].	Europe’s	
precautionary	approach	to	GMOs	places	many	restrictions	on	the	sale	of	GM	seeds	and	the	sale	of	GM	foods,	and	
it	appears	that	these	restrictions	are	based	more	on	value-driven	political	perceptions	than	on	scientific	evidence	
of	actual	or	potential	risks	[Tait,	2008].	Within	each	European	country,	governments	have	been	unable	or	unwilling	
to	support	decisions	based	on	scientific	evidence	and	 to	offer	 their	populations	 the	choice	of	whether	or	not	 to	
purchase	GM	foods.
Other	 motives,	 predominantly	 economic	 and	 protectionist,	 have	 also	 influenced	 the	
evolution	 of	 European	 regulation	 of	GMOs.	 In	 a	 dispute	 between	 the	US	 and	 the	 EU	
over	 the	 trade	of	GM	crops	 (including	permission	 for	US-based	companies	 to	 sell	GM	
seeds	in	Europe),	the	World	Trade	Organization	[WTO,	2003]	concluded	that	Europe	may	
also	have	adopted	a	precautionary	approach	 to	protect	 certain	 segments	of	European	
agriculture,	although	European	agriculture	as	a	whole	and	the	entire	agro-biotechnology	
sector	are	being	disadvantaged	by	the	failure	to	sell	GM	crops	in	Europe.
By	contrast,	public	attitudes	in	the	US	seem	to	be	more	accepting	of	GM	foods,	with	large	quantities	of	GM	foods	
being	sold	and	consumed	there	(as	 is	also	the	case	in	South	America,	 India	and	China).	This	comparative	 lack	
of	controversy	relates	partly	to	a	lack	of	knowledge	of	the	prevalence	of	GM	foods	in	the	US,	partly	to	a	different	
assessment	or	awareness	of	the	scientific	evidence	of	the	safety	of	GM	crops	and	related	food	products,	and	also	to	
US	cultural	attitudes	towards	nature	and	technology	(many	in	America	see	farming	as	quite	separate	from	“nature”)	
and	public	trust	in	expert	regulatory	agencies	[Hebden	et	al.,	2005].	US	regulations	of	GM	foods	reflect	these	values	
and	risk	perceptions,	and	have	been	less	risk	averse	and	more	supportive	of	the	agro-biotechnology	industry	than	
Europe’s	[Lynch	and	Vogel,	2001].	
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A4 Stakeholder involvement  
Failure to adequately identify and involve 
relevant stakeholders in risk assessment in 
order to improve information input and confer 
legitimacy on the process
Risk	 assessment	 can	 be	 compromised	 when	
important	 stakeholders	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	
process.	Stakeholders	may	have	biases	but	they	often	
bring	 indispensable	 or	 useful	 data	 and	 experience	
to	 the	 risk	 assessment	 process.	 Excluding	 relevant	
stakeholders	also	reduces	trust	in	the	resulting	analytic	
determinations	 and	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 subsequent	
policy	 decisions.	 There	 are	 multiple	 methods	 for	
involving	stakeholders	 (e.g.,	 an	opportunity	 to	make	
a	technical	presentation	before	risk	assessors	or	the	
opportunity	to	serve	as	a	scientific	peer	reviewer)	that	
can	be	considered	on	a	case-by-case	basis.
The	early	stages	of	a	 risk	assessment	process	may	
be	a	particularly	fruitful	time	to	seek	suggestions	from	
stakeholders	and	 involve	 them	 in	a	 risk	dialogue.	At	
this	time,	decisions	need	to	be	made	as	to	the	precise	
nature	and	understanding	of	 the	 risk	 itself	 (how	 it	 is	
“framed”),	the	scope	and	depth	of	a	risk	assessment,	
the	 types	of	data	 that	will	 be	collected,	 the	 types	of	
experts	 and	 contractors	 that	 will	 be	 commissioned,	
and	the	schedule	for	preparing	and	reviewing	the	risk	
assessment	 report.	 Stakeholders	 may	 have	 useful	
input	on	all	of	these	questions.		
Risk perceptions of nuclear power  
- Where experts may judge risks differently from lay-people.
In	the	case	of	nuclear	power,	public	perceptions	of	risk	have	become	central	to	the	making	of	energy	policy.	Some	
countries	have	responded	with	moratoria	and	phase-outs,	while	others	are	encouraging	–	or	even	subsidising	–	the	
construction	of	large	new	nuclear	plants.	Where	risk	perceptions	are	salient,	they	may	relate	to	nuclear	accidents,	
nuclear	waste	transport	or	storage,	nuclear	terrorism	or	even	nuclear	weapons	proliferation.		
Expert	judgements	about	the	risks	of	nuclear	power	frequently	do	not	correlate	with	public	
perceptions	of	risk.	In	one	study,	few	experts	judged	the	risks	of	domestic	nuclear	power	
to	be	larger	than	“very	small”,	while	65%	of	the	public	did	so	[Sjöberg,	1999].	This	probably	
results	from	the	fact	that,	when	considering	a	specific	risk,	experts	tend	to	use	the	product	
of	 probability	 and	consequences,	whereas	most	people	make	general	 risk	 judgements	
using	a	multi-attribute	perspective	that	includes	catastrophic	potential	[Slovic	et	al.,	1980].	
Issues	about	mistrust	of	experts	(especially	those	associated	with	the	nuclear	industry	or	
the	government)	may	also	be	a	factor	[Sjöberg,	1999].	
Heightened	public	fears	regarding	nuclear	power	may	be	the	result	of	different	judgements	of	benefits	and	threats.	
However,	they	may	also	be	due	to	biased	media	coverage	[Brewer,	2006]	and	creative	activism	by	resourceful	anti-
nuclear	groups	or	a	rigid	anti-nuclear	culture,	as	exists	in	Austria	or	Portugal	[FORATOM,	2008].		
As	concerns	about	climate	change	and	possible	electricity	shortages	have	grown,	some	people’s	perceptions	have	
begun	 to	 change.	 Recent	 years	 have	 not	 witnessed	 an	 accident	 on	 the	 scale	 of	 Chernobyl	 or	 even	 the	 fully-
contained	Three	Mile	 Island.	Publicity	affects	risk	perception	and	reduced	publicity	may	be	a	factor	 in	changing	
public	perception.	For	example,	the	Swedish	government	recently	(2008)	announced	that	it	would	seek	a	reversal	
of	its	previous	(1980)	decision	to	phase	out	nuclear	power.	Swedish	officials	are	now	considering	the	construction	of	
new	nuclear	plants	[Kanter,	2009].	This	reflects	changing	public	attitudes	in	Sweden	towards	nuclear	power,	which	
have	become	more	positive	over	the	last	ten	years	[Hedberg	and	Holmberg,	2009].	If	acceptable	ways	of	managing	
nuclear	waste	are	found	and	implemented	satisfactorily,	public	acceptance	of	nuclear	power	may	continue	to	grow	
in	many	countries.
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Just	as	important	as	the	task	of	gathering	knowledge	
is	the	process	of	engagement	that	can	lead	to	better	
risk	 communication.	Creating	 an	 interactive	 process	
for	 exchanges	 of	 information	 or	 opinion	 between	
stakeholders,	 so	 that	 they	 are	 aware	 of	 what	 is	
occurring	at	each	step	of	the	risk	assessment	process,	
can	lead	to	improved	understanding	of	the	risk	issues	
by	all	affected.	It	can	also	help	to	build	up	trust	in	the	
openness	and	fairness	of	the	risk	assessment	process	
and	this,	in	turn,	helps	to	improve	its	effectiveness.
Identifying	 and	 selecting	 which	 stakeholders	 should	
participate	 in	 risk	 assessment	 is	 important	 and	 not	
always	straightforward.	It	may	be	a	mistake	to	 invite	
only	 those	with	extreme	views	about	 risk	but	 it	may	
also	be	a	mistake	to	 include	only	 those	with	centrist	
interpretations	 of	 the	 science.	 While	 it	 is	 important	
to	be	open	 to	suggestions	 from	stakeholders,	public	
authorities	 as	 well	 as	 private	 sector	 players	 should	
be	careful	not	to	provide	an	opportunity	for	particular	
stakeholders	to	impose	their	interests	and	biases	on	
the	risk	assessment	itself.	Perhaps	the	most	relevant	
criteria	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	 stakeholders	 are:	 the	
ability	 to	 contribute	 useful	 knowledge	 or	 experience	
(including,	for	example,	industry	experts	and	relevant	
day-to-day	 experiences	 of	 vulnerable	 populations	 to	
risks	such	as	flooding);	 the	capacity	 to	participate	 in	
a	 constructive	 manner;	 and,	 the	 potential	 to	 confer	
some	legitimacy	to	the	risk	assessment	process.	Here	
the	input	from	stakeholders	should	focus	on	science-
related	 issues	 (including	 perception-related	 issues	
if	 a	 study	 of	 risk	 perception	 is	 being	 undertaken).	
Stakeholders	who	are	not	able	or	willing	to	participate	
in	 the	technical	aspects	of	risk	assessment	may	still	
be	appropriate	for	inclusion	in	the	later	phases	of	risk	
management	(see	cluster	B).
It	 is	 not	 always	 feasible	 or	 advisable	 to	 involve	
stakeholders.	Time	and	resource	limitations	will	affect	
whether	 stakeholders	 are	 consulted,	 how	 they	 are	
consulted	 and	 whether	 public	 opportunities	 for	 risk	
dialogue	between	stakeholders	and	risk	assessors	are	
provided.	An	excessive	emphasis	on	inclusiveness	can	
slow	down	the	process	of	risk	assessment,	leading	to	
efficiency	losses	and	diminished	trust	in	the	process;	
it	can	also	have	the	effect	of	concealing	responsibility	
or	shifting	it	away	from	the	managers	and	elected	and	
appointed	officials	 accountable	 for	 risk	 decisions.	 In	
most	cases,	however,	an	opportunity	for	some	form	of	
stakeholder	involvement	is	likely	to	be	helpful.
Large infrastructure projects (dams)
- Stakeholder involvement in the risk assessment process can improve public acceptance.
The	World	 Commission	 on	 Dams	 reported	 that	 “the	 need	 for	 improvement	 in	 public	 involvement	 and	 dispute	
resolution	for	large	dams	may	be	one	of	the	few	things	on	which	everyone	involved	in	the	building	of	large	dams	
agrees”	[WCD,	2000].	It	has	accordingly	declared	as	a	strategic	priority	the	need	to	improve	the	“often	secretive	
and	corrupt	processes	which	lead	to	decisions	to	build	large	dams”	[McCully,	2003].	Critics	of	large	dams	have	long	
called	for	water	and	energy	planning	to	be	made	more	participatory,	accountable	and	comprehensive.	The	World	
Bank	has	echoed	these	concerns	in	a	recent	sourcebook	[ESMAP/BNWPP,	2003].
For	example,	the	building	of	the	Nagara	River	Estuary	Barrage	in	Japan	was	planned	in	
1968	for	flood	control	and	protection	of	the	water	supply.	Numerous	conflicts	and	lawsuits	
delayed	its	construction	and	members	of	the	public	drew	attention	to	the	need	to	include	
issues	such	as	sustainability	and	nature	conservation	in	the	risk	assessment.	However,	
because	the	Ministry	of	Construction	and	the	Water	Resources	Development	Agency	had	
begun	to	deal	with	the	project	within	a	traditional	frame,	using	a	top-down	public-sector	
approach,	 they	were	 initially	 unwilling	 to	 listen	 to	 these	 representations	and	dismissed	
public	concerns	about	lack	of	participation.
Ultimately,	the	knowledge	contributed	by	the	local	representatives	was	brought	into	the	assessment	process	and	a	
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A5 Evaluating the acceptability of 
the risk  
Failure to consider variables that influence 
risk acceptance and risk appetite
Once	 a	 risk	 has	 been	 assessed	 from	 a	 scientific	
perspective	 and	 the	 analysis	 of	 concerns	 and	
perspectives	 has	 been	 completed,	 decision-makers	
must	determine	whether	the	risk	 is	acceptable1		and	
thus	 whether	 it	 requires	 specific	 risk	 management.	
Although	 acceptability	 is	 a	 value-laden	 judgement	
that	 people	 may	 sometimes	 seek	 to	 avoid,	 it	 is	 a	
necessary	one	in	a	sound	risk	governance	framework.	
Essentially,	thresholds	for	risk	acceptability	depend	on	
how	 risks	 and	 benefits	 are	 balanced.	 The	 valuation	
of	potential	benefits	(whether	 this	value	 is	 related	 to	
monetary	gain,	improved	welfare,	or	moral	or	ethical	
considerations)	 is	 key	 to	 whether	 one	 is	 willing	 to	
accept	the	associated	risk.
Even	 if	 the	scientific	aspects	of	risk	assessment	are	
sound,	there	may	be	a	failure	by	decision-makers	to	
consider	 variables	 that	 influence	 the	acceptability	of	
risk	or	consumer	confidence	in	a	product.	Terminology	
is	not	uniform,	but	an	inquiry	into	risk	acceptability	is	
called	“risk	evaluation”	in	the	IRGC	Risk	Governance	
Framework.
In	addition	to	the	valuation	of	potential	benefits,	social	
scientists	 have	 determined	 that	 a	 variety	 of	 other	
variables	appears	to	 influence	public	acceptability	of	
risk,	beyond	the	probability	and	severity	determinations	
that	 dominate	 the	 scientific	 assessment	 of	 risk.	
These	 factors	 include:	 whether	 the	 risk	 is	 incurred	
voluntarily	 or	 is	 imposed	 on	 citizens	 without	 their	
informed	 consent;	 whether	 the	 risk	 is	 controllable	
by	 personal	 action	 or	 whether	 it	 can	 be	 managed	
only	 through	 collective	 action;	 whether	 the	 risk	 is	
incurred	 disproportionately	 by	 the	 poor,	 children,	 or	
other	 vulnerable	 subpopulations;	whether	 the	 risk	 is	
unfamiliar	and	dreadful;	whether	the	risk	results	from	
man-made	rather	 than	natural	causes;	and,	whether	
the	 risk	 raises	 questions	 of	 intergenerational	 equity	
[Bennett	and	Calman,	1999].	
Although	 a	 risk	 may	 appear	 to	 be	 acceptable	 (or	
even	 negligible)	 based	 on	 purely	 probabilistic	
considerations,	segments	of	the	public	may	consider	
it	unacceptable	for	a	variety	of	psychological	or	ethical	
reasons,	 as	 has	 happened	 with	 GMOs	 in	 Europe	
and	some	applications	of	nanotechnology	 in	several	
countries.
To	 some	 extent,	 the	 inquiry	 into	 risk	 acceptability	
draws	 on	 the	 risk	 perception	 issues	 discussed	
earlier	 (see	 A3).	 In	 some	 public	 settings,	 however,	
the	 inquiry	 is	 more	 specific	 and	 entails	 a	 formal	
determination	 of	 risk	 acceptability	 under	 an	 explicit	
statutory	 or	 administrative	 standard.	 The	 factors	
involved	 in	 a	 formal	 risk-acceptability	 decision	 may	
vary	depending	upon	the	legal	context.	Under	US	law,	
for	example,	a	distinction	 is	often	made	between	an	
“imminent	 hazard”	 (a	 high	degree	of	 unacceptability	
that	triggers	emergency	measures)	and	a	“significant	
risk”	 (also	unacceptable,	but	potentially	manageable	
through	normal	rulemaking	procedures).	Terms	such	
as	 “unreasonable	 risk”	 and	 “negligible	 risk”	 also	
have	 specific	meanings	 under	 various	US	 laws	and	
regulations.	Such	legal	standards	of	acceptability	may	
have	less	prominence	in	countries	that	do	not	share	
the	 US	 emphasis	 on	 litigation-oriented	 solutions	 to	
risk	issues.
Deficits	 in	 risk	 acceptability	 often	 occur	 when	
organisations	and	stakeholders	fail	to	define	the	type	
and	amount	of	risk	that	they	are	prepared	to	pursue,	
retain	 or	 take	 (risk appetite)	 or	 to	 take	 relevant	
decisions	 based	 upon	 their	 attitude	 towards	 turning	
away	 from	 risk	 (risk aversion).	 This	 implies	 that,	 in	
order	 to	 make	 good	 risk	 management	 decisions	
(cluster	 B),	 organisations	 and	 stakeholders	 need	
to	 define	 their	 level	 of	 tolerance	 for	 each	 risk	 they	
1)	In	other	publications	IRGC	distinguishes	between	acceptable	risk	(needing	no	specific	mitigation	or	management	measures)	and	tolerable	risk	
(where	the	benefits	exceed	the	potential	downside	but	require	management	strategies	to	minimise	their	negative	impact).	Here	we	group	both	as	
acceptable	risk.
system	for	publicly	monitoring	the	impact	of	the	Barrage	on	the	river	ecosystem	was	proposed.	This	change	in	the	
risk	assessment	process,	 including	constructive	dialogue	with	stakeholders,	allowed	planning	for	construction	of	
the	Barrage	to	proceed	beyond	the	risk	assessment	phase.	If	the	relevant	stakeholders	had	been	brought	into	the	
assessment	process	earlier,	the	conflict	might	have	been	less	protracted	[Okada	et	al.,	2008].
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face	 (the	 organisation	 or	 stakeholder’s	 readiness	 to	
bear	 the	 risk	after	 risk	 treatment	 in	order	 to	achieve	
its	 objectives)	 [ISO,	 2009].	 In	 the	 private	 sector	 in	
particular,	 risk	 decisions	 will	 have	 to	 explicitly	 state	
the	 level	of	 loss	 that	 the	organisation	 is	prepared	 to	
accept	in	its	operations.
Radioactive waste disposal
- Fairness aspects in determining risk acceptability.
Radioactive	waste	disposal	 facilities	 can	pose	health	 and	environmental	 risks	 for	 local	
residents,	 both	 present	 and	 future.	 Equity	 considerations,	 intra-generational	 and	 inter-
generational,	are	thus	often	pre-eminent	when	assessing	risks	related	to	the	siting	of	such	
hazardous	 facilities	 [OECD	NEA,	1995].	A	 common	concern	 is	 that	 present	 and	 future	
residents	near	proposed	sites	should	not	be	expected	to	accept	a	greater	burden	of	risk	
than	other	sections	of	society	(who	are	equally	implicated	in	creating	the	waste	problem).	
Two		of		the		most		emphasised	fairness		criteria	are	“technical		efficiency”		(the		site		with	
minimal	overall	risk	should	be	chosen)	and	“contribution	to	the	problem”	(those	who	generate	the	waste	should	bear	
the	risk)	[Vari,	1996].	
In	the	US	in	the	1970s,	fairness	issues	regarding	three	low-level	radioactive	waste	(LLRW)	disposal	facilities	were	
brought	before	Congress	when	the	states	of	South	Carolina,	Nevada	and	Washington	indicated	that	they	were	no	
longer	willing	to	receive	and	store	waste	from	the	rest	of	the	country	and	thus	bear	a	disproportionate	amount	of	risk.	
In	response,	Congress	enacted	the	Federal	Low-Level	Radioactive	Waste	Policy	Act	of	1980,	making	each	state	
responsible	for	the	disposal	of	LLRW	produced	within	its	borders	[Vari,	1996].	When	underestimation	of	the	degree	
of	citizen	opposition	caused	state	cooperation	and	regional	solutions	to	fail,	more	states	were	forced	to	build	LLRW	
disposal	sites.	Not	only	was	this	inefficient,	but	it	increased	the	number	of	people	put	at	risk	by	such	facilities.	In	this	
case,	acceptability	of	risk	depends	on	difficult	trade-offs	to	be	made	between	efficiency	and	equity	issues.	Equity	
issues	can	be	some	of	the	most	complex	and	intractable	for	policymakers,	and	must	therefore	be	handled	with	care.	
As	this	case	demonstrates,	“inequality	does	not	necessarily	imply	inequity.	If	the	risk	burden	is	unequally	distributed,	
spreading	risks	more	widely	does	not	actually	make	it	more	equitable”	[Coates	et	al.,	1994].
A6 Misrepresenting information 
about risk  
The provision of biased, selective or incomplete 
information
This	 risk	 governance	 deficit	 refers	 to	 cases	 where	
efforts	 are	 made	 to	 manipulate	 risk	 governance	
through	 the	 provision	 of	 biased,	 selective	 or	
incomplete	 knowledge	 (or	 a	 failure	 to	 ascertain	
the	 objectivity,	 quality	 and	 certainty	 of	 submitted	
information).	 Often,	 this	 misleading	 information	 is	
submitted	by	stakeholders	who	seek	to	advance	their	
interests,	but	it	may	also	be	submitted	by	government	
officials	seeking	to	protect	themselves	from	criticism	
or	 by	 enterprising	 journalists	 or	 reporters	who	 seek	
to	create	an	interesting	story.	The	deficit	is	therefore	
related	to	a	lack	of	open,	unbiased	communication.
In	dealing	with	knowledge-related	deficits	(see	A2	and	
A3),		each	attribute		of		the		risk	science	–	complexity,	
uncertainty	 and	 ambiguity	 –	 can	 be	 either	 over-	 or	
understated	 by	 participants	 in	 the	 risk	 assessment	
process.	 Strategic	 manipulation	 of	 information	 is	 a	
classic	 interest-group	 strategy	 but	 it	 is	 particularly	
difficult	 to	 challenge	 misleading	 submissions	 about	
risks	when	knowledge	is	uncertain	and	clear	evidence	
is	lacking	to	support	a	particular	position	or	decision;	
a	 fact-based	 rebuttal	 is	 therefore	 impossible.	When	
analysts	 and	 policymakers	 are	misled	 by	 erroneous	
or	 biased	 information,	 many	 types	 of	 error	 in	 risk	
management	 (e.g.,	 over-regulation,	 under-regulation	
or	 misdirected	 regulation)	 can	 occur.	 Accurately	
conveying	uncertainty	about	a	risk	(for	example,	 the	
severity	and	stage	of	a	pandemic)	can	be	challenging,	
and	 erroneous	 information	 should	 in	 this	 case	 not	
be	understood	as	a	deliberate	attempt	to	manipulate	
data.	 Misrepresentation	 may	 also,	 therefore,	 be	
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unintentional.	Recipients	of	the	information	should	be	
made	aware	of	this.
Although	 some	 prefer	 a	 risk	 assessment	 process	
that	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 respectful	 behaviour	 typical	
of	 a	 scientific	 process,	 real-world	 risk	 assessment	
processes	 sometimes	 resemble	 a	 harsh	 political	
debate,	 and	controversy	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	deficit.	
One	set	 of	 stakeholders	may	describe	 the	available	
information	as	incomplete,	inaccurate	or	manipulated	
by	other	stakeholders.	They	in	turn	may	claim	to	know	
the	“real	truth”	(e.g.,	by	referring	to	studies	which	are	
not	generally	accepted	or	to	biased	studies	they	have	
commissioned	 themselves).	 They	 may	 also	 ignore	
evidence	 about	 fear,	 emotions	 or	 other	 perceptions	
with	regard	to	a	risk;	downplay	 it	as	being	 irrational;	
claim	that	it	is	unreliable;	or	feign	ignorance.	Or	they	
may	 simply	 point	 to	 only	 a	 few	 studies	 that	 support	
their	position	while	ignoring	a	larger	body	of	evidence	
that	does	not	support	their	view.		
A	confused	scientific	debate	about	risk	can	exacerbate	
some	of	 the	well-documented	difficulties	 that	people	
have	 in	 evaluating	 new	 information.	 People	 tend	 to	
adhere	 to	 their	 initial	beliefs,	opinions,	attitudes	and	
theories,	even	 if	 the	data	or	convictions	upon	which	
they	 were	 originally	 founded	 prove	 to	 be	 wrong	
or	 fictitious	 [Bradfield,	 2004].	 Such	 beliefs	 tend	 to	
structure	the	manner	in	which	subsequent	evidence	is	
interpreted:	if	it	supports	the	initial	beliefs,	it	is	judged	
to	be	reliable;	contradictory	evidence	on	the	other	hand	
is	dismissed	as	unreliable	or	erroneous	(confirmation	
bias)	[Tait,	2001].	People	thus	overestimate	the	validity	
of	evidence	that	confirms	their	prior	beliefs	and	values.	
Experts	as	well	as	lay-people	may	be	prone	to	such	
biases.
The tobacco industry and the risks of tobacco products 
- Industry funds were used to create scientific and public confusion about the health risks of tobacco products.
Buttressed	by	documents	released	during	litigation	against	the	tobacco	industry,	a	significant	
literature	now	exists	documenting	the	role	of	the	tobacco	industry	as	a	source	of	confusion	
about	the	health	risks	of	tobacco	products	[Barnes	and	Bero,	1996].	Scientists	were	hired	
by	the	industry	to	criticise	public	health	studies	of	the	risks	of	smoking	(including	the	risks	
of	environmental	tobacco	smoke)	and	re-analyse	data	in	the	hopes	of	finding	conclusions	
that	were	more	compatible	with	the	industry’s	public	positions	[Paddock,	2007].	Sometimes	
the			scientists		were		hired		as			consultants		or		expert			witnesses.		In			other		cases		the	
scientists	 received	 research	grants	or	 gifts	 from	 the	 industry.	The	 role	of	 the	 industry	 	 funding	was	sometimes	
concealed		from	the	public	and		the	scientific	community.	Tragically,	this	industry-funded	research	appears	to	have	
slowed	the	scientific	and	public	realisation	of	the	substantial	risks	of	tobacco	products.	Eventually,	the	overall	body	
of	evidence	on	the	risks	of	tobacco	products	became	so	overwhelming	that	much	of	the	industry-funded	work	came	
to	be	viewed	as	biased	or	simply	erroneous.	As	a	result,	companies	such	as	Philip	Morris,	which	were	under	intense	
public	criticism	from	anti-smoking	advocates,	terminated	their	external	research	programmes	on	the	health	risks	
of	tobacco	[Grimm,	2008].	Major	universities	in	the	US,	such	as	the	University	of	California,	have	adopted	policies	
that	 restrict	 the	 freedom	of	 university-based	 researchers	 to	 accept	 research	 funding	 from	 the	 tobacco	 industry	
[UC,	2007].	Such	 restrictions	are	viewed	as	a	device	 to	protect	 the	 researcher	as	well	as	 the	 reputation	of	 the	
university.
Disposal of the Brent Spar platform
 - Greenpeace made an erroneous public claim that the Brent Spar oil storage buoy contained some 5,000 tonnes of oil 
and toxic chemicals.
The	decision	to	decommission	and	dispose	of	the	Brent	Spar	oil	storage	buoy	was	taken	by	Shell	in	1992	and,	after	
having	ordered	at	least	30	studies	on	the	technical,	safety	and	environmental	implications	of	the	various	disposal	
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methods,	 Shell	 decided	 that	 the	 best	 practicable	 environmental	 option	was	 deep-sea	 disposal	 in	UK	 territorial	
waters.	Permission	for	 this	option	was	granted	by	the	UK	Department	of	Trade	and	Industry	 in	December	1994	
[Löfstedt	and	Renn,	1997].	
In	early	1995,	Greenpeace	began	a	 campaign	 to	block	 the	 implementation	of	Brent	Spar’s	deep-sea	disposal,	
as	they	claimed	the	buoy	contained	large	amounts	of	oil	and	hazardous	materials	(in	line	with	its	campaign	since	
the	early	1980s	against	dumping	 in	 the	North	Sea).	An	occupation	of	Brent	Spar	by	Greenpeace	activists	and	
journalists	 in	April	 1995	 received	 significant	 media	 coverage,	 predominantly	 supportive	 of	 Greenpeace,	 which	
catalysed	effective	consumer	boycotts	of	Shell	in	Germany,	the	Netherlands	and	parts	of	Scandinavia	in	May	1995	
[Löfstedt	and	Renn,	1997].
On	June	16,	1995,	Greenpeace	carried	out	a	second	occupation	of	Brent	Spar	just	as	it	
was	being	readied	for	transport.	Following	this	occupation,	Greenpeace	claimed	that	its	
scientific	analyses	of	Brent	Spar’s	storage	tanks	showed	that	they	contained	some	5,000	
tonnes	of	oil,	plus	heavy	metals	and	toxic	chemicals,	which	Shell	had	failed	to	declare	in	
its	analyses.	Shell	publicly	refuted	these	claims,	stating	that	the	remaining	oil	had	been	
flushed	out	into	a	tanker	in	1991,	and	that	its	full	analyses	of	tank	contents	had	been	made	
public		and	had		been	widely	reported	[Shell	UK,	1995].		Nevertheless,		a	few	days		later,	
Shell	announced	that	it	was	calling	off	the	deep-sea	storage	option	and	began	a	public	relations	campaign	to	try	to	
salvage	its	reputation.
In	 July	 1995,	 Shell	 hired	 a	 Norwegian	 company	 to	 conduct	 an	 independent	 audit	 of	 the	 allegations	made	 by	
Greenpeace	regarding	the	amount	of	oil	and	toxic	substances	in	Brent	Spar.	Just	before	the	report	(which	supported	
the	figures	provided	by	Shell)	was	released,	on	September	4,	1995,	Greenpeace	UK	sent	a	letter	of	apology	to	Shell	
UK	saying	that	“we	have	realised	in	the	last	few	days	that	when	the	samples	were	taken	the	sampling	device	was	
still	in	the	pipe	leading	into	the	storage	tanks,	rather	than	in	the	tank	itself	[…]	I	said	that	our	sampling	showed	a	
particular	quantity	of	oil	on	the	Brent	Spar.	That	was	wrong”	[Greenpeace,	1995].	Greenpeace’s	misrepresentation	
of	this	knowledge	had	a	huge	impact	on	its	campaign	and	on	the	outcome	of	the	Brent	Spar	conflict,	which	included	
an	estimated	financial	cost	to	Shell	of	£60-£100	million.
BSE and beef supply in the United Kingdom
- The UK government claimed that British beef was perfectly safe to eat.
From	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	 BSE	 outbreak	 in	 the	 1980s,	 knowledge	 was	 either	
misrepresented	by	 the	British	government	or	withheld.	After	 the	 initial	diagnosis	of	BSE	
in	 late	1986,	a	six	month	embargo	was	placed	on	the	sharing,	or	making	public,	of	any	
BSE-related	information.	Up	until	at	least	1990,	non-government	scientists	who	requested	
access	to	BSE	data	to	conduct	 further	studies	were	also	denied.	Government	scientists	
have	acknowledged	that	there	was	a	culture	of	suppressing	information,	to	the	point	that	
studies	revealing	damaging	evidence	were	refused	publication	permission	[Ashraf,	2000].	
The	withholding	 of	 such	 information	 allowed	 the	 government	 to	 publicly	 assert	 that	 BSE	was	 just	 like	 another	
version	of	scrapie	(a	non-transmissible	spongiform	encephalopathy	of	sheep)	and	that	there	was	“clear	scientific	
evidence	that	British	beef	is	perfectly	safe”	[UK	House	of	Commons,	1990].	Such	assertions	were	made	in	large	
part	to	protect	the	interests	of	the	British	beef	industry,	but	constituted	an	overstatement	of	the	level	of	certainty	
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A7 Understanding complex 
systems  
A lack of appreciation or understanding of 
the potentially multiple dimensions of a risk 
and of how interconnected risk systems can 
entail complex and sometimes unforeseeable 
interactions
Interactions	 among	 the	 components	 of	 a	 complex	
system	[OECD,	2003]	 raise	numerous	difficulties	 for	
risk	 assessment.	 For	 example,	 biological	 systems	
such	 as	 those	 involving	 influenza	 in	 human,	 pig	 or	
bird	 hosts,	 or	 environmental	 systems	 such	 as	 large	
ecosystems,	can	be	very	complex,	and	this	can	lead	
to	sometimes	unforeseeable	interactions	and	potential	
deficits.	 Such	 interactions	 include	 those	 involving	 a	
system’s	buffering	capacity,	which	can	serve	either	to	
amplify	(through	positive	feedback	loops)	or	attenuate	
(through	 negative	 feedback	 loops)	 the	 impact	 of	 a	
given	event	or	set	of	events	on	the	behaviour	of	the	
system.	In	practice,	there	is	ample	evidence	for	both	
risk	attenuation	and	 risk	amplification	 [Kasperson	et	
al.,	1988].	Additionally,	the	impact	of	events	occurring	
simultaneously	can	be	very	different	from	that	of	the	
same	 events	 occurring	 sequentially.	 Many	 of	 the	
concepts	and	methods	applied	in	risk	assessment	of	
simpler	 situations	will	 not	 be	 adequate	 if	 applied	 to	
complex	systems	[Lagadec,	2008].
It	becomes	difficult	to	identify,	understand	and	quantify	
the	 “causal	 links	 between	 a	 multitude	 of	 potential	
causal	agents	and	specific	observed	effects”	 [IRGC,	
2005].	 It	 is	difficult	 to	assess	 the	probability	and	 the	
consequences	 of	 a	 risk	 being	 realised,	 especially	
the	 rapid	 spread	 of	 damages	 across	 geographical,	
functional	or	sectoral	boundaries.	
Where	 systemic	 interactions	 are	 possible	 or	 likely,	
assessing	 risk	 problems	without	 acknowledging	 this	
complexity	 will	 not	 be	 fully	 informative	 [Sunstein,	
2005].	 For	 example,	 some	 risk	 assessments	 fail	 to	
take	indirect	effects	or	externalities	into	account2		and	
thus	 trade-offs	 in	 decision-making	 about	 complex	
systems	are	overlooked3.		As	a	result,	efforts	to	reduce	
risks	may	create	new	(secondary)	 risks,	unexpected	
consequences	may	 occur	 in	 areas	 or	 sectors	 other	
than	 those	 targeted,	and	 they	may	be	more	serious	
than	the	original	risk.	Finally,	risks	already	believed	to	
have	been	eliminated	“can	reappear	in	another	place	
or	in	a	different	form”	[Bailes,	2007].
Equally,	 the	 systemic	 nature	 of	 many	 risks	 means	
that	 there	are	 ramifications	 for	 the	assessment	 of	 a	
risk’s	scope	(domains	of	impact)	and	scale	(extent	of	
consequences).	 SARS	 was	 initially	 a	 new	 zoonotic	
disease	confined	to	China	but	spread	rapidly	to	many	
other	 countries	 and	 had,	 for	 example,	 a	 significant	
economic	impact	on	the	city	of	Toronto	as	well	as	on	
all	airline	companies	with	routes	in	the	Pacific	region.
Assessing	the	impact	of	systemic	interactions	is	one	
of	the	most	important	but	least	understood	aspects	of	
modern	risk	assessment.	The	way	to	address	this	is	not	
simply	through	a	cultural	change	in	the	risk	community	
but	through	a	sustained	research	programme	to	build	
better,	 validated	 tools	 that	 are	 applicable	 in	 these	
situations	and	 to	educate	 risk	 specialists	 to	prepare	
for	and	cope	with	such	situations.		
associated	with	the	knowledge	held	at	the	time.	No	scientific	evidence	yet	existed	regarding	BSE’s	transmissibility	
to	humans	from	contaminated	meat.	
The	 government	 backed	 up	 its	 assertions	 that	 British	 beef	was	 safe	 to	 eat	 by	 claiming	 that	 the	 precautionary	
regulatory	 controls	 it	 had	 implemented	would	prevent	 any	 contaminated	material	 from	entering	 the	 food	 chain,	
although	the	measures	were	not	designed	to	eliminate	exposure,	only	to	diminish	the	risk	[van	Zwanenberg	and	
Millstone,	2002].
Assertions	 regarding	 the	 safety	 of	 British	 beef	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 incorrect	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 public	 health	 was	
endangered	and	165	people	to	date	have	died	in	Britain	from	the	human	form	of	BSE.
		2)	For	example,	the	indirect	consequences	of	BSE	have	been	judged	“considerably	larger	than	its	direct	consequences”	[OECD,	2003].
		3)	On	the	pervasiveness	of	risk	trade-offs,	see	[Graham	et	al.,	1995].
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The subprime crisis in the United States
- Failure to adequately comprehend the complex dynamics of financial systems contributed to the severity of the US 
subprime crisis.
The	instigating	event	that	 led	to	the	subprime	financial	crisis	was	the	issuance	of	 loans	
(subprime	mortgages)	 to	people	who	could	not	afford	 them.	This	created	a	substantial	
amount	of	risk.	However,	an	important	secondary	problem	that	contributed	to	the	severity	
of	the	crisis	was	the	way	in	which	these	loans	were	re-packaged	into	complex	financial	
products	and	then	sold	to	investors	(securitisation).	A	lack	of	understanding	–	by	banks,	
investors,	borrowers,	lenders,	policymakers	and	regulators	–	of	the	complexities	of	these	
financial	products	(and	the	markets	in	which	they	are	traded)	led	them	to	miscalculate	and	
underestimate	risks.
(a)	Failure	to	understand	the	consequences	of	decisions	made	in	the	subprime	market:
While	subprime	mortgages	had	once	been	viewed	as	“a	positive	development”	by	many	(including	chairman	of	the	
Federal	Reserve	Board	Dr	Alan	Greenspan)	and	as	a	move	towards	the	democratisation	of	finance	(e.g.,	a	way	
to	allow	millions	of	low-income	earners	to	purchase	assets),	they	turned	out	to	be	something	of	a	“disaster	in	their	
implementation”	because	“they	lacked	the	kind	of	risk	management	institutions	necessary	to	support	the	increasingly	
complex	financial	machinery	needed	to	underwrite	them”	[Shiller,	2008].	This	complex	financial	machinery	included	
“a	blizzard	of	increasingly	complex	securities”	produced	by	Wall	Street.	These	securities	were	then	re-packaged	
to	form	other	kinds	of	asset-backed	securities	or	risk-swapping	agreements	so	that,	in	the	end,	the	final	product	
was	so	complex	that	it	was	difficult	or	impossible	for	investors	to	assess	the	real	risks	of	the	securities	they	were	
buying.	As	a	result,	investors	tended	to	put	their	trust	in	rating	agencies	that,	it	was	assumed,	had	adequate	data	
to	properly	assess	securities’	safety.	However,	rating	agencies	also	had	to	deal	with	increasing	complexity	in	the	
(often	misleading)	information	provided	to	them	by	the	originators	of	the	mortgage	loans	and	they	were	using	new,	
untested	models	to	evaluate	novel	loan	schemes.	This	combination	of	factors	led	them	to	seriously	miscalculate	
risks	in	many	instances	[Zandi,	2009].
(b)	Failure	to	assess	the	properties	and	dynamics	of	financial	systems:
At	the	regulatory	 level,	 there	was	also	an	important	 lack	of	understanding:	of	 the	nature	of	financial	markets;	of	
economic	bubbles,	their	causes	and	aftermath;	and,	of	the	numerous	feedback	loops	that	could	lead	problems	in	the	
housing	sector	to	cause	global	economic	chaos.	Some	commentators	believe	that	“policy-makers	and	regulators	had	
an	unappreciated	sense	of	the	flaws	in	the	financial	system”	[Zandi,	2009].	For	example,	the	US	Federal	Reserve	
Board’s	loose	monetary	policy	between	2000	and	2004	seems	to	have	increased	the	risk	of	financial	instability	in	
the	context	of	the	housing	bubble	that	was	growing	at	the	same	time.	Such	a	policy	(for	31	consecutive	months,	
the	base	inflation-adjusted	short-term	interest	rate	was	negative)	probably	would	not	have	been	implemented	and	
maintained	for	so	long	had	the	federal	regulators	been	able	to	fully	understand	the	complex	dynamics	of	the	system,	
the	nature	of	the	housing	bubble	and	the	probability	that	it	would	burst,	and	the	complicated	web	of	investments	
(including	from	overseas)	in	the	subprime	housing	market	[Shiller,	2008].
Fisheries depletion: Barents Sea capelin
- Fishing, combined with the unexpected effects of changes in the environmental conditions, depleted the Barents Sea 
capelin stock and the entire fish ecosystem. 
In	 the	1970s,	 the	Barents	Sea	capelin	stock	maintained	an	annual	fishery	with	catches	up	 to	 three	million	 tons	
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A8 Recognising fundamental or 
rapid changes in systems  
Failure to re-assess in a timely manner fast 
and/or fundamental changes occurring in risk 
systems
Risk	 assessment	 is	 most	 straightforward	 when	 the	
analyst	 uses	 established	 tools	 in	 a	 relatively	 stable	
environment,	where	an	accurate	picture	of	the	future	
can	be	predicted	by	extrapolating	from	past	experience.	
When	 risks	 emerge	 unexpectedly	 because	 of	 rapid	
changes	in	the	fundamentals	of	political,	technological,	
environmental	or	economic	systems,	risk	assessment	
becomes	far	more	difficult.	In	this	case,	risk	managers	
may	be	forced	to	move	away	from	using	experience-
based	assessments	(based	on	past	data)	and	towards	
exposure-based	assessments	 (based	on	anticipated	
data).	
In	 such	 dynamic	 circumstances,	 individuals	 often	
continue	to	behave	as	if	the	risks	follow	known	routines.	
They	fail	 to	recognise	the	fundamental	changes	that	
render	 simpler	 assumptions	 obsolete.	 Reactions	 to	
fundamental	changes	are	often	slow	or	non-existent	
because	analysts	and	decision-makers	do	not	expect	
or	recognise	them.
New	risks	can	emerge	rapidly	(e.g.,	the	early	stages	of	
the	SARS	epidemic)	or	they	can	be	characterised	by	
a	creeping	evolution	where	they	are	difficult	to	identify	
at	 an	 early	 stage,	 spread	 only	 gradually	 and	 have	
consequences	that	cannot	be	recognised	until	a	much	
later	stage	(e.g.,	the	effects	of	global	climate	change	
or	 the	negative	health	effects	of	asbestos	fibres).	 In	
either	case,	the	troublesome	trends	are	detected	too	
late.	
Fundamental	change	may	not	become	obvious	until	
a	 previously	 unknown	 threshold	 or	 “tipping	 point”	 is	
reached	and	the	system	disruptively	jumps	to	another	
[Gjøsæter	and	Bogstad,	1998].	The	stock	then	began	to	decline	and	in	1985	scientists	recommended	that	no	quota	
be	set	for	1986	[ICES,	1986].	The	Joint	Norwegian-Soviet	Fisheries	Commission	found	itself	unable	to	follow	this	
advice	for	political	reasons,	and	a	quota	was	set	for	1986	[Hønneland,	2006]	but	the	fishermen	were	not	able	to	
catch	even	this	quota	because	there	were	so	few	fish.	The	collapse	was	an	inescapable	fact	and	the	fishery	was	
closed	until	1991,	when	it	was	partially	reopened.
Although	 possible	 ecological	mechanisms	 had	 been	 hypothesised	 before	 the	 collapse	
[Hamre,	 1984;	 ICES,	 1986],	 these	 were	 far	 from	 established.	 The	 collapse	 was	 later	
explained	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 environmental	 conditions.	 One	 was	 the	 unforeseen	
importance	 for	 capelin	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 spring-spawning	 herring	 stock,	 which	 has	 its	
nursery	area	in	the	Barents	Sea.	Since	the	herring	stock	had	been	depleted	since	the	late	
1960s,	its	role	in	the	Barents	Sea	ecosystem	had	only	been	rarely	studied.	The	increased	
inflow	of	Atlantic	water	to		the		Barents		Sea	in	1983		provided		favourable		environmental	
conditions	 and	 	 resulted	 	 in	 an	 	 outstanding	 	 number	 of	 herring	 and	 cod	 larvae	 in	 the	Barents	Sea.	What	 the	
scientists	did	not	fully	realise	was	the	extent	to	which	the	young	herring	would		graze	on	the	young	capelin,	and	that	
cod	would	eat	a	significant	part	of	the	maturing	capelin	stock.	The	combination	of	massive	predation	and	fishing	
led	to	the	depleted	capelin	stock	[Tjelmeland	and	Bogstad,	1993].	The	lack	of	capelin	as	prey	fish	then	led	to	poor	
growth	and	high	mortality	among	the	fish,	marine	mammals	and	marine	birds	that	depend	on	them,	resulting	in	a	
more	or	less	collapsed	ecosystem	[Hamre,	2003].
As	a	consequence,	an	extensive	stomach-sampling	scheme	was	conducted	to	map	the	complex	interrelationships	
between	the	species	in	the	Barents	Sea	[Gjøsæter	et	al.,	2002].	Now	that	managers	are	warned	when	the	observed	
abundance	of	herring	larvae	is	high,	the	assessment	of	capelin	takes	into	account	the	predation	of	cod	and,	overall,	
uncertainties	are	better	addressed.
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state.	Such	threshold	levels	are	often	identified	in	the	
environmental	 domain	 (e.g.,	 pollution	 of	 lakes	 and	
rivers,	biodiversity	loss,	Gulf	Stream	turnaround),	but	
economic	systems	can	show	similar	behaviour	as	they	
are	 influenced	by	psychological	characteristics	(e.g.,	
herd	mentality).	Failures	to	react	to	such	fundamental	
changes	can	lead	to	disaster.	
The HIV/AIDS epidemic
- The uncontrolled and extensive spread of the virus was unanticipated and went unnoticed for a long time.
Since	 its	first	diagnosis,	 in	 the	US	(Los	Angeles)	 in	1981,	AIDS	–	a	new	disease	now	thought	 to	have	zoonotic	
origins	–	has	become	a	pandemic	of	disastrous	proportions,	with	epidemics	of	differing	severity	occurring	 in	all	
regions	of	the	globe.	At	least	25	million	deaths	have	already	occurred.	The	very	long	latency	period	of	the	AIDS-
causing	 human	 immunodeficiency	 virus	 (HIV)	 infection	 before	 disease	 symptoms	 became	 obvious	meant	 that,	
unlike	most	epidemics,	it	was	able	to	become	well-established	before	the	causative	agent	could	be	identified.
When	AIDS	was	first	recognised	as	a	distinct	disease	in	the	US,	more	than	100	cases	were	diagnosed	within	the	
first	six	months,	3,000	within	the	first	two	years	and,	by	August	1989,	100,000	cases	had	been	reported.	While	it	
took	eight	years	to	reach	the	first	100,000,	a	second	100,000	cases	were	reported	in	only	two	years	(November	
1991),	and	the	total	figure	surpassed	half	a	million	in	October	1995	[Osmond,	2003].	
Researchers	examining	earlier	medical	literature	have	estimated	that	some	persons	in	the	
US	must	have	been	infected	with	HIV	as	long	ago	as	the	1960s,	if	not	earlier	[Osmond,	
2003],	indicating	that	the	virus	had	been	spreading	for	some	time.	However,	accurate	risk	
assessment	was	hampered	by	the	long	latency	period,	which	meant	that	infection	was	“not	
accompanied	by	signs	and	symptoms	salient	enough	to	be	noticed”	[Mann,	1989],	and	in	
the	early	stages	by	scientific	disagreements	over	the	nature	of	the	causative	agent.	Once	
this	was	identified,		there	was		no	effective	treatment	and		there	was		disagreement		over	
preventive	measures	that	could	halt	the	virus’	spread.				
Only	when	the	frequency	of	infection	reached	a	certain	level	and	the	spread	of	the	disease	became	more	extensive	
did	the	public	in	general	realise	the	significance	of	the	risks	posed	by	HIV/AIDS.	It	was	not	until	1988	that	the	US	
government	began	a	national	effort	 to	educate	the	public	about	HIV/AIDS.	However,	 the	gay	community,	as	the	
most	affected	group,	reacted	with	more	speed	and	caution	in	assessing	the	risks	they	were	facing.	The	raising	of	
societal	awareness,	along	with	other	HIV-prevention	efforts,	saw	the	number	of	new	infections	in	the	US	decline	
rapidly	after	peaking	in	the	mid-1980s	[AMA,	2001].	Worldwide,	HIV	remains	a	huge	challenge	for	public	health	
officials,	despite	a	massive	infusion	of	funds	in	Africa	and	elsewhere	by	the	Bush	administration.
Potato blight and the Irish Potato Famine
- A technological advance changed the dynamics of a system, creating new risks through allowing the spread of 
pathogens. 
Late	 potato	 blight	 (Phytophthora	 infestans)	 is	 a	 virulent	 disease	 of	 potatoes	 which	
originated	in	the	highlands	of	Mexico	and	is	believed	to	have	reached	the	US	in	the	early	
1840s.	The	disease	thrives	in	cool,	moist	conditions	and	can	also	destroy	tomatoes.	The	
pathogen	–	an	oomycete	and	not,	strictly	speaking,	a	fungus	–	survives	on	infected	tubers	
[Karasevicz,	1995].
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A9 The use of formal models   
An over- or under-reliance on models and/or a 
failure to recognise that models are simplified 
approximations of reality and thus can be 
fallible
Risk	 assessors	 use	 formal	 (quantitative,	 semi-
quantitative	and	qualitative)	models	both	to	understand	
the	 relations	 between	 components	 of	 a	 system	and	
to	estimate	future	trends	under	various	assumptions.	
The	use	of	models	requires	an	understanding	of	their	
potential	as	well	as	of	their	associated	assumptions	and	
limitations.	Models	can	provide	useful	approximations	
of	“reality”	and	can	help	to	bring	clarity	to	complex	risk	
assessments	regarding	potential	future	outcomes.	For	
example,	 the	 use	 of	 epidemic	models	 constitutes	 a	
valuable	adjunct	for	decision-makers	by	allowing	them	
to	use	available	data	to	project	the	size	and	severity	of	
a	disease	outbreak,	while	in	the	field	of	climate	change,	
models	 are	 probably	 essential	 tools.	 Consequently,	
decision-makers	are	making	increasing	use	of	 large,	
complex	computer-based	models	for	exploring	options	
in	critical	areas	of	economic,	environmental	and	social	
risk.	
Typically,	models	consist	of	a	computational	projection	
forward	 in	 time	 of	 certain	 key	 parameters	 (e.g.,	
atmospheric	temperature,	economic	growth,	stocks	of	
natural	resources,	statistics	on	population	and	ageing,	
or	 the	 number	 of	 new	 cases	 of	 HIV/AIDS	 infection)	
based	 on	 historical	 data	 and	 expert	 judgement	 of	
parameters.	Given	 the	 intrinsic	 limitations	of	models	
and	 their	 possible	 deliberate	 or	 inadvertent	misuse,	
policymaking	 and	 decision-making	 that	 is	 solely	
informed	by	or	based	on	modelling	results	is	a	frequent	
source	of	controversy.	
Without	 proper	 safeguards,	 quality	 control	 and	
transparency,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 the	 wrong	 risk	
mitigation	measures	or	business	and	policy	decisions	
could	 be	 implemented	 based	 on	 faulty	models	 (i.e.,	
over-reliance	on	imperfect	models)	or,	conversely,	that	
the	necessary	risk	decisions	will	not	be	adopted	owing	
to	lack	of	confidence	in	the	ability	of	scientists	to	make	
accurate	 projections	with	models	 (under-reliance	 on	
useful	models).	Striking	the	right	balance	in	the	use	of	
models	in	decision-making	is	not	easy.	At	the	present	
time,	 formal	modelling	enjoys	widespread	support	 in	
the	scientific	community	and	 in	both	 the	private	and	
public	 sectors,	 even	 though	 particular	 models	 or	
modelling	 predictions	may	 be	 the	 source	 of	 intense	
criticism.
The	 growing	 recourse	 to	 models	 is	 linked	 to	 the	
fact	 that	 many	 risks	 (and	 other	 challenges	 facing	
modern	 societies)	 are	 impossible	 to	 comprehend	
using	 simple	 analytical	 or	 statistical	 methods.	 The	
challenges	 involve	 diverse	 elements	 that	 interact	 in	
complex	ways	on	very	 large	scales,	 thus	precluding	
the	 use	 of	 common	 sense	 or	 historical	 precedent.	
Often,	 the	 societal	 challenges	 are	 directly	 linked	 to	
scientific	and	technological	phenomena:	for	example,	
energy	 production,	 the	 geosphere,	 climate	 change	
and	 biodiversity.	 These	 phenomena	 are	 to	 a	 large	
extent	intrinsically	quantifiable	and	thus	amenable	to	
formal	modelling.	At	the	same	time,	the	rapid	growth	
In	the	1830s,	a	new	form	of	sailing	ship,	the	clipper,	began	to	replace	older,	slower	ships	transporting	goods	from	
the	Americas	to	Europe.	This	new	vessel	substantially	reduced	journey	times	but	also	allowed	potato	blight	to	reach	
Europe.	The	blight	had	previously	not	survived	the	journey	even	though	it	had	caused	the	destruction	of	potatoes	
on	board.	Potato	blight	 infection	was	noticed	 in	 the	 Isle	of	Wight	 (southern	England)	 in	1844.	 In	1845,	most	of	
Ireland’s	potato	crop	was	destroyed	by	blight	and	between	1845	and	1849	Ireland	suffered,	as		a	result		of	further	
potato	harvests	devastated		by		blight,	a		famine	that	was	one	of	Europe’s	worst	natural	disasters.		In	all,	Ireland’s	
population	fell	by	over	1.6	million	between	1841	and	1851.	One	million	people	are	believed	to	have	died	in	Ireland,	
with	starvation	and	typhus	the	main	causes,	and	a	further	million	emigrated,	many	on	“coffin	ships”	to	America	on	
which	as	many	as	20%	died	[Schama,	2002].
The	development	of	 the	clipper	constituted	a	fundamental	change	 in	 international	 trading	systems,	substantially	
increasing	the	speed	of	passenger	and	goods	movements	and	also	increasing	the	risk	of	spreading	diseases.	
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of	 information	 and	 communications	 technology	
(combined	 with	 the	 falling	 costs	 of	 memory	 and	
computational	hardware)	provide	a	strong	incentive	to	
create	and	apply	computer	models	to	guide	decision-
making	about	risk.	
Despite	 the	 usefulness	 of	 models,	 there	 may	 be	
situations	 where	 too	 little	 is	 known	 about	 a	 system	
or	 set	 of	 scenarios	 to	 permit	 useful	 modelling.	 For	
example,	 catastrophic	 losses	 in	 situations	 of	 high	
uncertainty	are	unpredictable	and	immeasurable,	and	
attempts	to	quantify	them	may	not	form	a	useful	basis	
for	action	[Weitzman,	2008].	Yet	it	may	not	be	obvious	
what	the	alternatives	to	 imprecise	computations	are,	
and	 decision-makers	 will	 typically	 seek	 some	 form	
of	 guidance,	 especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 potentially	
catastrophic	losses.	
In	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 decision-oriented	 models	
are	 not	 dismissed	 or	 ignored	 in	 the	 future	 owing	 to	
highly-publicised	cases	of	modelling	flaws	or	misuse,	
analysts	and	decision-makers	should	become	aware	
of	the	limitations	of	modelling	and	the	deficits	that	can	
result	 from	 their	 use	 and	 misuse.	 These	 limitations	
include:
•	 	 if	assumptions	regarding	the	phenomenon	being	
studied	are	incorrect,	the	results	may	be	of	limited	
(or	no)	validity;	
•			the	computer	programme	that	embodies	the	model	
may	 itself	be	an	extremely	complex	artefact	and	
it	may	behave	unpredictably,	but	in	ways	that	are	
not	self-evident	to	even	an	experienced	user;
•	 because	 complex	 models	 usually	 contain	 large	
numbers	of	adjustable	parameters,	the	outcomes	
of	the	computation	can	be	adjusted	(deliberately	or	
inadvertently)	so	as	to	agree	with	desired	values;
	
•		those	who	build	and	run	computer	models	do	not	
always	 make	 them	 transparent	 –	 they	 may	 not	
document	them	properly	and	do	not	always	make	
either	software	or	data	available	 for	 independent	
verification,	especially	by	critics;	
•	 the	 results	 that	 are	 presented	 to	 sponsors,	
colleagues	 or	 the	 public	may	 represent	 only	 the	
selected	 “best”	 instances	 of	 running	 the	 model,	
with	 dubious	 or	 incomprehensible	 results	 being	
suppressed;	
•	 results	 of	 computations	 that	 are	 presented	 for	
decision-making	purposes	often	do	not	adequately	
specify	the	associated	uncertainties	(“error	bars”)	
that	result	from	imperfections	in	the	modelling	and	
in	the	input	data;	and
•	 	 when	 the	 results	 of	modelling	 are	made	 public,	
most	journalists	do	not	have	the	scientific	expertise	
to	 independently	assess	the	results	derived	from	
complex	 models,	 so	 they	 tend	 to	 report	 as	 fact	
the	 most	 pessimistic	 or	 sensational	 projections	
and	 results,	 without	 accurately	 presenting	
uncertainties	 or	 alternative	 viewpoints	 or	without	
giving	 adequate	 emphasis	 to	 the	 prediction	 that	
has	the	most	scientific	support.	
Given	these	limitations,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	risk	
managers	and	policymakers	 (especially	professional	
politicians)	sometimes	incorrectly	extrapolate	or	even	
misinterpret	the	results	of	modelling	exercises	in	order	
to	support	long-held	personal	strategic	or	ideological	
positions.	Advocates	 from	 stakeholder	 groups	 (e.g.,	
environmental	 activists	 or	 industry	 associations),	
including	 academic	 scientists	 aligned	 with	 these	
groups,	 may	 behave	 in	 similar	 ways.	 The	 deficit	
applies	equally	to	business;	the	limitations	of	financial	
models	were	one	reason	for	the	subprime	crisis	and	
the	wider	economic	problems	it	caused	(see	below).	
Recognising	some	of	these	concerns,	the	US	federal	
government	has	issued	information	quality	guidelines	
that	 require	 all	 formal	 models	 used	 in	 regulatory	
policymaking	 to	 be	 transparent	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
data	 employed	 and	 the	model	 structure	 (with	 a	 few	
exceptions)	 [OMB,	 2002].	 There	 is	 also	 a	 trend,	
stimulated	 by	 some	 professional	 and	 scientific	
societies,	to	make	greater	use	of	websites	to	publicly	
disclose	 details	 about	 data	 and	 modelling	 structure	
that	 are	not	 publishable	 in	 a	 scientific	 journal	 (open	
source	access).	Despite	these	modest	efforts,	a	case	
can	be	made	that	there	is	a	need	for	more	international	
deliberation	and	standards	on	the	use	of	 large-scale	
computer	models	in	the	risk	handling	process.		
P 31
international risk governance councilRisk Governance Deficits
Fisheries depletion: Newfoundland cod
- Modelling used to estimate northern cod off Newfoundland proved erroneous.
Between	 the	 late	 1960s	 and	 the	 late	 1980s,	 industrial	 overfishing	managed	 to	wipe	 out	 the	Grand	Banks	 cod	
fishery,	once	considered	one	of	the	greatest	in	the	world,	to	the	point	that	biological	extinction	of	the	fish	stock	was	
considered	a	real	possibility	[McCay	and	Finlayson,	1995].	This	occurred	in	spite	of	the	government’s	employment	
of	mathematical	models	to	set	total	allowable	catches	(quotas).	While	models	can	be	very	useful	and		have		an	
important		place		in		fisheries		management,		this	example	demonstrates	that	models,	and	what	they	represent,	
are	complex	and	that	models	can	be	fallible.	How	models	are	used	is	thus	crucial	to	their	usefulness	and	potential	
success.
Re-assessments	of	the	abundance	of	northern	cod	indicate	in	hindsight	that	the	abundance	
was	overestimated	by	as	much	as	100%	 [Walters	and	Maguire,	1996].	There	 is	broad	
agreement	that	the	assessment	model	failed	to	represent	nature	and	the	impact	of	fishing	
in	a	way	that	was	adequate	for	policymaking.	However,	several	scientists	have	concluded	
that,	given	 the	data,	 the	knowledge	and	 the	managers’	dependence	on	a	number	 from	
the	fisheries	scientists	to	set	quotas,	the	collapse	could	not	have	been	foreseen	earlier	
[McGuire,		1997;			Shelton		and		Lilly,			2000;			Shelton,		2005].			In		spite		of		the		model’s
shortcomings	and	warning	voices	from	parts	of	the	inshore	fleet	and	the	scientific	society	[Finlayson,	1994;	Rose,	
2007],	the	mathematical	model	was	a	convenient	tool	for	policymakers	who	wanted	–	more	than	anything	–	to	avoid	
making	the	politically	disastrous	decision	to	halt	or	significantly	decrease	fishing	[Pilkey	and	Jarvis-Pilkey,	2007].	
Two	years	before	the	collapse,	the	scientists	became	confident	that	the	stock	had	been	severely	overestimated.	Yet,	
the	managers	chose	to	listen	to	the	still-optimistic	representatives	from	the	offshore	fleet	and	set	a	quota	of	twice	
the	level	recommended	by	the	scientists	[Rose,	2007].
Ultimately,	the	collapse	became	evident.	There	was	a	complete	closure	of	the	Grand	Banks	cod	fishery	in	1992	and,	
since	then,	the	fishery	has	been	reopened	only	sporadically	and	on	an	experimental	basis.	Cod	stocks	have	still	not	
recovered	sufficiently	to	allow	the	fishery	to	reopen	on	a	permanent	basis	[Hannesson,	2008].	The	overfishing,	with	
a	fortified	effect	from	environmental	changes,	may	have	changed	the	ecosystem	structure	[Frank	et	al.,	2005]	so	
that	a	recovery	in	the	near	future	cannot	be	taken	for	granted.	
The subprime crisis in the United States
- Over-reliance on, and over-confidence in, financial models led to miscalculation of risks.
If	the	financial	sector	largely	failed	to	see	the	2007	subprime	crisis	coming	and	was	unaware	
of	 the	 true	magnitude	 of	 the	 risks	 bound	 up	 in	 complex	 securities,	 some	 of	 the	 fault	 –	 	
besides	that	of	failing	to	analyse	fundamental	socio-economic	behaviours	–	must	be	laid	to	
a	failure	of,	and	over-reliance	on,	financial	models	(or	those	developing	such	models	and	
interpreting	their	data).
In	March	2008	(well	after	the	housing	bubble	had	burst	but	before	the	extent	of	the	consequences	could	be	gauged),	
Alan	Greenspan,	 former	 chairman	 of	 the	US	Federal	 Reserve,	wrote	 in	 the	Financial Times	 that	 “the	 essential	
problem	is	that	our	models	–	both	risk	models	and	econometric	models	–	as	complex	as	they	have	become	–	are	still	
too	simple	to	capture	the	full	array	of	governing	variables	that	drive	global	economic	reality.	A	model,	of	necessity,	is	
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A10 Assessing potential surprises 
Failure to overcome cognitive barriers 
to imagining events outside of accepted 
paradigms (“black swans”)
The	history	of	influenza	or	past	experiences	of	natural	
catastrophes	teaches	us	to	expect	surprises.	No	one	
can	reliably	anticipate	the	future.	This	deficit,	however,	
is	not	the	failure	to	predict	the	unpredictable	–	which	
is,	by	definition,	impossible	–	but	the	failure	to	break	
through	embedded	cognitive	barriers	to	imagine	events	
outside	the	boundaries	of	accepted	paradigms.	
Risk	assessors	and	decision-makers	may	not	realise	
that	 rare	 events	 can	 happen,	 presumably	 because	
they	 have	 never	 happened	 before,	 or	 not	 for	many	
decades.	For	example,	unexpected	events	of	extreme	
impact	(the	so-called	“black	swans”)	[Taleb,	2007]	or	
paradigm	shifts	that	undo	long-established	truths	must	
be	acknowledged.	Even	 if	 risk	assessors	are	aware	
that	such	events	and	developments	could	occur,	they	
may	 downplay	 them,	 ignore	 them	 or	 be	 helpless	 in	
considering	how	to	take	them	into	account	[Lagadec,	
2008].	
One	should	not	assume	that	rare	surprises	are	always	
bad.	But	regardless	of	whether	surprises	are	good	or	
bad,	better	information	and	preparedness	for	a	world	
with	surprises	make	organisations	more	resilient.	
One	 of	 the	 advantages	 of	 computer	 models	 is	
that	 they	 allow	 us	 to	 simulate	 the	 future	 based	 on	
alternative	 –	 even	 unlikely	 –	 scenarios.	 But	 more	
sophisticated	 tools	 to	 study	 and	 model	 risk	 issues	
will	not	necessarily	resolve	this	deficit	and	expansion	
into	 more	 qualitative	 tools	 like	 scenario	 planning	
may	also	be	needed.	What	is	necessary	as	well	is	a	
focus	on	creativity	and	an	openness	to	imagining	the	
atypical,	singular,	exceptional	or	even	inconceivable.	
This	 requires	 integrating	 lateral	 thinkers,	 including	
people	 from	outside	 the	established	circles,	 in	order	
to	contemplate	the	unknown	(and	even	the	completely	
unimagined).	 More	 importantly	 perhaps,	 there	 is	 a	
need	to	counteract	one	of	the	many	cognitive	biases	
potentially	 affecting	 judgement	 on	 global	 risks:	 “not	
knowing	 what	 we	 do	 not	 know”,	 and	 thus	 inviting	
potential	surprises	[Yudkowsky,	2008].
A	 key	 caveat	 is	 necessary	 here	 –	 each	 prediction	
from	 unconventional	 analysis	 should	 be,	 whenever	
possible,	 subjected	 to	 a	 “reality	 check”	 in	 which	
an	abstraction	from	the	full	detail	of	the	real	world”	[cited	in	Shiller,	2008].	The	variables	affecting	the	fortunes	of	the	
subprime	mortgage	market	were	so	many	and	so	complex	that	developing	accurate	models,	even	for	subsections	
of	the	securities	markets,	would	have	been	very	difficult,	to	say	the	least.	Another	difficulty	facing	modellers	was	
that	many	financial	products	and	loan	schemes	were	new	and	had	never	been	through	a	recession	or	a	slump	in	
housing	 values.	This	made	developing	accurate	models	 very	 challenging	 (not	 least	 because	modellers	 require	
historical	data	when	building	the	models)	and	increased	the	risk	that	the	models	“were	not	up	to	the	task	they	were	
asked	 to	perform”	 [Zandi,	2009].	Too	heavy	a	 reliance	on	such	shaky	models	 led	 to	serious	miscalculations	of	
risks	and	consequences	by,	for	example,	ratings	agencies	when	providing	opinions	about	the	creditworthiness	of	
securities	[Zandi,	2009].
George	Soros	has	contended	that	it	was	not	only	the	simplicity	of	models	or	an	over-reliance	on	them	that	proved	
dangerous.	He	has	also	criticised	as	false	and	in	urgent	need	of	replacement	“the	prevailing	paradigm	[that	‘financial	
markets	are	self-correcting	and	tend	towards	equilibrium’]	on	which	the	various	synthetic	instruments	and	valuation	
models	which	have	come	to	play	such	a	dominant	role	in	financial	markets	are	based”	[Soros,	2008].	Models	are	
based	on	knowledge,	causal	chains	and	interactions.	In	the	financial	sector,	however,	participants	cannot	base	their	
decisions	on	knowledge	because	in	economics,	as	opposed	to	systems	in	the	natural	sciences,	social	phenomena	
exert	a	significant	influence,	with	participants’	views	and	psychologies	coming	into	play	and	influencing	behaviours.	
This	 indeterminacy	 introduces	 uncertainty	 into	 events	 and	 “outcomes	 are	 liable	 to	 diverge	 from	 expectations”	
[Soros,	2008].
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surprising	possibilities	are	re-examined	in	light	of	what	
is	known	and	what	 is	unknown	about	 the	behaviour	
of	the	system.	Through	this	process	of	prediction	and	
validation,	the	performance	of	unconventional	thinkers	
can	 be	 compared	 to	 that	 of	 standard	 modellers,	
and	directions	 for	 further	analytical	 attention	 can	be	
identified.	Obviously,	the	unconventional	thinkers	will	
also	have	error	rates,	potentially	large	ones.
The	 concept	 of	 unknowability	 used	 in	 financial	 risk	
assessment	 refers	 to	 “situations	 where	 the	 events	
defining	 the	space	cannot	be	 identified	 in	advance”,	
where	 there	 is	 no	 underlying	 model	 and	 risk	
assessors	are	unable	to	understand	certain	observed	
phenomena,	 conceive	 hypotheses	 and	 theories,	 or	
even	 identify	 the	 phenomena	 [Diebold	 et	 al.,	 2008].	
It	 can	be	 illustrated	by	black	holes,	which	 scientists	
could	not	look	for	until	a	theory	was	developed	about	
how	 matter	 behaves	 under	 extreme	 gravitational	
forces.	 Unknowable	 risks	 are	 subject	 to	 deficits	 in	
their	 assessment	 until	 people	 understand	 that	 their	
existence	 is	 not	 predictable;	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	
characterised,	 measured,	 prevented	 or	 transferred;	
and	 that	 the	only	 strategy	 for	 dealing	with	 them	will	
be	to	develop	the	capacity	to	deal	with	surprises	(see	
cluster	B).	Thus,	we	turn	to	risk	management,	where	
failure	to	prepare	for	the	aftermath	of	surprises	(e.g.,	
public	health	emergencies	and	terrorist	events)	is	one	
example	of	a	wide	range	of	risk	governance	deficits.		
9/11 terrorist attacks
- Nobody imagined the occurrence of events that were unthinkable within the accepted paradigm of terrorist behaviour.
When	the	terrorist	attacks	of	9/11	occurred,	it	seems	that	nobody	had	expected	terrorists	
to	use	a	civil	aircraft	as	a	bomb,	as	opposed	to	bringing	a	bomb	onto	an	aircraft;	nor	had	
they	imagined	an	airliner	hijacking	where	no	demands	were	made	and	no	negotiation	was	
possible.	Even	though	a	terrorist	attack	was	not	completely	unexpected	[9/11	Commission	
Report,	 2004],	most	 people	 regard	 the	 9/11	 attack	 as	 unexpected	 because	 the	way	 in	
which	it	was	carried	out	was	unthinkable.	
This	could	be	blamed	on	intelligence	failures	–	failure	to	detect	early	warnings	that		such		an	attack		was		being	
planned	 	 [Gertz,	2002].	 	However,	 	any	 	such	 failure	must	be	at	 least	partly	 rooted	 in	an	 inability	 to	escape	 the	
accepted	paradigm	of	terrorist	behaviour.	As	David	T.	Jones,	a	retired	senior	US	State	Department	Foreign	Service	
officer	and	foreign	affairs	adviser	 to	 the	Army	Chief	of	Staff,	wrote	 in	2001:	“We	were	trapped	by	our	paradigm.	
Ever	since	‘modern’	terrorism	began	approximately	33	years	ago	with	the	assassination	of	US	ambassador	Gordon	
Mein,	experts	have	been	constructing	programs	to	handle	the	endless	sequence	of	hijackings	and	hostage	takings	
[…]	experts	determined	 from	 the	psychological	 patterns	of	 the	hostage	 takers	 that	negotiations	would	be	more	
productive	to	resolve	the	crises	and	save	lives	[…]	a	‘book’	was	devised	and	experts	trained	[…]	The	premise	was	
that	the	hostage	takers	wanted	something	negotiable;	this	time,	all	they	wanted	was	our	lives”	[Jones,	2001].
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Successful	 risk	 management	 builds	 on	 sound	 risk	
assessment.	
Governance	deficits	in	risk	management	occur	when	
the	capacity	to	accomplish	one	or	more	of	the	following	
functions	 is	 lacking:	 setting	 goals,	 developing	 and	
evaluating	 a	 reasonable	 range	 of	 risk	 management	
measures,	 consulting	 stakeholders,	 balancing	
efficiency	and	equity,	making	and	implementing	policies	
and	decisions,	resolving	conflicts,	and	evaluating	and	
monitoring	the	results	of	those	decisions	in	the	light	of	
actual	experience.	
Although	 they	 have	 different	 objectives	 and	
perspectives,	both	the	public	and	private	sectors	play	
important	roles	in	risk	management.	Each	has	separate	
responsibilities,	 but	 the	 effective	 management	 of	
many	systemic	risks	requires	cohesion	between	them.	
They	are	also	prone	to	some	similar	deficiencies.	For	
example,	 pressures	 to	 address	 near-term	 concerns	
are	 prevalent	 in	 both	 sectors.	 The	 scope	 for	 action	
of	 politicians	 may	 be	 shaped	 by	 electoral	 cycles,	
while	 corporate	 actors	 are	 constrained	 by	 pressure	
from	shareholders	to	maximise	profits	and	short-term	
shareholder	value.	Even	leaders	of	NGOs	dedicated	
to	long-term	causes	may	focus	on	short-term	publicity	
to	bolster	their	visibility	and	acquire	an	edge	in	fund-
raising	 and	 political	 influence.	 Thus,	 a	 pervasive	
challenge	in	risk	management	is	to	bring	some	long-
term	perspective	to	bear	on	risks	when	the	pressures	
to	focus	on	near-term	concerns	are	powerful.	This	is	
heavily	influenced	by	an	organisation’s	risk	culture.
Risk culture	 refers	 to	 a	 set	 of	 beliefs,	 values	 and	
practices	 within	 an	 organisation	 regarding	 how	 to	
assess,	 address	 and	manage	 risks.	A	major	 aspect	
of	risk	culture	is	how	openly	risks	can	be	addressed	
and	 information	 about	 them	 shared	 among	 a	 risk	
community.	 A	 risk	 culture	 defines	 an	 organisation’s	
risk	 appetite.	A	 good	 risk	 culture	 produces	 a	 sound	
basis	for	how	the	competing	pressures	for	risk	taking	
and	 risk	 avoidance	 are	 resolved.	 Either	 pressure,	
if	 allowed	 to	 dominate	 decision-making,	 can	 be	
detrimental.	 For	 example,	 public	 administrators	 are	
often	 criticised	 for	 being	 excessively	 risk	 averse,	 in	
part	 because	 they	 are	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 criticism	
for	 under-reacting	 to	 a	 risk	 than	 for	 over-reacting.	
Corporate	 leaders	are	often	criticised	 for	generating	
(or	 neglecting)	 environmental	 risks,	 in	 part	 because	
the	 damages	 from	 environmental	 risks,	 which	 are	
seen	as	an	externality,	are	rarely	reflected	in	corporate	
profit-loss	 determinations.	 Shell’s	 experience	 with	
its	disposal	of	the	Brent	Spar	platform	demonstrates	
how	deficits	 in	risk	governance	have	the	potential	 to	
significantly	affect	the	bottom	line.
Good	 public	 and	 corporate	 management	 requires	
a	 risk	 culture	 that	 combines	 a	 need	 for	 enlightened	
risk	 taking	 with	 a	 need	 for	 prudent	 risk	 aversion.	
Risk	 culture	 will	 vary	 between	 individual	 people,	
businesses,	governments	and	nations:	 some	will	 be	
more	 risk	averse	 than	others,	 and	 their	 level	 of	 risk	
aversion/acceptance	will	itself	vary	according	to	each	
risk	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 them.	 Good	 risk	 governance	
requires	acknowledgement	of	the	lack	of	a	universal	
risk	culture.
A	capacity	 to	manage	 risk	 is	also	dependent	on	 the	
extent	to	which	an	organisation	has,	or	can	access,	the	
knowledge,	skills	and	technical	and	financial	resources	
that	are	needed.	Additionally,	although	confronted	with	
the	 same	 risk	 landscape,	 governments,	 regulators	
and	industry	may,	depending	on	their	goals,	prioritise	
individual	risks	differently.	
In	practice,	risk	management	is	not	linear.	Respected,	
well-intentioned	 government	 officials	 and	 business	
risk	 managers	 may	 neglect	 serious	 risks,	 make	
decisions	with	unintended	outcomes	or	 side	effects,	
or	 micromanage	 risk	 to	 the	 point	 that	 technological	
innovations	 are	 suffocated.	 Even	 large,	 well-funded	
organisations	are	often	under-equipped	 to	deal	with	
the	challenges	of	uncertain	 future	 risks	 that	arise	 in	
complex	 technological	 and	 behavioural	 systems.	
Organisations	 may	 lack	 the	 capacity	 to	 anticipate	
and	respond	to	risks	in	a	preventive,	forward-looking	
manner,	and	they	may	lack	the	flexibility	and	resilience	
that	is	often	critical	when	responding	to	risks	that	occur	
unexpectedly.
II Cluster B: Managing risks 
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In	the	following	pages,	some	important	deficits	related	
to	risk	management	are	identified	and	illustrated	with	
examples	 from	 past	 and	 current	 risk	 governance	
activities.
B1 Responding to early warnings   
Failure of managers to respond and take action 
when risk assessors have determined from 
early signals that a risk is emerging
A	 risk	 management	 deficit	 may	 arise	 when	 signals	
indicating	 a	 risk	 is	 emerging	 are	 picked	 up	 and	
assessed,	 but	 no	 decisions	 or	 actions	 are	 taken	 to	
prevent	 or	 mitigate	 the	 risk.	 The	 detection	 of	 early	
warnings	is	useful	only	if	they	are	then	prioritised	and	
followed	by	a	response	that	is	commensurate	with	the	
significance	 of	 the	 potential	 risk.	 This	 often	 implies	
the	 need	 for	 a	 prioritisation	 of	 risks,	 to	 allow	 the	
organisation	to	concentrate	on	those	most	relevant	to	
it.
The	 failure	 to	 respond	 may	 occur	 for	 a	 variety	 of	
reasons.	 In	 some	 cases	 the	 information	 gathered	
from	 early	 warnings	 and	 risk	 assessment	 is	 not	
conveyed	 to	 decision-makers.	By	definition,	 there	 is	
no	definitive	proof	in	the	case	of	early	warnings,	and	
some	professionals	will	contest	the	evidence	in	terms	
of	 what	 it	 implies	 and	 what	 concrete	 action	 should	
be	 taken.	Related	 to	 this	 point,	 a	 failure	 to	 respond	
may	 reflect	 “unwillingness	 to	 know”	 if,	 for	 instance,	
the	information	causes	inconvenience	or	jeopardises	
particular	interests	or	ongoing	plans.	Therefore,	even	
if	there	is	an	adequate	early	warning	system,	there	is	
no	guarantee	that	decision-makers	will	respond	to	the	
signals	it	provides.	
Over-reacting	 to	an	early	warning	 is	also	a	potential	
deficit	 and	 can	 include	 unnecessary	 regulation	
(which	may	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 stifling	 innovation)	 or	
apprehension	 (which	can	provoke	counterproductive	
behaviours).	
For	example,	the	measles,	mumps	and	rubella	(MMR)	
controversy	of	1998	in	the	UK	led	to	a	reduction	in	the	
number	 of	 children	 being	 vaccinated.	A	 speculative	
claim	 was	made	 in	 the	medical	 journal	The Lancet	
that	 there	 was	 a	 link	 between	 the	 vaccine	 and	
autism,	 and	 in	 June	 2008	 the	UK	Health	Protection	
Agency	 reported:	 “Due	 to	 almost	 10	 years	 of	 sub-
optimal	 MMR	 vaccination	 coverage	 across	 the	 UK,	
the	 number	 of	 children	 susceptible	 to	 measles	 is	
now	 sufficient	 to	 support	 the	 continuous	 spread	 of	
measles”	[HPA,	2008].	Ultimately,	after	completion	of	
numerous	epidemiological	studies,	it	was	determined	
that	there	was	no	credible	evidence	of	a	link	between	
use	of	the	vaccine	and	autism	[Wakefield	et	al.,	1998;	
IOM,	2004].
Hurricane Katrina
- Failure to respond to early warnings of the hurricane danger to New Orleans resulted in disaster.
The	disaster	that	resulted	when	Hurricane	Katrina	hit	New	Orleans	on	August	29,	2005	
cannot	be	classified	as	a	surprise.	In	both	the	long	and	the	short	terms,	ample	warning	of	
the	disaster	was	met	with	an	insufficient	response.
In	the	long	term,	the	fact	that	New	Orleans	was	susceptible	to	a	levee	collapse	was	well	
known	and	the	threat	of	a	hurricane	causing	such	damage	even	had	its	own	name:	“the	
New	Orleans	scenario”.	In		the	years		prior	to		Katrina,	Federal	Emergency		Management	
Agency	(FEMA)	staff	ranked	the	New	Orleans	scenario	as	one	of	the	most	critical	potential	disasters	facing	the	
US.	Nevertheless,	concern	was	not	matched	by	resources	to	respond,	and	it	took	FEMA	five	years	to	find	sufficient	
funding	for	a	partial	simulation	exercise	[FEMA,	2004]	to	model	the	effect	of	a	hurricane	hitting	New	Orleans.	Even	
then,	the	funds	were	insufficient	to	include	an	evacuation	in	the	simulation.	
In	the	short	term,	the	National	Weather	Service	issued	grave	warnings	in	the	days	before	the	hurricane’s	landfall.	
Such	warnings	convinced	the	governors	of	Mississippi	and	Louisiana	to	declare	states	of	emergency	on	Friday,	
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three	days	before	the	hurricane	reached	land.	However,	the	mayor	of	New	Orleans	did	not	order	an	evacuation	until	
Sunday	morning.	Similarly,	federal	responders	also	lacked	urgency,	with	their	initial	response	after	landfall	marked	
by	inertia	[Moynihan,	2008].	
Fisheries Depletion: North Sea herring 
- A quick reaction to early warning signals avoided collapse.
A	positive	example	of	how	previous	failures	led	to	improved	risk	governance	is	the	case	of	
the	North	Sea	herring	fishery.	This	fishery	suffered	a	severe	collapse	in	1975-76	following	
failures	by	regulators	to	act	on	early	warning	signs	that	fish	stocks	were	unhealthily	low,	
even	 though	 rapid	declines	 in	spawning	stock	biomass	and	catches	composed	of	80%	
juvenile	fish	were	observed	throughout	the	1960s.	The	fishery	was	closed	in	1978	and	it	
took	19	years	for	stock	to	recover.	Upon	the	reopening	of	the	herring	fishery	in	1981,	efforts	
were	made	to	improve	the	management	of	fish	stocks	[CEFAS,	1999]	and,	in	1995,	when	
early	warning	 signs	 again	 showed	 that	 fish	 stocks	were	 becoming	dangerously	 low,	 quick	 and	drastic	 action	 –	
including	an	EU/Norway	agreement	on	fishery	management	 in	1997	–	was	 taken	 to	avoid	another	collapse.	By	
2003,	 the	 stock	 had	 recovered	without	 requiring	 even	 temporary	 closures	 of	 the	 fishery	 [Simmonds,	 2007].	An	
important	reason	for	the	success	was	the	support	from	the	fishing	industry.	Why	the	herring	industry	in	particular	has	
been	more	supportive	of	precautionary	management	actions	than	many	other	fisheries	can	partly	be	explained	by	
the	memory	of	the	earlier	collapse	[Simmonds,	2007].	But	perhaps	more	importantly,	the	number	of	fishing	vessels	
and	companies	involved	in	the	fishery	is	small	and	the	businesses	are	well	enough	capitalised	to	benefit	from	long-
term	planning.
BSE in the United Kingdom 
- Ignoring early warnings increased risks to human health.
The	 incorporation	 of	 rendered	 meat	 and	 bonemeal	 into	 animal	 feed	 creates	 a	 number	 of	 risks	 related	 to	 the	
transmission,	recycling	and	amplification	of	pathogens.	Such	risks	were	recognised	well	before	the	emergence	of	
BSE.		In		the		UK,		the		Royal		Commission		on		Environmental		Pollution		recommended			in		1979			that		minimum
processing	standards	be	 implemented	by	 the	 rendering	 industries	 in	order	 to	minimise	
the	potential	 for	 spreading	disease	 [RCEP,	1979].	The	 incoming	Thatcher	government	
withdrew	 these	 proposed	 regulations,	 preferring	 to	 let	 industry	 decide	 for	 itself	 what	
standards	to	use.	In	retrospect,	it	seems	that	the	failure	to	act	at	this	point	to	mitigate	the	
general	 risk	of	disease	 transmission	may	have	had	an	 impact	on	 the	 later	outbreak	of	
BSE,	given	that	the	disease	“probably	originated	from	a	novel	source	in	the	early	1970s”	
[BSE	Inquiry,	2000b].
Early	 signs	 that	 BSE	might	 be	 transmissible	 to	 humans	 were	 observed	 by	 scientists	 and	 government	 officials	
throughout	 the	 period	 from	 1986	 (the	 time	 of	 first	 diagnosis	 in	 cattle)	 to	 1995	 (when	 vCJD	was	 first	 observed	
in	humans).	Such	observations	are	noted	 in,	 for	example,	 the	minutes	of	a	meeting	of	 the	National	 Institute	 for	
Biological	Standards	and	Control	 in	May	1988,	where	it	was	concluded	that	“by	analogy	(with	scrapie	and	CJD)	
BSE	may	be	transmissible	to	humans”	[cited	in	van	Zwanenberg	and	Millstone,	2002].	The	diagnosis	in	May	1990	
of	a	domestic	cat	with	a	previously	unknown	spongiform	encephalopathy	resembling	BSE	indicated	that	the	disease	
could	infect	a	wider	range	of	hosts,	and	in	August	1990	BSE	was	experimentally	transmitted	to	a	pig	via	injection	of	
BSE-infected	material	into	its	brain.	
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According	to	the	BSE	Inquiry,	“these	transmissions	were,	to	put	it	neutrally,	consistent	with	the	possibility	that	BSE	
was	transmissible	to	humans”	[BSE	Inquiry	2000a,	Ch	5	and	Ch	6:	para	644].	Responses	to	such	early	warnings	of	
potential	dangers	to	human	health	(e.g.,	the	Specified	Bovine	Offal	ban	of	1989)	were	too	weak,	too	late,	or	badly	
implemented	and	enforced.	This	may	have	been	partly	a	result	of	an	“unwillingness	to	know”	about	the	problem,	
partly	because	of	 the	economic	harm	 this	knowledge	would	cause	 the	UK	beef	 industry	and	partly	because	of	
failures	in	institutional	capacities	and	procedures
Regulation of the artificial sweetener saccharin 
- Over-reaction to an early warning based on poor scientific evidence led to unnecessary regulation.
Saccharin	has	been	used	as	an	artificial	sweetener	in	food	for	over	100	years	and	controversy	over	whether	its	
consumption	is	hazardous	to	human	health	has	been	ongoing	for	almost	as	long.	It	was	in	1907,	as	a	result	of	the	
Pure	Food	and	Drug	Act	(1906),	that	the	United	States	Department	of	Agriculture	first	began	to	examine	saccharin	for	
potential	adverse	health	effects	[Priebe	and	Kauffman,	1980],	followed	by	a	failed	attempt	(due	to	lack	of	evidence)	
to	ban	saccharin	in	1911	[FDA,	1999].	In	the	1970s,	three	studies	in	which	rats	were	fed	high	concentrations	of	
saccharin	linked	the	additive	to	increased	rates	of	bladder	cancer	[Arnold,	1984].	This	was	interpreted	as	an	early	
warning			by			the			Canadian				government			which,			despite			the			scarce				scientific				evidence,			took			strongly	
precautionary	actionand	banned	the	use	of	saccharin	as	a	food	additive	[le	Riche,	1978].	
The	FDA	proposed	a	similar	ban	 in	 the	US,	despite	saccharin	being	 the	only	available	
alternative	to	sugar	at	the	time	[FDA,	1999].	Public	outcry	spurred	Congress	to	impose	a	
moratorium	on	the	ban	to	allow	for	further	scientific	study,	but	with	the	condition	that	foods	
containing	saccharin	carry	the	warning	label:	“Use	of	this	product	may	be	hazardous	to	
your	health.	This	product	contains	saccharin,	which	has	been	determined	to	cause	cancer	
in	laboratory	animals”	[FDA,	1999].
Following	these	events,	a	great	deal	of	scientific	research	was	done	on	saccharin,	none	of	which	supported	the	
theory	 that	saccharin	caused	cancer	 in	humans.	An	extensive	 review	by	 the	 International	Agency	 for	Research	
on	Cancer	concluded	 that	 “there	 is	no	consistent	evidence	 that	 the	 risk	of	cancer	 is	 increased	among	users	of	
saccharin”	[IARC,	1982	cited	in	Chappel,	1994].	The	mechanism	by	which	large	doses	of	saccharin	cause	cancer	
in	rats	 is	unlikely	to	be	relevant	to	 low-dose	human	exposures	[Ellwein	and	Cohen,	1990]	and,	 in	2000,	the	US	
removed	 saccharin	 from	 its	 official	 list	 of	 carcinogens	 and	 repealed	 the	 law	 requiring	 warning	 labels	 on	 food	
[Graham,	2003].	
B2 Designing effective risk 
management strategies 
Failure to design risk management strategies 
that adequately balance alternatives
Successful	 risk	 management	 requires	 setting	 an	
objective,	designing	a	strategy	to	reach	the	objective,	
and	 planning	 and	 acting	 to	 implement	 this	 strategy.	
Deficits	will	be	found,	for	example,	when	there	is	(a)	no	
clear	objective,	(b)	no	adequate	risk	strategy,	or	(c)	no	
appropriate	 risk	 policy,	 regulation	 or	 implementation	
plan.	When	 there	 are	 two	 or	 more	 objectives	 (e.g.,	
economic	 prosperity	 and	 environmental	 protection),	
deficits	 can	 arise	 from	 a	 preoccupation	 with	 one	
objective	to	the	exclusion	of	the	other.	
In	 both	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors,	 it	 is	 the	 risk	
manager’s	 task	 to	 design	 and	 implement	 effective	
policies	and	strategic	decisions.	That	task	is	not	easy	
to	 accomplish	 for	 persistent	 risks	 that	 have	 defied	
elimination	for	centuries	(e.g.,	abuse	of	alcohol)	and	
for	uncertain	risks	that	may	be	caused	by	an	emerging	
technology	(e.g.,	nanotechnology).	In	the	case	of	risks	
relating	 to	 electromagnetic	 fields,	 the	 decision	 by	
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some	insurance	companies	to	write	specific	exclusion	
clauses	[Allianz,	2007]	represents	a	strategic	decision	
to	make	a	trade-off	between	potential	short-term	loss	
due	 to	 missed	 business	 opportunities	 and	 potential	
long-term	liability	risks.	Regardless	of	the	nature	of	the	
risk,	effectiveness	 implies	an	explicit	 goal	 (or	goals)	
for	risk	management,	including	systems	for	measuring	
progress	 towards	 the	 goal	 once	 risk	 management	
decisions	 are	 implemented.	 It	 is	 not	 only	 the	 public	
sector	which	must	develop	effective	strategies	for	risk	
management.	Whether	 as	 the	 result	 of	 government	
regulation,	product	liability	and	personal	injury	laws	or	
the	need	to	manage	risk	as	part	of	a	broader	approach	
to	 portfolio	 management,	 businesses	 also	 need	 to	
set	 and	 implement	 risk	management	 strategies	 that	
encourage	 customer	 satisfaction	 and	 shareholder	
value.	Failures	imply	risk	to	both	the	bottom	line	and	a	
company’s	wider	reputation.	
An	ineffective	regulatory	regime	may	be	harmful	for	the	
regulated	industry	as	well	as	the	intended	beneficiaries	
of	the	regulatory	programme	(e.g.,	consumers,	workers	
or	community	residents).	For	example,	there	may	be	a	
need	to	put	some	regulation	in	place	quickly	to	ensure	
safety	while	 the	opportunities	associated	with	a	new	
technology	are	explored.	Yet,	the	investment	necessary	
to	support	technology	development	may	depend	on	a	
favourable	and	predictable	regulatory	environment.	If	a	
regulatory	system	is	not	effective,	it	may	be	vulnerable	
to	 public	 criticism	 and	 to	 ill-considered	 reforms	 that	
reduce	the	confidence	of	investors	in	new	technology,	
constrain	product	development	and	undermine	public	
acceptance	of	an	industrial	innovation.		
If	it	is	not	known	whether	a	regulation	will	be	effective,	
it	may	still	be	appropriate	to	apply	adaptive	regulation	
and	evaluate	experience.	For	example,	management	
of	 novel	 risks	 could	 be	 done	 through	 the	 use	 of	
instruments	such	as	containment,	which	may	limit	the	
use	of	 a	 new	 technology	 (or	 practice)	 in	 space	and	
time	 to	 gain	 more	 experience	 with	 uncertain	 risks	
and	 benefits.	 Regulation	 can	 then	 be	 revised	 on	 a	
dynamic	basis	according	to	the	results	of	evaluations.	
For	example,	 it	has	been	recommended	that	carbon	
capture	 and	 storage	 systems	 at	 coal-fired	 power	
plants	 be	 regulated	 in	 this	manner,	 in	 order	 both	 to	
minimise	 risks	and	 to	maximise	 the	 information	 that	
can	 be	 applied	 to	 later	 regulatory	 decisions.	 When	
regulatory	effectiveness	has	not	yet	been	measured	
or	 proven,	 an	 adaptive	 governance	 approach	 using	
flexible	and	resilient	strategies	may	be	advisable.
BSE in the United Kingdom 
- Heightened economic losses as a result of trying to protect both public heath and industrial interests.
It	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 UK	 government	 gave	 greater	 priority	 to	 economic	 interests	
than	to	the	protection	of	public	health	in	the	handling	of	the	BSE	crisis.	For	example,	the	
specified	bovine	offal	(SBO)	ban	of	1989	was	one	of	the	major	controls	put	in	place	to	try	
to	stop	the	spread	of	infection.	This	ban	was	an	effective	measure,	but	it	could	have	been	
made	even	more	so	had	economic	interests	not	caused	a	policy	trade-off	to	be	made.	As	
it	happened,	only	those	tissues	of	the	lowest	commercial	value	were	specified.	Tissues	of	
higher		commercial	value,	or		those	that		would	have	been		very	hard	to	remove	and		thus	
have	raised	abattoir	costs,	were	exempt	[BSE	Inquiry,	1999].	Therefore,	the	risks	to	public	health	were	traded	off	
against	the	risks	to	industry,	and	the	chances	of	human	exposure	were	not	diminished	as	much	as	they	could	have	
been.
The United States’ biofuels policy  
- Effective with respect to energy security and agricultural development, but not to environmental protection. 
Until	recently,	the	great	promise	of	biofuels	was	that	they	could	increase	energy	security,	decrease	greenhouse	gas	
emissions	and	provide	a	substantial	boost	to	the	agricultural	sector	–	all	at	the	same	time.	Indeed,	all	three	of	these	
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objectives	have	been	used	to	justify	the	biofuel	subsidies	and	mandates	pursued	by	the	US	government	[Rubin	et	
al.,	2008].	For	example,	the	Energy	Independence	and	Security	Act	of	2007	emphasises	the	first	two	objectives	
[Energy	Independence	and	Security	Act,	2007,	see	Title	II],	while	the	objective	of	boosting	domestic	agriculture	is	
implied	by	provisions	in	Title	IX	of	the	2002	and	2008	Farm	Bills	[US	Farm	Bill,	2002;	US	Farm	Bill,	2008].
Recent	 studies	on	 the	environmental	 impacts	of	 biofuels	have	 called	 into	question	 the	
compatibility	of	the	three	policy	objectives.	The	widespread	production	and	use	of	corn-
based	ethanol	may	be	generating	more	 carbon	dioxide	emissions	 than	 the	petroleum-
based	products	that	are	being	replaced.	 In	this	case,	more	serious	analysis	 is	required	
to	 determine	 whether	 the	 objectives	 are	 conflicting	 and,	 if	 so,	 what	 the	 right	 balance	
should	be.	 In	 the	US,	 it	seems	 that	energy	security	and	agricultural	development	have	
overwhelmed	consideration	of	the	environment.			
B3 Considering a reasonable 
range of risk management 
options 
Failure to consider a reasonable range of risk 
management options (and their negative or 
positive consequences) in order to meet set 
objectives
A	 risk	 deficit	 occurs	 when,	 for	 reasons	 such	 as	
familiarity,	 prior	 use	 or	 time	 constraints,	 the	 risk	
manager	 selects	 a	 favoured	 option	 to	 manage	 risk	
without	either	considering	other	promising	options	or	
adequately	justifying	and	communicating	this	choice.	
Such	risk	management	options	include,	for	example,	
precautionary	or	conventional	risk-based	approaches	
–	even,	in	some	circumstances,	simply	doing	nothing.	
A	filtering	process	is	necessary	to	distinguish	the	most	
promising	risk	management	options.	
As	more	 than	 one	 option	 is	 considered,	 a	 range	 of	
consequences	 (in	 addition	 to	 relative	 effectiveness)	
may	 be	 considered.	 Trade-offs	 between	 different	
consequences	(good	and	bad)	may	need	to	be	made.	
The	 manager	 should	 not	 necessarily	 pre-determine	
a	preference	for	one	outcome	over	the	other.	 It	may	
be	useful	to	perform	a	form	of	multi-criteria	analysis,	
where	 all	 the	 consequences	 (including	 financial,	
environmental	 and	 social	 benefits	 and	 costs)	 of	
different	risk	management	alternatives	are	compared	
in	a	rigorous	manner.	One	alternative	may	be	superior	
with	respect	to	near-term	effectiveness,	while	another	
Protecting the safety of workers  
- Revising regulation to increase its effectiveness.
The	US	Occupational	Health	and	Safety	Administration	(OSHA)	began	operations	in	1971.	
One	of	OSHA’s	policy	objectives	was	to	reduce	the	rate	of	worker	injury	through	enforcement	
policies	 that	would	motivate	employers	and	employees	 to	adhere	 to	established	safety	
standards.	This	policy	objective	was	explicit,	measurable	by	injury	data	reported	to	OSHA	
by	firms	and	pursued	by	OSHA	through	a	policy	of	increased	frequency	of	inspections	at	
workplaces	and	 the	 imposition	of	 financial	 penalties	 for	 violations.	Early	evaluations	of	
OSHA’s				activities			(1972			to			1975)			found		no			evidence			that			the			reported			injury	
rate	was	reduced	by	the	increased	risk	of	inspection	and	punishment	for	violations.	As	a	result,	OSHA	shifted	the	
enforcement	policy	to	emphasise	inspections	and	punishment	at	workplaces	with	a	history	of	serious	violations.	
After	this	shift	in	practice,	it	is	estimated	that	OSHA	did	accomplish	a	5-10%	reduction	(1975-83)	in	the	workplace	
injury	rate	[Viscusi,	1992].
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may	 be	 superior	 with	 respect	 to	 technological	
innovation	and	long-term	effectiveness.
The	inappropriate	use	of	a	precautionary	approach4		or,	
vice-versa,	the	neglect	of	it,	is	often	seen	as	a	failure	
in	choosing	an	appropriate	risk	management	option.	
When	 decisions	 must	 be	 made	 about	 whether	 an	
activity	needs	to	be	avoided	or	about	the	likelihood	that	
this	activity	is	unsafe,	scientific	studies	are	conducted,	
often	 leading	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 uncertainties	
or	 thresholds	 for	 the	 probability	 or	 likelihood	 that	
the	 activity	 is	 unsafe.	 For	 example,	 when	 these	
uncertainties	 are	 high	 (or	 perceived	 to	 be	 high)	 or	
when	thresholds	are	low,	decision-makers	often	opt	for	
a	precautionary	approach.	But	when	there	are	multiple	
stakeholders,	the	differences	in	their	perception	of	(a)	
the	benefit	and	cost	of	avoidance	as	well	as	of	(b)	the	
accuracy	of	the	information	provided	by	the	scientific	
study	may	result	in	different	evaluations,	for	example	
of	the	advisability	of	taking	a	precautionary	approach	
which	could	lead	to	lost	opportunities.
Risk	management	failures	also	arise	when	decision-
makers	 have	 neglected	 an	 entire	 set	 of	 risk	
management	options,	such	as	those	that	aim	to	build	
redundancies	and	 resilience	 into	systems	 that	might	
be	 exposed	 to	 unknown	 or	 uncertain	 threats.	 Such	
actions	 can	 reduce	 system	 vulnerabilities	 and	 allow	
for	 a	 quicker	 recovery	 after	 a	 hazardous	 event	 has	
occurred	 [IRGC,	2005].	Building	 redundancy	 is	 thus	
a	 risk	 management	 strategy	 which,	 by	 increasing	
resilience,	can	be	a	valid	approach	to	responding	to	
uncertain	 risks	and	should	be	among	 the	options	 to	
be	considered.
Fisheries management 
- Drawing from past experience when choosing risk management measures.
Measures	 to	 reduce	 the	 impact	of	fishing	 include	quotas,	closed	seasons	and	areas,	and	restrictions	on	fishing	
gear.	For	such	measures	to	be	effective	there	must	be	a	sufficient	control	and	enforcement	system	in	place.	Two	
classes	of	management	tools	serve	particularly	well	in	providing	incentives	for	responsible	fisheries:	rights-based	
management	and	participatory	governance.	
It	is	often	important	to	divide	a	fish	stock	among	different	nations	or	other	groups.	A	divisible	quota	is	usually	required	
because	other	approaches,	such	as	limits	on	fishing	effort,	are	too	difficult	to	measure	for	distribution.	Even	when	
an	overall	quota	is	set	that	guarantees	ecological	sustainability,	economic	waste	is	created	when	fishermen	lack	
secure	rights	to	the	resource.	In	this	case	their	incentive	is	to	catch	as	many	fish	as	possible	as	quickly	as	possible	
before	the	quota	is	reached.	This	competitive	“race	to	fish”	can	lead	to	excessive	harvests,	industry	lobbying	for	
larger	quotas	and	generally	poor	stewardship	of	fish	stocks.	
Rights-based	management	 is	a	 regulatory	 tool	 to	prevent	 these	drawbacks.	 It	can	 take	
many	forms,	all	of	which	provide	a	rights	holder	with	a	certain	share	of	the	fishery	whether	
they	are	an	individual,	a	cooperative	or	a	community.	The	greatest	economic	efficiency	is	
achieved	when	these	rights	are	permanent,	secure	and	transferable.	Individual	transferable	
quotas	(ITQs)	allocate	each	fisherman	a	certain	portion	of	the	overall	catch	quota,	which	
he	can	use	or	trade.	This	creates	incentives	to	increase	economic	efficiency	in	a	fishing	
fleet.				Examples			of			rights-based			management			where			the		objective			is		to			protect	
fishing	communities	are	territorial	use	rights	in	fishing	(TURFs),which	specify	the	right	to	specific	fishing	locations,	
and	community	quotas,	where	fish	quotas	are	allocated	to	fishing	communities.
Iceland	was	among	the	first	countries	to	introduce	ITQs.	The	ITQ	system	has	led	to	substantial	increases	in	economic	
efficiency	[Arnason,	2006],	but	also	to	quota	concentrations,	causing	a	concentration	of	wealth	and	marginalizing	
fisheries-dependent	coastal	communities	[Pálsson	and	Helgason,	1995].
4)	IRGC	refers	to	the	definition	given	in	the	Rio	Declaration	on	Environment	and	Development,	1992:	Principle	15	states	“In	order	to	protect	the	envi-
ronment,	the	precautionary	approach	shall	be	widely	applied	by	States	according	to	their	capabilities.	Where	there	are	threats	of	serious	or	irreversible	
damage,	lack	of	full	scientific	certainty	shall	not	be	used	as	a	reason	for	postponing	cost-effective	measures	to	prevent	environmental	degradation.”
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The	pollock	fishery	in	Alaska	is	certified	as	sustainable	by	the	Marine	Stewardship	Council.	The	fishery	is	formed	
by	cooperatives	with	pre-set	quota	shares.	Although	 these	 rights	have	been	an	 incentive	 to	 increase	economic	
investments	and	gains,	 they	do	not	provide	sustainability	on	 their	own.	The	North	Pacific	Fishery	Management	
Council,	 which	 also	 set	 regulations	 for	 the	 pollock	 fishery,	 provides	 precautionary	 fisheries	 management	 with	
relatively	low	harvest	rates	and	strict	bycatch	regulations.	Also,	each	pollock	vessel	has	complete	observer	coverage	
so	that	there	are	no	compliance	problems	[Witherell	et	al.,	2000].
Managing pesticides 
- Regulation as incentive or constraint – how different options influence industrial innovation.
Pesticides	are	 intentionally	 toxic,	which	calls	 for	 regulation	 to	ensure	 that	products	are	
safe,	effective	and	of	high	quality.	However,	regulation	can	itself	induce	other	types	of	risks	
because	it	may	constrain	innovation.	
Pesticide	 regulations	 can	 be	 categorised	 along	 two	 scales:	 enabling	 (providing	
encouragement	or	inducements	to	undertake	a	desired	course	of	action)	versus	constraining	
(creating	disincentives	for	undertaking	undesirable	actions);	and	indiscriminate across	a	
range	of	products	versus	discriminating	among	products	on	some	policy	basis	[Tait	et	al.,	2006;	Chataway	et	al.,	
2006;	Tait	et	al,	2001].		
The	US	Food	Quality	Protection	Act	(FQPA)	1996	is	both	enabling	and	discriminating.	It	created	a	“fast	track”	for	
regulating	pesticides	with	a	better	health	or	environmental	safety	profile	 than	products	currently	on	 the	market.	
This	enabled	companies	with	such	products	to	gain	an	advantage	over	others	and	changed	the	behaviour	of	some	
companies.	It	led	to	pesticide	candidates	with	better	properties	displacing	others	in	the	queue	for	registration,	so	
that	pesticides	without	these	attributes	could	not	be	registered	within	a	reasonable	timescale.	This	was	constraining	
for	companies	that	did	not	have	these	“better”	products	in	their	pipelines,	and	acted	as	a	stimulus	to	move	their	
research	and	development	in	this	direction.
The	European	Drinking	Water	Directive	(DWD)	(80/778/EEC,	now	replaced	by	the	EU	Water	Framework	Directive)	
was	constraining	and	indiscriminate.	As	framed	in	1998,	it	set	a	very	low	limit	(0.1ppm)	on	the	permitted	level	of	
contamination	of	drinking	water	reservoirs	by	any	pesticide.	It	acted	as	a	constraint,	imposing	penalties	rather	than	
creating	an	incentive	as	in	the	FQPA.	It	also	did	not	discriminate	between	pesticides	with	a	difference	in	toxicity	of	
up	to	1,000-fold,	and	focussed	attention	on	the	important,	but	less	appropriate,	characteristic	of	mobility	in	soils,	
prompting	companies	to	reject	any	such	chemicals	from	their	research	and	development	pipelines.	
Managers	in	Zeneca	Agrochemicals	in	1998	described	how	the	FQPA	and	the	DWD	had	affected	their	decision-
making	on	pesticide	development.	The	company’s	strobilurin	fungicide	was	the	first	product	to	be	registered	under	
the	FQPA	fast	track	as	a	safer	product,	but	narrowly	escaped	being	rejected	from	the	research	and	development	
pipeline	because	of	its	mobility	in	soil.
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B4 Designing efficient and 
equitable risk management 
policies
Inappropriate risk management occurs when 
benefits and costs are not balanced in an 
efficient and equitable manner
One	of	 the	key	shortcomings	of	 risk	management	 is	
that	policies	or	decisions	may	be	inefficient,	inequitable	
or	both.
The	most	common	measure	of	efficiency,	drawn	from	
the	 field	 of	 “welfare	 economics”,	 is	 maximisation	
of	 net	 benefits	 (benefits	 minus	 costs).	 In	 this	 strict	
form	 of	 benefit-cost	 analysis,	 the	 consequences	
of	 risk	 management	 measures	 are	 quantified	 and	
expressed	 in	 common	 units	 (usually	 a	 monetary	
measure).	The	underlying	principle	is	that,	when	two	
or	more	measures	are	compared,	 the	more	efficient	
one	has	 the	highest	estimate	of	net	benefits.	Unlike	
business	economics,	which	tends	to	maximise	profit,	
a	“societal”	benefit-cost	analysis	includes	all	forms	of	
benefits	 and	 costs,	 including	 those	 affecting	 human	
health	 and	 the	 environment.	 In	 recent	 years,	 the	
European	Commission,	 the	UK	and	 the	US	have	all	
used	benefit-cost	analyses	to	inform	public	decisions	
about	air	quality	and	climate-protection	programmes.
When	 the	 key	 consequences	 of	 a	 measure	 cannot	
be	 quantified	 and	 expressed	 in	monetary	 units,	 the	
findings	 of	 a	 benefit-cost	 analysis	 are	 less	 clear;	
decision-makers	 must	 use	 judgement	 to	 weigh	 the	
unquantified	 –	 and	 sometimes	 intangible	 –	 benefits	
and	 costs.	 This	 process	 of	 weighing	 qualitative	 as	
well	 as	 quantified	 benefits	 and	 costs	 is	 sometimes	
called	“soft”	benefit-cost	analysis	and	it	is	often	more	
practical	than	purely	numeric	forms	of	analysis5.	
Another	 insight	 from	efficiency	analysis,	called	cost-
effectiveness,	 is	 that	 uniform	 standards	 may	 be	
more	 costly	 and	 less	 effective	 than	 market-based	
instruments	such	as	taxes	on	pollution	or	programmes	
that	permit	companies	to	buy	and	sell	pollution	permits	
under	a	national,	regional	or	international	cap	on	total	
pollution.	Building	on	the	experience	of	the	EU’s	cap-
and-trade	programme	 to	 control	 carbon	dioxide,	 the	
Obama	 administration	 has	 recently	 proposed	 that	 a	
similar	 programme	 to	 control	 greenhouse	 gases	 be	
enacted	in	the	US.
However,	risk	management	policies	are	not	determined	
solely	on	the	basis	of	efficiency,	as	positive	efficiency	
does	not	necessarily	 include	an	equitable	sharing	of	
costs	and	benefits.	Various	notions	of	equity,	such	as	
intra-	and	 inter-generational	equity	 (sustainability)	or	
concepts	of	distributive	justice	(ethical	acceptability),	
are	 employed	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 distribution	
of	 winners	 and	 losers	 from	 risk	 management	 is	
acceptable.	
Applying	a	theory	of	“justice”	pioneered	by	the	Harvard	
philosopher	 John	 Rawls,	 risk	 managers	 sometimes	
seek	equity	by	asking	what	impact	a	risk	management	
measure	will	have	on	the	least	advantaged	members	
of	society	(measured	by	income,	social	class	or	race/
ethnicity).	Even	if	a	measure	is	efficient	on	a	society-
wide	basis,	it	may	be	judged	inequitable	if	it	imposes	
more	 burdens	 than	 benefits	 on	 the	most	 vulnerable	
populations	 or	 the	 least	 advantaged	 members	 of	
society.	In	the	field	of	environmental	policy,	concepts	
of	 equity	 are	 often	 subsumed	 under	 the	 heading	
“environmental	justice”.
A	different	notion	of	equity	concerns	situations	where	
the	costs	of	a	risk	management	measure	are	imposed	
on	a	group	of	people	or	nations	that	did	not	create	a	
risk	and	do	not	deserve	to	be	burdened.	For	example,	
the	 international	 community	 recognises	 that	 it	 is	
inequitable	for	citizens	of	developing	countries	to	pay	
the	costs	of	programmes	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	
emissions	when	 it	was	 the	growth	of	 the	developed	
world	that	led	to	the	predicament	that	now	troubles	the	
globe.	 It	 is	generally	agreed	 that	wealthier	countries	
should	subsidise	the	application	of	green	technology	
to	facilitate	sustainable	development	in	the	developing	
world.
Equity	arguments	in	risk	management	are	difficult	 to	
evaluate	because	no	citizen,	region	or	country	wants	
to	be	made	worse	off	by	risk	management	measures.	
Losers	from	risk	management	will	have	a	tendency	to	
see	their	losses	as	inequity,	while	winners	will	perceive	
their	 gains	 as	 deserved.	 It	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	
perform	 careful	 analysis	 of	 equity	 arguments	 even	
though	 there	 is	 no	 objective	 yardstick	 by	 which	 to	
5)	In	addition,	formal	methods	of	decision	analysis	such	as	multi-criteria	analysis	(MCA)	or	multi-attribute-utility-analysis	(MAU)	can	assist	decision-
makers	to	evaluate	intangible	outcomes		[Skinner,	1999].
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evaluate	equity,	and	 justification	of	gains	and	 losses	
inherently	involves	some	degree	of	subjectivity.	
The	most	 perverse	 risk	management	measures	 are	
those	that	compromise	both	efficiency	and	equity,	with	
no	corresponding	benefit	to	justify	their	continuation.	
The	tools	of	regulatory	impact	assessment	(RIA)	have	
been	developed	and	employed	by	many	governments	
to	 assist	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 policies	 that	 have	
superior	consequences	for	both	efficiency	and	equity.	
According	to	the	OECD,	most	developed	countries	in	
the	world	now	have	some	RIA	process	in	their	national	
governments.	A	small	but	growing	number	of	countries,	
as	well	as	 the	European	Commission,	have	created	
centralised	oversight	units	to	issue	guidelines	for,	and	
to	review	the	quality	of,	major	impact	assessments.
The Kyoto Protocol 
- Issues of efficiency and equity were central to concluding the Kyoto agreement on greenhouse gas emissions.
The	problem	of	equity	and	climate	change	is	two-fold.	The	rich,	developed	countries	have	produced	the	majority	of	
greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	have	special	responsibility	for	the	risks	the	entire	world	is	now	facing.	And	although	
all	 countries	will	 be	affected	by	climate	change,	 they	will	 be	affected	 in	different	ways	and	 to	different	extents.	
Developing	nations	are	especially	at	risk	because	of	 their	 location	and	geography,	 their	greater	dependence	on	
agriculture	and	their	greater	vulnerability,	because	fewer	resources	result	in	a	weaker	capacity	for	adaptation	[Stern	
et	al.,	2006].
The	Kyoto	Protocol	to	the	UN	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	takes	equity	as	one	of	 its	
guiding	principles,	placing	a	heavier	burden	on	 industrialised	nations	under	 the	principles	of	“polluter	pays”	and	
“common	but	differentiated	responsibilities”.	Annex	1	countries	to	the	Protocol	(industrialised	countries)	are	subject	
to	legally	binding	emissions	reductions	commitments,	while	developing	countries	are	exempt.	Although	they	share	
general	 obligations	 (Article	10)	 to	work	 towards	 the	mitigation	of	 climate	change,	 their	 emissions	growth	 is	not	
restricted,	so	as	not	to	limit	their	further	social	and	economic	development	[UNFCCC,	1998].		
While	the	question	of	who	pays	for	abatement	is	a	fairness	issue,	the	question	of	where	
abatement	takes	place	is	largely	a	cost	and	efficiency	issue	[Sheeran,	2007].	The	Kyoto	
Protocol	addresses	efficiency	via	 its	mechanism	of	 Joint	 Implementation	and	 its	Clean	
Development	Mechanism	(Articles	6	and	12)	[UNFCCC,	1998].	These	mechanisms	allow	
countries	to	earn	emission	reduction	units	by	reducing	emissions	wherever	reductions	may	
be	most	efficiently	achieved,	whether	in	another	industrialised	country	or	in	a	developing	
country.			Although			imperfect			(there		are			many			criticisms			of			the		Protocol’s			equity	
and	efficiency),	such	an	international	agreement	could	not	have	come	about	without	the	issues	of	equity	and	cost-
efficiency	taking	centre	stage.	
B5 Implementing and enforcing 
risk management decisions 
Failure to muster the necessary will and 
resources to implement risk management 
policies and decisions
Designing	 wise	 risk	 management	 policies	 is	 only	
part	 of	 the	 challenge.	 Real-world	 implementation	 is	
another	 critical	 issue.	 If	 the	 policies	 are	 voluntary,	
there	must	be	some	system	of	follow-through,	where	
the	performance	of	participating	parties	 is	monitored	
to	 determine	 whether	 voluntary	 agreements	 have	
been	honoured;	 there	must	also	be	a	mechanism	to	
ensure	 that	 complying	companies	are	not	penalised	
by	 non-complying	 competitors	 not	 bearing	 the	
costs	 of	 compliance.	 If	 the	 policy	 is	 legally	 binding	
(e.g.,	 a	 mandatory	 regulation	 on	 the	 behaviours	 of	
businesses	or	individuals),	deficits	in	implementation	
can	occur	if	violators	of	binding	rules	are	not	detected	
and	punished	appropriately.	 In	 other	words,	 policies	
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may	be	perfectly	conceived	and	formulated,	and	well-
adapted	 to	a	particular	 risk,	and	 regulations	may	be	
well-balanced,	 but	 little	will	 be	 accomplished	 if	 they	
are	not	implemented	and	enforced.
There	 are	 sometimes	 perverse	 incentives	 for	
policymakers	 to	 create	 risk	 management	 policies	
that	 are	 not	 implemented.	 Policymakers	 may	 wish	
to	 be	 seen	 as	 “acting”	 when	 in	 fact	 they	 lack	 the	
resources,	 time	or	organisational	capacity	 to	ensure	
implementation.	 In	 some	 cases,	 policies	 may	 be	
implemented	 only	 symbolically,	 and	 implementation	
may	 be	 (quietly)	 taken	 for	 granted	 and	 not	 even	
monitored.
BSE in the United Kingdom
- Effective regulations were successfully designed, but flawed implementation or lack of enforcement led to a negative 
outcome.
Two	of	the	most	important	regulations	introduced	during	the	BSE	crisis	were	the	ruminant	
feed	ban	and	the	specified	bovine	offal	(SBO)	ban.	Implementation	was	deficient	in	both	
cases.	 The	 feed	 ban,	 while	 an	 effective	 measure,	 was	 not	 implemented	 as	 swiftly	 or	
effectively	as	it	could	have	been:	it	was	passed	on	June	14,	1988,	but	not	implemented	until	
July	18	–	a	five	week	delay	that	allowed	many	thousands	more	animals	to	become	infected.	
The	SBO	ban	of	November	1989	was	an	even	stronger	illustration	of	implementation		and	
enforcement		failure.		Because		there		was		a		“failure	to	give	proper	thought		to	the	terms
of	this	measure	when	it	was	introduced”	[BSE	Inquiry,	2000b],	the	ban	was	all	but	unenforceable	and	was	widely	
disregarded	by	industry.	Enforcement	was	lax	until	1995,	when	unannounced	visits	to	abattoirs	revealed	that	48%	
were	not	complying	with	the	regulations,	and	a	rigorous	enforcement	campaign	was	launched	[van	Zwanenberg	
and	Millstone,	2002].	
Fisheries depletion: Mediterranean bluefin tuna
- Ignored fishing quotas have led to serious depletion of fish stocks.
The	Mediterranean	tuna	fishery	has	one	of	the	highest	levels	of	overfishing	in	the	world.	It	is	fished	by	11	Mediterranean	
coastal	states,	some	of	which	are	bound	by	 the	 rules	of	 the	EU’s	Common	Fisheries	Policy.	Despite	 the	many	
regulations	in	place	and	the	quotas	assigned	to	each	fishing	nation,	bluefin	tuna	stocks	are	now	dangerously	low.	
Many	criticise	the	International	Commission	for	the	Conservation	of	Atlantic	Tuna	and	its	member	states	for	setting	
quotas	far	higher	than	the	sustainable	limits	recommended	by	scientists	[Black,	2008].	Another	major	problem	is	
that	these	quotas	are	not	respected	(the	rules	on	reporting	catches	and	the	bans	on	using	tuna	spotting	planes	are	
not	obeyed)	and	enforcement	of	policies	is	seriously	lacking	[WWF,	2008a].
In	2007,	Italy	overshot	its	quota	by	at	least	38%	(approximately	1,653	tonnes)	and,	despite	
the	EU’s	early	closure	of	the	fishery	in	2008,	it	had	already	overshot	its	quota	by	724	tonnes.	
It	has	used	spotter	planes	(a	banned	activity)	to	help	direct	purse	seiners	to	their	catch	and	
has	under-reported	catches	 in	recent	years	 [WWF,	2008b].	The	EU’s	Joint	Deployment	
Plan	launched	in	March	2008	(under	the	auspices	of	the	EU	Community	Fisheries	Control	
Agency)	aims	to		coordinate	and	step	up	joint	control	and	enforcement	activities	to	rectify		
this		situation	[CFCA,	2009].		The		resources		of		seven		main		EU-member		fishing	states
will	be	pooled	to	carry	out	enforcement	operations	involving	inspections	at	sea	and	in	ports	[EC,	2008].	It	is	hoped	
that	these	efforts	to	improve	enforcement	of	policies	(along	with	parallel	efforts	to	reduce	fleet	capacity)	will	help	
the	fishery	to	recover.
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B6 Anticipating side effects of 
risk management 
Failure to anticipate, monitor and react to the 
outcomes of a risk management decision in 
the case of negative side effects
Changes	 in	one	part	of	a	complex	system	can	have	
an	 impact	 on	 and	 beyond	 the	 other	 components	 of	
the	 system.	 Successful	 risk	 management	 requires	
anticipation	 of	 both	 the	 intended	 and	 unintended	
consequences	 of	 decisions.	 For	 example,	 well-
intentioned	efforts	 to	protect	 the	environment	and	 to	
avoid	other	secondary	risks	from	nuclear	power	may	
have	strengthened	the	business	case	for	building	new	
coal-fired	power	stations,	with	many	adverse	impacts	
on	 environmental	 quality.	 Similarly,	 biofuel	 policies	
designed	 to	 strengthen	 energy	 security	 may	 have	
negative	 impacts	elsewhere,	such	as	on	 food	prices	
or	indirect	greenhouse	gas	emissions.
	
A	corollary	of	 this	governance	deficit	 is	 the	 frequent	
failure	to	monitor the	effects	of	decisions,	not	just	for	
effectiveness	 but	 for	 plausible	 adverse	 side	 effects	
and	ancillary	benefits.	Contingency	plans	need	to	be	
prepared	that	can	be	put	into	action	quickly	should	the	
measures	fail	to	meet	their	targets	or	have	unintended	
negative	side	effects.	Without	appropriate	monitoring	
and	 evaluation	 of	 policies,	 the	 proper	 design	 and	
implementation	of	contingency	plans	can	be	expected	
to	suffer.	
Monitoring the use of clozapine
- Careful monitoring of reactions to this effective drug allows it to remain on the market, despite its potentially dangerous 
side effects.
Austrian	and	German	clinicians	began	investigating	the	drug	clozapine	in	the	mid-1960s.	A	
potent	anti-psychotic,	clozapine	was	atypical	in	that	it	showed	few	if	any	of	the	neurological	
side	effects	common	to	most	anti-psychotic	medication	[Hippius,	1989].	It	was	introduced	
to	the	market	in	Europe	in	1973	[BMJ,	1991].	However,	reports	from	Finland	in	1975	soon	
raised	concern	about	its	risks,	as	16	out	of	2,260	patients	developed	agranulocytosis	(an	
acute,	 severe	and	dangerous	decrease	 in	 the	number	of	white	 blood	 cells),	with	 eight	
subsequently		dying	[Naheed	and	Green,	2000].		The		manufacturer	of	the	drug,	Sandoz,	
subsequently	 withdrew	 the	 product	 from	 the	 market,	 judging	 the	 risks	 (1-2%	 risk	 of	 agranulocytosis,	 and	 the	
company’s	associated	liability)	to	be	too	high.	
Because	clozapine	had	been	shown	to	be	extremely	effective	against	conventional	treatment-resistant	schizophrenia,	
ameliorating	 symptoms	 and	 decreasing	 the	 suicide	 mortality	 rate,	 there	 was	 pressure	 from	 psychiatrists	 to	
reintroduce	 the	drug.	Many	 felt	 that	 its	benefits	outweighed	 its	 risks	 [Naheed	and	Green,	2000].	Such	pressure	
led	to	the	reinstatement	of	drug	trials,	this	time	under	close	haematological	monitoring	–	“the	real	question	is	not	
whether	agranulocytosis	occurs,	but	how	to	prevent	fatalities	amongst	those	developing	such	disorders.	Regular	
blood	monitoring	makes	this	possible”	[Hippius,	1989].	Following	successful	trial	data,	clozapine	was	reintroduced	
in	the	European	market	and	approved	for	the	first	time	in	the	US	in	1990.	
Given	the	previous	experience,	a	risk	management	programme	with	strict	requirements	for	blood	monitoring	was	
made	mandatory	in	many	countries.	In	the	US	this	was	known	as	the	“no	blood,	no	drug”	programme.	It	mandated	
physician,	pharmacist	and	patient	registration,	a	patient	database,	ongoing	compliance	monitoring	and	feedback,	
and	weekly	complete	blood	cell	counts	for	patients,	both	prior	to	and	while	receiving	the	drug	[Liederman,	2008].	
This	programme	is	regarded	as	having	been	successful	and	has	been	adapted	over	the	years	on	the	basis	of	real-
world	data	and	patient	experiences	[Mechcatie,	2005].	
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B7 Reconciling time horizons
An inability to reconcile the time frame of the 
risk with the time frames of decision-making 
and incentive schemes   
As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	 section,	
business	 and	 politics	 are	 often	 dominated	 by	 short-
term	considerations.	Yet	risk	issues	have	a	variety	of	
time	profiles.	Some	become	apparent	only	after	a	long	
period	 of	 time	 (e.g.,	 chronic	 disease	 after	 a	 certain	
latency	 period),	 some	 strike	 suddenly	 with	 various	
degrees	 of	 warning	 (natural	 disasters),	 some	 start	
slowly	 but	may	escalate	 rapidly	 in	 epidemic	 fashion	
(e.g.,	 AIDS)	 and	 some	 are	 so	 persistent	 that	 they	
breed	neglect	due	to	familiarity	(e.g.,	alcohol	abuse).	
Risk	managers,	as	they	grapple	with	risk	issues,	must	
encourage	time	horizons	for	risk	management	action	
that	 are	 aligned	 with	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 risk	 and	 its	
consequences,	even	though	those	perspectives	may	
not	be	natural	or	appealing	to	politicians	or	business	
leaders.	This	trade-off	is	particularly	difficult	to	resolve	
with	issues	such	as	climate	change,	where	the	effects	
of	decisions	made	now	will	not	be	realised	for	many	
years.
Arguably	 the	most	pervasive	deficit	 is	a	 tendency	 to	
ignore	 long-term	 risks	and	costs	 relative	 to	 the	day-
to-day	needs	 that	seem	 to	be	–	and	sometimes	are	
–	 urgent.	 A	 related	 tendency	 is	 to	 look	 for	 simple	
“quick	fixes”	to	complicated,	long-term	challenges	that	
may	require	fundamental	changes	in	public	attitudes,	
behaviours	 and	 institutions	 (e.g.,	 sustainability	 and	
climate	change).		
CFCs and ozone depletion
- Monitoring the consequences of the use and the banning of CFCs.
In	the	1930s,	when	chlorofluorocarbons	(CFCs)	were	first	employed	on	an	industrial	scale,	a	lack	of	comprehensive	
scientific	knowledge	made	it	impossible	to	anticipate	that	these	chemicals	would	affect	stratospheric	ozone.	Rather,	
they	were	considered	“non-toxic,	stable	and	harmless	in	every	way”	[Mullin,	2002].	
However,	once	scientists	made	the	discovery	in	1974	that	the	breakdown	of	CFCs	in	the	stratosphere	was	causing	
the	depletion	of	stratospheric	ozone	[Molina	and	Rowland,	1974;	Cicerone	et	al.,	1974],	efforts	to	monitor	 these	
consequences	of	CFC	production	were	quickly	mounted.	Indeed,	monitoring	of	anthropogenic	CFC	emissions	and	
of	 ozone	 loss	 and	 recovery	 has	been	 carried	 out	 systematically	 and	 carefully	 since	 the	 late	 1970s,	 using	ever	
more	sophisticated	technologies.	The	discovery	of	the	ozone	“hole”	over	Antarctica	in	1985	heightened	the	already	
growing	international	concern	about	ozone	depletion.		
In	1987,	the	Montreal	Protocol	on	Substances	that	Deplete	the	Ozone	Layer	was	signed,	
leading	to	regulated	production	and	a	scheduled	phasing	out	of	ozone-depleting	substances	
(entry	into	force	January	1,	1989).	As	a	result	of	the	Protocol’s	regulations,	the	combined	
levels	of	ozone-depleting	gases	in	the	stratosphere	decreased	by	8-9%	as	of	2005	from	
their	peak	values	observed	in	1992-1994	[WMO	et	al.,	2007].	Although	emissions	reductions	
for	many	ozone-depleting	substances	have	been	significant,	atmospheric	concentrations	
decrease		much	more	slowly	because	of	the	long	atmospheric		lifetimes	of	some	of	these	
compounds,	which	can	be	50-100	years	[WMO	et	al.,	2006].	It	is	expected	that,	because	of	the	“resounding	success”	
of	the	Montreal	Protocol,	CFCs	and	other	harmful	emissions	could	fall	below	the	levels	that	produce	an	ozone	hole	
around	2070	[NASA,	2007].	
To	ensure	that	this	goal	remains	possible	and	that	actions	continue	to	be	effective,	continual	monitoring	of	compliance	
with	the	Protocol,	of	emissions	levels,	and	of	ozone	depletion	and	recovery	must	continue.
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Asbestos
- Long-term health damage and costs to industry from asbestos-related disease were incurred because of the short-term 
orientation of policymakers in industry and government.
In	the	UK,	accounts	of	asbestos-related	health	hazards	were	recorded	as	early	as	1898	
and	 the	 first	 dust	 control,	 medical	 surveillance	 and	 compensation	 regulations	 in	 the	
world	were	introduced	in	1931.	Unfortunately,	these	rules	were	only	partially	enforced	as	
concerns	 for	 the	near-term	economic	viability	of	 the	 industry	contributed	 to	decades	of	
delay	in	response	to	early	warnings	of	risk.	Licensing	regulations	and	exposure	limits	were	
ultimately	introduced	in	1984	and	a	full	ban	on	asbestos	was	implemented	in	1999	[Gee	
and		Greenberg,	2002].		It		has	been		estimated	that		“a	surge	in		asbestos-related	claims
over	the	coming	decades	could	land	British	insurers	and	employers	with	a	bill	of	up	to	£20bn”	[Jones,	2004].		
It	 turns	 out	 that	 exposure	 to	 asbestos	 is	 associated	 with	 an	 increased	 risk	 of	 developing	 lung	 cancer	 and	
mesothelioma	(a	relatively	rare,	and	deadly,	cancer	of	the	thin	membranes	that	line	the	chest	and	abdomen	[Collins,	
2008;	National	Cancer	Institute,	2009]).	Such	cancers	have	a	long	latency	period,	from	10	to	50	years	after	the	time	
of	first	exposure	to	asbestos.		
This	long	latency	period	contributed	to	a	period	of	complacency	about	asbestos	exposure,	especially	since	politicians	
and	 regulators	were	concerned	about	 the	near-term	benefits	of	asbestos-related	profits	 for	employers,	 jobs	 for	
workers	and	tax-related	revenues	for	government.	With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	 it	 is	apparent	that	the	trade-offs	
that	were	made	were	short-sighted.	In	effect,	fear	of	short-term	costs	led	to	much	larger	long-term	costs	for	both	
industry	and	government	as	early	warnings	of	health	risks	were	discounted	and	public	health	responses	delayed.	
The	failures	were	not	unique	to	the	UK.	They	happened	as	well	in	the	US	and	other	regions	of	the	world.	
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
- The difficulty of weighing the near-term costs and long-term benefits of aggressive international policies to slow global 
climate change.
In	order	to	successfully	prevent	(or	slow)	the	global	climate	change	caused	by	man-made	emissions	of	greenhouse	
gases,	governments	around	the	world	are	considering	adoption	of	costly	policies	that	may	reap	significant	long-term	
environmental	and	economic	benefits.	Economic	analysis	of	such	policies	must	 include	an	appropriate	discount	
rate	–	an	interest	rate	employed	so	that	future	benefits	and	costs	may	be	directly	compared	to	current	benefits	and	
costs.		
In	October	2006,	the	UK	government	released	the	“Stern	Review	on	the	Economics	of	Climate	Change”,	a	report	for	
policymakers	that	made	an	economic	case	for	“strong	and	early”	action	–	including	costly	actions	–	to	prevent	global	
climate	change		[Stern		et		al.,		2006].			Lord		Stern’s		findings		and		conclusions		triggered		significant		controversy	
for	a	simple	reason:	critics	challenged	his	premise	that	an	extremely	low	rate	of	discount	
should	be	applied	to	impacts	(benefits	or	costs)	that	occur	dozens	or	hundreds	of	years	
in	the	future.	While	standard	economic	analyses	employ	real	(inflation-adjusted)	annual	
discount	rates	of	2-7%,	the	Stern	Review	chose	a	very	low	discount	rate	of	0.1%	[Dasgupta,	
2006].	Professor	Richard	Nordhaus	of	Yale	University,	another	eminent	economist,	argued	
that	the	Stern	Review	should	have	used	discount	rates	up	to	and	beyond	3%	[Nordhaus,	
2007;	Nordhaus	and	Boyer,	2000].		Nordhaus	and	others	believe	that	a	very	low	discount
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rate	 acts	 to	 discourage	 near-term	 investments	 that	 are	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 world’s	 currently	 impoverished	
populations.	Only	by	relying	on	such	a	very	 low	discount	rate,	Nordhaus	argues,	was	the	Stern	Review	able	 to	
justify	such	a	large	near-term	investment	in	policies	to	curb	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	Stern	counters	that	use	of	
higher	discount	rates	has	the	mathematical	effect	of	short-changing	the	welfare	of	future	generations.	
B8 Balancing transparency and 
confidentiality
Failure to balance two of the necessary 
requirements     of    decision-making:   trans-
parency, which can foster stakeholder trust, 
and confidentiality, which can protect security 
and maintain incentives for innovation
When	 communicating	 information	 about	 the	 risk	
issue	and	 the	decisions	 taken	on	how	to	manage	 it,	
the	need	for	either	transparency	or	confidentiality	will	
vary.	An	excessive	focus	on	confidentiality	may	reduce	
trust	 in	 risk	management	and	 in	decision-makers	by	
raising	 suspicion	 that	 the	 shield	 of	 confidentiality	 is	
being	 used	 as	 a	 power	 lever	 (e.g.,	 by	 government	
and/or	 industry)	 to	 advance	 or	 protect	 particular	
interests	without	adequate	 justification.	On	the	other	
hand,	 excessive	 transparency	 may	 not	 respect	 the	
need	to	protect	 legitimate	 interests	(e.g.,	 the	privacy	
interests	 of	 individual	 citizens).	 For	 example,	 a	
citizen’s	 desire	 to	 keep	 his	 or	 her	 health	 records	
confidential	 is	 a	 legitimate	 claim	 of	 confidentiality	 in	
many	societies.	Likewise,	 the	protection	of	business	
secrets	in	competitive	markets,	where	innovations	can	
be	 the	 subject	 of	 piracy,	 is	 also	 seen	 as	 necessary	
for	 a	well-functioning,	 innovative	 economy.	And,	 the	
requirements	 of	 national	 security	 and	 defence	 or	 a	
desire	to	avoid	public	panic	may	justify	a	prioritisation	
of	confidentiality	over	transparency.
The	general	trend	in	public	and	corporate	governance,	
however,	 is	 towards	 more	 release	 of	 data,	 more	
transparent	 reporting	 and	 fuller	 accountability,	 while	
maintaining	 some	 confidentiality	 under	 compelling	
circumstances.	 Terrorism	 is	 a	 relevant	 example.	
In	 an	 initiative	 tailored	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 risk	
governance,	 the	UK	government	has	addressed	 the	
problem	of	balancing	transparency	and	confidentiality	
by	issuing	“Principles	of	Managing	Risks	to	the	Public”,	
which	 includes	 the	 promise	 to	 give	 an	 “appropriate”	
answer	to	the	public	in	all	situations:
Government	 will	 make	 available	 its	 assessments	
of	 risks	 that	 affect	 the	 public,	 how	 it	 has	 reached	
its	 decisions,	 and	 how	 it	 will	 handle	 the	 risk.	 […]	
When	 information	has	 to	be	kept	private,	or	where	
the	 approach	 departs	 from	 existing	 practice,	 it	 will	
explain	why.	Where	facts	are	uncertain	or	unknown,	
government	will	seek	to	make	clear	what	the	gaps	in	
its	knowledge	are	and,	where	relevant,	what	is	being	
done	to	address	 them.	 It	will	be	open	about	where	
it	has	made	mistakes,	and	what	it	is	doing	to	rectify	
them.	[HM	Treasury,	2005]
The	 recent	 emphasis	 on	 greater	 transparency	 in	
communication	perhaps	reflects	lessons	learned	from	
past	 experiences	 where	 inadequate	 communication	
and	 explanation	 of	 risk	 management	 decisions	 led	
to	 negative	 outcomes.	 For	 example,	 this	 occurred	
during	 the	 handling	 of	 the	BSE	 epidemic	 in	 the	UK	
over	 the	 period	 1986-96.	 In	 this	 case,	 there	 was	
a	 disproportionate	 emphasis	 on	 confidentiality	 in	
order	 to	 protect	 the	 interests	 of	 industry	 and	 avoid	
public	 panic,	 which	 ultimately	 led	 to	 the	 risks	 being	
downplayed.	 This	 resulted	 in	 a	 serious	 erosion	 of	
public	trust	in	the	government.
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B9 Organisational capacity
Failure to build or maintain an adequate 
organisational capacity to manage risk
Effective	 risk	 management	 depends	 on	 people	 and	
organisations	 that	 can	 mobilise	 resources,	 build	
consensus	 and	 translate	 ideas	 into	 practical	 risk	
policies.	Such	managerial	effectiveness	relies	upon	an	
adequate	 organisational	 risk	 management	 capacity.	
There	are	many	dimensions	to	such	capacity.
IRGC	has	summarised	these	dimensions	as	comprising	
three	distinct	but	complementary	dimensions:	“assets”,	
“skills”	 and	 “capabilities”	 [IRGC,	 2005].	 Assets	
include	 knowledge,	 financial	 and	 human	 resources,	
organisational	 structures	 and	 processes,	 and	 the	
organisational	 integration	 that	 deploys	 these	 assets	
most	effectively.	Skills	are	the	ability	of	organisations	
and	 their	 managers	 and	 staff	 to	 adapt	 their	 assets	
to	 deal	with	 changing	 and	often	 dynamic	 situations.	
Capabilities	 constitute	 the	 framework	 in	 which	 the	
assets	 and	 skills	 can	 be	 best	 exploited,	 including	
the	network	within	which	an	organisation	cooperates	
and	 communicates	 in	 the	handling	of	 risks,	 and	 the	
overall	governance	regime	under	which	that	network	
operates.
At	the	most	intangible	level,	organisations	must	have	a	
culture	that	recognises	the	value	of	risk	management	to	
the	long-term	viability	of	the	organisation	and	society,	
Enron
- A deliberate lack of transparency in accounting practices put the entire company at risk.
The	lack	of	transparency	in	Enron’s	accounting	practices	was	so	great	that	it	was	able	to	
convince	investors,	shareholders	and	the	market	in	general	that	the	company	was	on	firm	
ground.	In	truth,	Enron	had	a	huge	amount	of	debt	that	its	incredibly	complex	and	opaque	
accounting	practices	had	allowed	 it	 to	hide	 in	off-balance-sheet	overseas	entities.	This,	
combined	with	 its	use	of	 “mark	 to	market”	accounting	 (where	projected	 future	earnings	
from	 long-term	 contracts	 were	 treated	 as	 current	 income),	 greatly	 inflated	 its	 reported	
earnings,	so	that	its	sudden	bankruptcy	shocked	the	market.		The	lack	of	transparency	in
Enron’s	accounting	and	auditing	was	one	of	 the	major	 failures	of	corporate	governance	 implicated	 in	 the	Enron	
scandal,	offering	an	example	of	using	financial	innovations	within	modern	corporations	to	an	extent	that	is	neither	
sustainable	nor	ethical	[Dembinski,	2006].
The subprime crisis in the United States
- A lack of transparency in financial markets was a contributing factor to the crisis.
A	build-up	of	opacity	occurred	in	financial	markets	prior	to	the	recent	subprime	mortgage	
crisis.	Home	and	car	loans	were	offered	to	millions	of	people	with	weak	credit	records	and	
insufficient	incomes	and	assets.	In	the	years	preceding	the	recent	crisis,	financial	products	
became	 less	 transparent	 about	 the	 risks	 of	 the	 underlying	 loans	 that	 were	 packaged	
together	and	resold	around	the	world.	Managers	in	the	financial	system	made	decisions	
about	investments	based	on	information	which	was	not	transparent	about	risk	and	did	not	
conform	to		expected	regulatory	standards.		Ratings	agencies	assigned	superb	ratings	to
highly	vulnerable	investments.	Global	banks	took	on	risks	that	they	did	not	declare	until	they	were	forced	to	analyse	
and	evaluate	them	and	take	responsibility.	In	such	opaque	markets,	it	should	not	be	surprising	that	investors	tended	
to	panic	when	the	troubles	were	disclosed,	just	as	they	did	during	past	financial	crises	[Zandi,	2009].
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despite	both	the	controversies	created	when	risks	are	
managed	 explicitly	 and	 the	 costs	 that	 preventative	
measures	 may	 represent,	 with	 no	 direct	 return	 on	
expenditure.	 Such	 a	 culture	 must	 show	 awareness	
of	 risk	 and	 its	 consequences,	 and	 be	 supportive	 of	
responding	adequately	to	risks	even	during	the	early	
stages	of	their	development.
Organisations	 with	 a	 sophisticated	 approach	 to	
risk	 governance	 also	 recognise	 the	 importance	 of	
communicating	and	consulting	with	stakeholders,	and	
know	which	methods	of	stakeholder	involvement	are	
most	 appropriate	 for	 a	 particular	 risk	 management	
problem	[Renn,	2008].	We	have	argued	(see	A4)	that	
risk	assessment	can	be	enhanced	through	 including	
within	the	process	lay	stakeholders	and	the	knowledge	
they	can	communicate.	An	extension	of	 the	concept	
of	 “organisation”	 to	 include	 stakeholders	 within	 risk	
management,	particularly	of	 risks	 that	are	 inherently	
complex,	uncertain	or	ambiguous,	can	bring	benefits	
that	include	achieving	acceptance	and	implementation	
of	the	management	decision	[IRGC,	2005].			
Hurricane Katrina
- A well-intentioned reorganisation to combat terrorism curtailed a federal agency’s capacity to respond to natural 
disaster.
After	 9/11,	 the	US	Federal	Emergency	Management	Agency	 (FEMA)	was	 reorganised	
to	become	a	part	of	the	new	Department	of	Homeland	Security	(DHS).	Because	of	the	
heightened	focus	on	terrorism,	FEMA	had	its	powers	and	resources	downgraded	as	DHS	
stepped	up	 counterterrorism	efforts.	Some	 funds	 that	 had	been	allocated	 to	FEMA	by	
Congress	were	redirected	to	other	parts	of	DHS	to	reflect	 its	new	priorities,	and	FEMA	
began	to	suffer	serious	budget	shortages.	Personnel	shortages	were	one	consequence	of	
this		and,		prior		to	Hurricane	Katrina,	the		Agency	had	a		15-20%		vacancy		rate	and	was	
relying	heavily	on	temporary	employees.	As	a	result,	when	Katrina	hit,	FEMA	did	not	have	sufficient	organisational	
capability	to	respond	effectively	[Senate	Report,	2006;	House	Report,	2006].	
Health-care workers and the Toronto SARS outbreak
- The importance of communicating with stakeholders.
When	a	previously	unknown	infectious	disease	was	first	identified	in	a	Toronto	hospital	in	
March	2003,	the	Ontario	Public	Health	Branch	immediately	prepared	a	letter	raising	an	alert	
and	advising	that	precautions	(such	as	wearing	gloves,	gowns,	eye	protection	and	masks)	
be	 taken	by	all	health-care	workers	when	dealing	with	suspected	cases.	However,	 this	
letter	was	sent	only	to	physicians	and	not	to	other	equally	important	front-line	responders,	
such	as	nurses,	ambulance	services	and	paramedics.	Indeed,	the	relevant	unions	had	no	
knowledge	that	any		of	this	information	was	communicated	to		health-care	workers	in	any	
health-care	 facility.	Overlooking	 the	 “critical	need	 to	 listen	 to	nurses	and	other	healthcare	workers	and	 to	more	
effectively	communicate	with	 them	 in	hospital	and	other	settings”	significantly	compromised	efforts	 to	bring	 the	
SARS	 crisis	 under	 control	 [Campbell	 et	 al.,	 2004].	 Important	 decisions	 concerning	 health-care	 workers,	 such	
as	 the	 controversial	 directive	 to	wear	 fit-tested	N95	masks,	 were	made	without	 consulting	 the	most	 important	
stakeholders	–	those	who	would	have	to	implement	them.	The	fit-testing	of	masks	was	felt	by	health-care	workers	
to	be	operationally	impossible,	and	they	received	no	support	to	help	them	comply	with	the	directive	[Health	Canada,	
2003].
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B10 Dealing with dispersed 
responsibilities 
Failure of the multiple departments or organi-
sations responsible for a risk’s management 
to act cohesively
This	deficit	can	occur	where	complex	interconnected	
systems	require	multi-actor	and	multi-level	governance	
structures	but	no	single	entity	has	overall	responsibility,	
or	 one	 entity	 has	 conflicting	 responsibilities.	
Overlapping,	 shared	 or	 unclear	 responsibilities,	with	
poor	communication	and	cooperation,	can	mean	that	
important	 decisions	 will	 not	 be	 taken	 or	 will	 not	 be	
implemented.	
Governments	 and	 large	 corporations	 tend	 to	 create	
fragmentation	 in	 risk	management	 through	 complex	
and	 compartmentalised	 organisations.	 They	 often	
create	separate	functional	groups	that	generate	“silo	
thinking”	about	risk	(e.g.,	one	unit	concentrates	on	air	
pollution,	 another	 on	 water	 pollution,	 and	 so	 forth).	
Although	fragmentation	serves	some	useful	purposes	
(e.g.,	specialisation	of	labour),	it	invites	unproductive	
situations	 where	 no	 one	 has	 accountability	 for	 the	
overall	 problem	 and	 where	 sub-departments	 are	
disinclined	to	consult	with	each	other,	share	information	
or	work	 together	as	a	problem-solving	 team.	Things	
can	fall	through	the	cracks.	
Dispersed	 responsibilities	 occur	 when	 actors	 at	
different	 levels	 are	 required	 to	 work	 together,	 for	
example	when	the	federal,	regional	(states)	and	local	
(municipalities)	governments	share	responsibilities,	or	
when	multi-disciplinary	and	global	teams	in	industries	
and/or	 government	 work	 together.	 They	 may	 also	
occur	 when	 government,	 business	 and	 civil	 society	
have	different,	potentially	overlapping	responsibilities,	
as	for	example	in	the	electricity	sector,	where	different	
companies	 act	 as	 power	 producers,	 retailers	 and	
managers	of	unbundled	transmission	and	distribution	
networks,	with	governments	or	government	agencies	
as	regulators.	
Within	 organisational	 structures,	 different	 ministries	
or	 different	 operating	 companies	of	 the	 same	group	
may	 have	 conflicting	 interests	 and	 objectives	 (as	
happened,	for	 instance,	during	the	UK	government’s	
handling	of	the	BSE	crisis	or	during	Shell’s	Brent	Spar	
problem).	
Dispersed	 responsibilities	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 prevalent	
on	 an	 international	 scale	 where	 nation-states	 have	
sovereign	powers,	but	risks	in	one	country	or	region	of	
the	globe	have	trans-boundary	impacts.	International	
treaties	(and	less	formal	mechanisms)	are	sometimes	
assembled	to	address	trans-boundary	issues,	but	the	
international	organisations	that	are	created	to	manage	
such	risks	suffer	from	some	of	the	same	deficits	that	
afflict	national	and	local	organisations.		
In	 theory,	 risk	 governance	 frameworks	 should	
assign	responsibilities	for	risk	management	and	hold	
managers	accountable	for	performance.	For	example,	
the	British	government	states	that	“those	who	impose	
risks	on	others	also	bear	responsibility	for	controlling	
those	risks	and	for	any	consequences	of	inadequate	
control”	[HM	Treasury,	2005]	–	a	principle	that	holds	in	
all	countries	whose	laws	include	the	duty	of	care.	 In	
reality,	though,	it	is	not	always	evident	who	is	or	was	
responsible	 for	 decisions	 and	 policies.	 Finding	 the	
right	 balance	of	 responsibility	 in	a	multi-actor,	multi-
level	process	 (for	example,	when	public	and	private	
organisations,	 including	NGOs,	contribute	to	a	failed	
risk	management	strategy)	and	establishing	effective	
communication	between	dispersed	organisations	are	
therefore	crucial	challenges.
Swiss-Italian blackout
- The division of responsibilities between countries and companies created challenges that complicated risk governance.
The	efficient	and	secure	transmission	of	electricity	between	many	European	countries	relies	on	cooperation	between	
separate,	 independent	 transmission	 service	operators	 (TSOs)	 and	 their	 compliance	with	 standards	established	
by	 the	 Union	 for	 the	 Coordination	 of	 Transmission	 of	 Electricity	 (UCTE).	 The	 responsibility	 for	 managing	 the	
interconnected	European	electricity	network	is	therefore	shared	between	the	TSOs.
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On	September	28,	2003,	a	power	blackout	affected	more	than	56	million	people	across	Italy	(except	Sardinia)	and	
parts	of	Switzerland.	The	economic	cost	of	the	blackout	has	been	estimated	at	US$139	million	[IEA/OECD,	2005].	
The	initial	incident	was	a	trip	(caused	by	a	tree	flashover)	of	the	380kV	Mettlen-Lavorgo	line	
in	Switzerland.	High	loading	had	increased	the	line’s	temperature,	causing	it	to	sag	close	
to	nearby	trees.	In	turn,	this	increased	the	load	on	a	cross-border	line,	Sils-Soazza,	which	
could	not	safely	maintain	such	a	load	for	more	than	15	minutes	[UCTE,	2004].	Rather	than	
ask	Italian	operators	to	take	action	to	restore	N-1	security	to	the	system	(the	N-1	rule	being	
part	of	the	UCTE	standards),	the	Swiss	operators	tried,	unsuccessfully,	to	re-close	the	line,		
and	then	telephoned		the	Italians		to		request		that		they		reduce		their		power		imports		by	
300MW.	It	is	not	clear	whether	the	Swiss	informed	the	Italians	(who	had	no	way	to	see	what	was	happening	in	the	
Swiss	system)	about	the	outage	of	the	Mettlen-Lavorgo	line	[Schläpfer	and	Glavitsch,	2006].	
Steps	taken	by	both	operators	failed	to	prevent	the	trip	of	the	Sils-Soazza	line.	This	second	trip	created	overloads	on	
remaining	lines,	which	caused	the	remaining	interconnections	to	trip	and	isolated	Italy	from	the	European	network.	
This	destabilised	the	Italian	system	and	tripped	several	of	its	domestic	generators,	causing	the	blackout.	The	loss	
of	Italian	demand	also	led	to	sharp	frequency	increases	elsewhere	in	the	UCTE	system,	necessitating	emergency	
responses	 from	other	European	system	operators	 in	order	 to	quarantine	 the	effects	of	 the	outage	 [IEA/OECD,	
2005].
Subsequent	investigations	of	the	blackout	found	that	the	underlying	problems	that	led	to	the	incident	were	largely	
a	 result	 of	 how	 responsibilities	 for	 cross-border	 exchanges	 of	 electricity	 were	 shared	 between	 TSOs.	 They	
recommended	improved	coordination	between	the	TSOs	(including	joint	operator-training	programmes)	and	better	
compliance	with	UCTE	 standards,	which	 should	 become	 legally	 binding	 [SFOE,	 2003;	UCTE,	 2004;	CRE	and	
AEEG,	2004].
BSE in the United Kingdom
- Assigning the same ministry responsibility for both industry promotion and risk management invites management 
deficits.
The	UK	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	Fisheries	and	Food	(MAFF)	was	responsible	for	promoting	
the	 economic	 interests	 of	 the	 agricultural	 community	 –	 in	 this	 case	 the	 cattle	 farmers,	
abattoirs	and	 renderers	–	as	well	as	dealing	with	matters	 related	 to	 food	safety.	Given	
the	heavy	influence	of	the	industries	involved,	risk	management	might	have	been	more	
successful	 had	 these	 two	 responsibilities	 been	 separated.	As	 it	 was,	MAFF	 could	 not	
implement	measures	related	to	food	safety	without	hurting	industry	 interests.	This	goes	
some		way		towards	explaining	its	initial	“unwillingness		to	know”	about		the		extent	of	the
problem	and	its	weak	policy	response	[Dressel,	2000].	After	the	BSE	crisis,	this	split	role	was	addressed	by	the	
creation	in	2000	of	a	separate	body,	the	Food	Standards	Agency,	to	deal	with	food	safety	risks	to	public	health	[van	
Zwanenberg	and	Millstone,	2002].	The	success	of	the	new	institutional	arrangement	has	yet	to	be	put	to	the	test.
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B11 Dealing with commons 
problems and externalities 
A lack of understanding of the complex nature 
of commons problems and consequently also 
of the specific risk management tools required 
to address them 
The	 term	 “commons”	applies	 to	goods	or	 resources	
to	which	all	members	of	a	community	have	rights	or	
access.	 The	 so-called	 “Tragedy	 of	 the	 Commons”	
[Hardin,	1968]	describes	a	dilemma	in	which	multiple	
individuals	 acting	 independently	 in	 their	 own	 self-
interest	 can	 ultimately	 destroy	 a	 shared	 resource	
even	 though	 it	 is	 in	 their	 joint	 long-term	 interest	 to	
preserve	 it.	 Given	 that	 many	 common	 resources	
(e.g.,	 the	 atmosphere	 and	water	 bodies)	 are	 crucial	
for	the	Earth’s	life	support	systems,	their	uncontrolled	
exploitation	may	create	serious	long-term	risks.	Local	
fisheries	or	smog	pollution	are	examples	of	commons	
problems	within	a	region	or	nation-state.	International	
fisheries	or	greenhouse	gas	emissions	are	examples	
of	 cross-border	 issues	 with	 more	 complicated	
management	concerns.
Common	goods	 or	 resources	may	 fall	 under	 a	 very	
limited	system	of	property	rights,	or	such	a	system	may	
be	absent.	One	example	of	assigning	property	rights	
to	 a	 common	 property	 resource	 is	 the	 development	
of	“cap	and	trade”	schemes	to	control	the	amount	of	
carbon	dioxide	(and	other	greenhouse	gases)	emitted	
into	 the	 atmosphere.	Managing	 commons	 problems	
can	 be	 difficult	 because	 the	 protection	 of	 global	
commons	 often	 demands	 relinquishing	 short-term	
economic	or	other	benefits	in	exchange	for	protection	
of	shared	resources.	Other	solutions	to	the	commons	
problem	 relate	 to	 governmental	 oversight	 and	
monitoring	(which	tend	to	lead	to	high	control	costs)	or	
voluntary	agreements	among	all	users	to	refrain	from	
overusing	the	resources.	If	such	an	agreement	can	be	
established,	 free-riders	 avoided	 and	 the	 sustainable	
Hurricane Katrina
- Confusion of responsibilities between federal, state and local responders.
The	multi-level	 nature	 of	 crisis	 response	 in	 the	US	 assumes	 a	 gradual	 expansion	 of	 government	 involvement	
as	 local	 and	 then	 state	 responders	 are	 required	 to	 give	 assistance.	 However,	 this	 “pull”	 approach	 encounters	
difficulties	when	state	and	local	capacities	are	damaged	or	overwhelmed.	In	the	case	of	Katrina,	federal	responders	
waited	too	long	for	specific	requests	for	aid	from	state	and	local	authorities	instead	of	taking	a	more	aggressive	
“push”	approach.		
Dispersed	responsibilities	also	complicated	efforts	to	set	up	a	central	command.	Confusion	
about	responsibilities	was	increased	by	the	existence	of	three	major	federal	operational	
commands:	the	Joint	Field	Office	and	Federal	Coordinating	Officer;	the	Principal	Federal	
Official;	and	Joint	Task	Force	Katrina.	The	lack	of	a	clear	directing	authority	encouraged	
responders	to	“freelance”	without	coordinating	with	appropriate	authorities.	For	example,	
the	heroic	efforts	of	the	Coast	Guard	in	search	and	rescue	have	been	rightly	praised,	but	
there	was	little	effort	to	coordinate	with		FEMA,	state	agencies,	the	National	Guard	or	the	
Department	of	Defense,	which	were	also	running	search	operations.	As	a	result,	there	was	duplication	of	effort	in	
some	neighbourhoods	and	a	lack	of	attention	to	others.	
The	 network	 of	 responders	 also	 includes	 NGOs,	 and	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 the	 additional	 challenge	 of	
coordinating	 their	activities	 [Moynihan,	2008].	 In	Katrina	 the	Red	Cross	worked	closely	with	FEMA,	but	still	had	
difficulties	in	coordination.	The	Red	Cross	communicated	logistical	needs	to	FEMA,	but	found	that	FEMA	often	did	
not	supply	reliable	information,	failed	to	deliver	promised	supplies	or	delivered	inadequate	amounts	too	slowly.	Such	
problems	are	indicative	of	more	serious	challenges	in	incorporating	NGOs	into	the	response	network.	
P 54
international risk governance council Risk Governance Deficits
yield	per	user	clearly	defined,	such	arrangements	can	
be	both	very	effective	and	efficient.
When	 commons	 problems	 entail	 cross-border	 or	
planet-wide	 impacts,	 international	 cooperation	 is	
generally	 required	 for	 effective	 management.	 Such	
cooperation	 is	 notoriously	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 but	
attempts	are	being	made	(e.g.,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	to	
the	UNFCCC	 and	 the	UN	Convention	 on	Biological	
Diversity).	 The	 uneven	 or	 ineffectual	 experience	 of	
international	 agreements	 has	 demonstrated	 how	
difficult	it	is	to	deal	with	commons	problems.
The Montreal Protocol
- An example of successful international cooperation to address a commons problem: depletion of the stratospheric ozone 
layer.
One	positive	example	of	managing	a	commons	problem	in	a	cooperative	and	coordinated	way	is	the	adoption	of	the	
Montreal	Protocol	on	Substances	that	Deplete	the	Ozone	Layer	[UNEP,	2000].	This	Protocol	called	for	the	regulation	
(and	phasing	out)	of	CFCs	and	other	substances	which	react	in	the	upper	atmosphere	to	deplete	ozone.	Because	
the	ozone	layer	protects	the	Earth’s	surface	from	ultraviolet	radiation	that	is	harmful	to	plant	and	animal	life,	and	
because	 these	chemicals	were	widely	used	by	 industries	 in	many	countries,	action	had	 to	be	 international	and	
include	participation	by	governments,	industry	and	scientists.	All	major	stakeholders	played	a	role	in	international	
negotiations	and,	despite	their	different	perspectives	and	interests,	were	able	to	cooperate	effectively.	
The	push	for	binding	regulation	on	CFCs	was	initiated	by	the	Toronto	group	of	like-minded	
governments	 and	 followed	 up	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 Environment	 Programme,	 which	
convened	the	inter-governmental	negotiations	in	1982	that	led	to	the	Vienna	Convention	
on	Protection	of	the	Ozone	Layer,	signed	in	1985	[Benedick,	2004].	The	Montreal	Protocol	
to	this	convention	(signed	in	1987	and	in	force	since	1989)	imposed	a	strict	timetable	for	
the	phasing	out	of	ozone-depleting	substances.	
The	Montreal	Protocol	was	a	ground-breaking	agreement	and,	according	to	Kofi	Annan,	“perhaps	the	most	successful	
environmental	agreement	to	date”	[UNEP,	2003].	It	was	the	first	international	environmental	agreement	to	adopt	a	
precautionary	strategy	of	immediate	action	before	all	the	scientific	ramifications	were	understood.	It	imposed	trade	
sanctions	to	achieve	its	goals	and	differentiated	between	developed	and	developing	countries	in	recognising	the	
origins	of	the	problem	and	distributing	responsibility	for	solving	it	[UNEP,	2005].	It	also	gave	industry	an	incentive	for	
innovation	by	opening	the	market	to	higher	value-added	patented	chemicals	to	replace	CFC	commodity	chemicals	
[Tait	and	Bruce,	2004].	The	“fundamental	shift	in	industrial	processes”	led	industry	to	develop	a	CFC	substitute	in	
only	three	years,	a	result	that	“would	have	been	inconceivable	without	international	regulation”	[citation	in	DeSombre	
2000/1;	see	also	Mullin,	2002].
The Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation scheme
- Using financial incentives as a tool to address a commons problem.
Forests	play	an	important	role	in	the	global	carbon	budget,	acting	either	as	sinks	or	sources	of	CO2	emissions.	The	
effects	vary	globally	as	a	result	of	differences	in	soil,	tree	type,	tree	cover	and	other	factors.	Deforestation	(which	
is	estimated	by	 the	UN	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	at	13	million	hectares	per	year	 for	1990-2005	 [FAO,	
2005])	and	forest	degradation	result	in	substantial	reductions	in	forest	carbon	stocks	and	significant	increases	in	
emissions.	
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B12 Managing conflicts of 
interests, beliefs, values and 
ideologies 
A conflict may be negotiable or irreconcilable, 
and risk managers must have the capacity to 
distinguish between the two
Management	of	 risk	 is	not	a	purely	 technical	 task;	 it	
may	entail	accepting	or	seeking	to	resolve	fundamental	
conflicts	 between	 individuals,	 societal	 groups,	
businesses	 and	 governments.	 Broadly	 speaking,	
those	 conflicts	 may	 relate	 to	 differing	 interests	 that	
are	 typically	 tangible	 or	material	 in	 nature	 (such	 as	
economic	 interests),	 to	commonly	held	beliefs	about	
the	nature	and	the	consequences	of	risks,	or	to	basic	
values	such	as	social	justice	or	ecological	sustainability.	
They	may	also	relate	to	differing	ideologies	(“views	of	
the	world”),	whether	those	ideologies	are	grounded	in	
religion,	ethics,	philosophy,	culture,	tradition	or	politics.	
Conflicts	and	tensions	can	arise	at	multiple	levels,	and	
deficits	may	occur	when	the	determination	of	“who	is	
at	 risk?”,	 “what	are	 the	priorities	 for	 response?”	and	
“whose	 priorities	 are	 these?”	 are	 not	made	 clear	 or	
are	the	subject	of	disagreement.
The	 underlying	 motives	 that	 drive	 conflict	 may	
be	 exaggerated	 by	 the	 concerns	 or	 personalities	
of	 particular	 leaders,	 including	 the	 varying	 levels	
of	 trust	 that	 people	 have	 in	 them,	 as	 well	 as	 by	
how	 comfortable	 people	 are	 with	 the	 processes	 of	
negotiation,	compromise	and	compensation.
Confusion	about	the	underlying	motives	of	protagonists	
can	 occur.	 For	 example,	 advocates	 with	 a	 material	
interest	 in	 the	 issue	may	 represent	 their	 position	as	
rooted	in	a	philosophical	principle	that	cannot	possibly	
be	 compromised.	 Likewise,	 decision-makers	 may	
dismiss	 or	 even	 disbelieve	 a	 stakeholder’s	 honest	
claim	 that	 a	 concern	 flows	 from	 adherence	 to	 an	
unusual	 religious	 or	 ethical	 belief.	 It	 may	 therefore	
be	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	 risk	 manager	 to	 accurately	
determine	 what	 the	 motives	 of	 stakeholders	 are.	
Thus,	 the	 imperative	 of	 conflict	 resolution	 rests	 to	
some	extent	on	the	manager’s	critical	need	to	gather	
information	about	the	views,	interests	and	ideologies	
of	the	key	stakeholders.
In	handling	conflicts,	it	is	often	crucial	to	reach	out	to	
certain	stakeholders.	Even	if	those	groups	cannot	make	
a	technical	contribution	to	the	task	of	risk	assessment,	
their	views	are	a	crucial	part	of	the	knowledge	needed	
Some	have	referred	to	the	destruction	of	the	world’s	forests	as	a	tragedy	of	the	commons	even	though	the	forests	
may	be	privately	owned.	Many	externalities	result	 from	the	private	benefit	earned	from	deforestation,	 leading	to	
public	costs	in	terms	of	lost	ecosystem	services.
Payments	for	Environmental	Services	(PES)	have	been	proposed	as	a	means	of	assigning	an	economic	value	to	
common	goods	and	services,	and	making	direct,	contractual	and	conditional	payments	to	 local	 landholders	and	
users	in	return	for	adopting	practices	that	secure	ecosystem	conservation	and	restoration	[CIFOR,	2005].
The	Reduced	Emissions	 from	Deforestation	 and	 Forest	Degradation	 (REDD)	 scheme,	
agreed	on	in	principle	at	the	Bali	Conference	of	the	Parties	to	the	UNFCCC	in	December	
2007,	includes	provisions	for	positive	financial	incentives	for	the	reduction	of	deforestation	
and	forest	degradation	(specifically,	 for	reduction	of	the	greenhouse	gas	emissions	that	
result).	These	payments	compensate	landowners	for	the	loss	of	income	they	would	have	
received	from	deforesting.	REDD	may	thus	be	seen	as	a	form	of	PES.	
REDD	is	concerned	not	only	with	maintaining	services	contributed	by	forests	such	as	carbon	sequestration,	sustaining	
biodiversity,	supporting	the	hydrological	cycle	and	helping	to	build	soils,	but	also	with	the	social	consequences	of	its	
actions.	REDD	aims	to	ensure	that	all	its	associated	measures	and	actions	address	the	needs	of	the	approximately	
1	billion	people	who	depend	directly	on	forests	for	their	 livelihoods,	 incorporating	standards	to	ensure	adequate	
protection	for	the	rights	of	local	people	and	indigenous	communities	[UNFCCC,	2008].
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to	inform	a	decision,	and	their	acceptance	of	the	final	
decision	is	crucial	to	its	efficacy.	Without	the	support	
or	acquiescence	of	key	stakeholders,	a	decision	may	
be	blocked,	undermined	or	contested	in	the	courts	or	
on	the	streets	–	even	if	the	decision	is	well-grounded	
in	scientific	risk	analysis.	In	the	early	days	of	advocacy	
of	nuclear	energy,	for	example,	there	was	a	tendency	
for	decision-makers	to	ignore	or	discount	the	views	of	
stakeholders	who	lacked	scientific	credentials	instead	
of	an	active	campaign	of	outreach	to	all	stakeholders	
who	might	influence	the	future	of	nuclear	energy.
Conflicts	 with	 different	 motivations	 may	 require	
different	 pathways	 to	 resolution.	 If	 the	 automobile	
and	oil	 industries	have	different	material	 interests	 in	
how	a	risk	is	managed	(as,	perhaps,	with	the	current	
goal	 for	 the	 automobile	 industry	 to	 build	 cars	which	
use	 less	 petrol	 and	 diesel),	 it	 may	 be	 feasible	 to	
broker	 a	 compromise	 by	 offering	 compensation	 to	
the	losing	party	or	deciding	to	resolve	more	than	one	
risk	 issue	at	once.	When	deeply-held	 ideologies	are	
at	stake,	it	may	be	crucial	to	find	solutions	that	allow	
leaders	of	opposing	parties	to	retain	their	adherence	
to	a	cherished	belief.	Some	conflicts	–	such	as	those	
rooted	in	deep	ideological	conviction	or	large	material	
interest	–	may	be	 irreconcilable	 (at	 least	 in	 the	 time	
horizon	of	interest).	For	the	risk	manager,	it	is	critical	to	
distinguish	those	conflicts	that	may	be	resolvable	from	
those	that	cannot	possibly	be	resolved.	A	deficit	in	risk	
governance	 can	 occur	when	 decision-makers	 fail	 to	
understand	 the	 motives	 of	 conflicting	 stakeholders,	
misapply	the	many	tools	of	conflict	resolution	or	treat	a	
conflict	as	negotiable	when,	in	fact,	it	is	irresolvable.
The Canadian asbestos industry
- Canada has not successfully reconciled conflicting interests related to human health with its economic, political and social 
interests in the asbestos industry.
Canada	 has	 consistently	 opposed	 global	 efforts	 to	 regulate	 international	 trade	 in	 asbestos,	 despite	 its	 known	
hazards,	and	has	taken	only	relatively	weak	measures	to	address	potential	health	risks.	Such	a	position	singles	
Canada	out	among	Western	industrialised	countries,	many	of	which	have	banned	or	heavily	restricted	the	use	or	
import	of	asbestos	[Attaran	et	al.,	2008;	Brophy	et	al.,	2007].	Indeed,	“asbestos	remains	one	of	the	most	glaring	
examples	in	all	of	occupational	health	in	Canada	of	the	gap	between	the	scientific	evidence	of	harm	and	the	lack	of	
adequate	preventive	measures”	[Brophy	et	al,	2007].	
In	the	context	of	its	economic	and	political	 interests,	the	Canadian	federal	government’s	argument	for	promoting	
“controlled	use”	and	unrestricted	trade	of	chrysotile	(white)	asbestos	becomes	more	understandable.	Canada	is	the	
fourth-largest	producer	of	asbestos	in	the	world,	producing	10%	of	world	output,	and	the	second-largest	exporter;	
and	its	asbestos	industry	in	Quebec,	despite	employing	under	1,000	workers	and	earning	a	modest	CAD110	million	
in	 2007,	 has	 “an	 almost	 sacred	 status	 in	 the	 province,”	 which	 has	 “made	 it	 politically	 untouchable”,	 especially	
since	support	 from	Quebec	 is	essential	 for	any	political	party	wishing	 to	 form	a	majority	government	 in	Canada	
[Economist,	2008;	Howse	and	Tuerk,	2001].	
Canada	 challenged	 France’s	 ban	 on	 asbestos	 (including	 imports)	 at	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organization	in	1998,	but	lost	its	case	when	a	panel	decided	that	France’s	actions	were	
necessary	 for	 the	protection	of	human	health	and	did	not	violate	 international	 trade	 law	
[Howse	and	Tuerk,	2001].	Canada	has	repeatedly	tried	to	prevent	the	addition	of	chrysotile	
asbestos	to	the	United	Nations	(UN)	Rotterdam	Convention,	which	would	require	importing	
countries	to	give	prior	informed	consent	to	prove	their	awareness	of	the	hazardous	nature	of	
the	material			they	are	buying	[Collier,	2008].			These	actions	have	been	heavily	criticised.	
Ninety-six	percent	of	Canadian	asbestos	is	exported,	and	almost	all	of	this	goes	to	the	developing	world,	where	
the	legal	infrastructure	and	technological	capacity	to	reduce	exposure	to	asbestos	dust	are	weak	or	non-existent	
[Collier,	2008;	Brophy	et	al.,	2007].	
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B13 Acting in the face of the 
unexpected 
Insufficient flexibility in the face of unexpected 
risk situations
As	 in	 the	 failure	 to	 imagine	 surprises	 (A10),	 risk	
managers	 may	 be	 unable	 to	 act	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	
unexpected.	This	risk	governance	deficit	occurs	when	
people	 and	 organisations	 are	 not	 prepared	 or	 able	
to	 swiftly	 adjust	 their	 risk	management	 strategies	 to	
respond	to	new	emerging	risks,	rapid	changes	in	the	
risk	landscape,	or	unexpected	crises	and	emergency	
situations.	Organisational	capacity	 that	 is	well-suited	
to	 dealing	 with	 today’s	 risks	 may	 prove	 inadequate	
tomorrow	 when	 new	 threats,	 abrupt	 change	 and	
paradigm	shifts	 fundamentally	 transform	 the	context	
within	which	risks	must	be	managed.	Here,	the	deficit	
may	arise	because	risk	managers	delay	 the	change	
from	 routine	 to	 crisis	management	 or	 because	 they	
have	 not	 previously	 envisaged	 and	 planned	 for	 the	
need	to	make	changes.	Many	crises	could	have	been	
managed	more	effectively	if	risk	managers	had	planned	
for	the	crisis	or	responded	to	it	more	promptly.
Acting	in	the	face	of	the	unexpected	requires	creativity,	
especially	 the	 encouragement	 of	 unconventional	
Even	at	home,	Canada	has	been	unable	to	properly	address	asbestos-related	health	risks	because	of	this	conflict	of	
interests.	There	was	no	asbestos	dust	standard	in	place	in	Quebec	until	1978	and,	even	since	then,	the	occupational	
exposure	 limit	 for	 chrysotile	 asbestos	 has	 remained	 ten	 times	higher	 than	 the	generally	 accepted	 international	
standard	[Brophy	et	al.,	2007].	
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- Dealing with complex and intractable conflicts involving material interests as well as values and ideologies.
The	conflict	between	Jewish	and	Palestinian	nationalisms	–	the	desire	of	both	peoples	to	
establish	an	 independent	nation-state	on	the	same	territory,	 to	which	both	groups	have	
long-standing	claims	–	is	at	the	root	of	this	continuing	conflict,	one	of	the	world’s	major	
sources	of	geopolitical	instability	and	risk.	However,	this	conflict	is	not	only	over	material	
interests	such	as	land,	water	and	security,	but	also	involves	questions	of	ideology,	identity	
and	values.	Such	issues	are	evident	when	one	considers	how	central	and	sensitive	the	
question	of	the		“ownership”	of	Jerusalem	and		the		stewardship	of		key	religious	sites	for	
both	Jews	and	Muslims	has	been	throughout	the	conflict.	What’s	more,	the	influence	of	religious	(Zionist	and	Islamist)	
ideologies	on	both	sides	has	affected	the	attitudes,	perceptions	and	fears	of	the	stakeholders,	thus	complicating	
the	task	of	reconciliation.	Decades	of	acrimony	and	violence	have	built	up	a	legacy	of	mistrust,	fear	and	bitterness	
[Tessler,	1994;	Beinin	and	Stein,	2006].
Over	the	years,	many	efforts	have	been	made	to	try	to	resolve	the	competing	claims	and	halt	the	sporadic	violence	
and	war	 that	 have	 repeatedly	broken	out	between	 the	 two	parties.	After	UN	Resolution	181	 failed	disastrously	
by	trying	to	impose	a	rational,	yet	perhaps	simplistic,	solution,	later	efforts	focussed	on	mediation	and	promoting	
negotiation	 [UN,	 2008].	 These	 efforts	 included	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 negotiations	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	
international	organisations	(the	UN),	great	world	powers	(US,	Soviet	Union)	or	a	combination	of	both	(the	Quartet,	
which	involves	the	US,	the	EU,	the	UN	and	Russia,	in	2002).	Some	negotiations	between	Israel	and	neighbouring	
Arab	states	have	been	successful	(Israel	signed	peace	treaties	with	Egypt	in	1979	and	Jordan	in	1994)	[IMFA,	2007],	
but	the	conflicts	of	interest,	negative	past	experiences	and	strong	ideologies	dividing	the	Israelis	and	Palestinians	
have	thus	far	prevented	any	lasting	peace.	Many	observers	regard	this	conflict	as	one	of	the	most	intractable	in	the	
world	today.
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thinking	 and	 innovation,	 plus	 the	 capacity	 to	 make	
decisions	 in	 situations	 of	 aleatory	 uncertainty6.	
Processes	 are	 needed	 that	 generate	 insights	 and	
ideas	 situated	 on	 the	 margins	 of	 current	 thinking	
and	 that	 challenge	 conventional	 wisdom	 to	 imagine	
possible	 futures.	 Such	 techniques	 (e.g.,	 scenario	
planning	or	expert	Delphi)	are	useful	as	part	of	the	risk	
manager’s	portfolio	in	order	to	be	better	prepared	for	
future	surprises	and	emergencies,	as	for	example	with	
contingency	planning	for	a	global	influenza	pandemic	
[WHO,	2005].	
When	 unexpected	 events	 occur,	 professionals	 who	
deviate	 from	 mainstream	 opinion	 and	 advocate	
outsider	 positions	 are	 often	 denounced	 as	
troublemakers	and	ignored,	or	even	demoted	instead	
of	 being	 rewarded.	 Without	 strong	 support	 and	
backing	from	the	senior	leadership	of	an	organisation,	
imaginative	professionals	will	not	be	inclined	to	think	
laterally	or	express	original	thoughts.	The	result	is	that	
people	and	organisations	can	confine	 their	attention	
only	to	a	standard	list	of	agreed	risks,	which	creates	
vulnerability	to	unexpected	or	emerging	risks.
Given	that	there	will	always	be	more	unconventional	
opinions	than	there	are	future	risks,	it	is	also	important	
for	risk	managers	not	to	be	too	readily	diverted	from	
mainstream	 thinking	 by	 poorly	 supported	 lateral	
thinking.	 Thus,	 openness	 to	 new	 ideas	 must	 be	
accompanied	 by	 rigorous	 scrutiny	 of	 those	 ideas.	 It	
is	also	important	to	realise	that	we	will	never	be	able	
to	predict	and	be	prepared	for	all	future	outcomes,	no	
matter	how	 thorough	and	able	our	 foresight,	and,	 in	
such	circumstances,	readiness	and	ability	to	change	
routine	procedures	become	more	important.
Where	 there	 is	a	need	 to	deal	with	 the	unexpected,	
including	 sudden	 change	 associated	 with	 emerging	
risks,	 decision-makers	 may	 neglect,	 or	 refuse	 to	
acknowledge,	 such	 risks.	 Denial	 may	 be	 especially	
problematic	 if	 economic,	 political	 or	 environmental	
systems	are	about	to	change	or	are	already	changing,	
and	thus	new	approaches	are	needed.	
Risk	 management	 failures	 can	 also	 arise	 when	
decision-makers	have	neglected	to	build	redundancies	
and	 resilience	 into	 systems	 that	 might	 be	 exposed	
to	 unknown	 or	 uncertain	 threats,	 or	 when	 they	 are	
unable	 to	 draw	 on	 slack	 resources	 or	 reassign	
resources	from	elsewhere.	Such	actions	could	reduce	
system	vulnerabilities	and	allow	for	a	quicker	recovery	
after	a	hazardous	event	has	occurred	[IRGC,	2005].	
Building	redundancy	on	the	one	hand	and	being	able	
to	adapt	quickly	on	the	other	are	thus	complementary	
components	 of	 a	 risk	 management	 strategy	 which,	
by	 increasing	 resilience,	can	be	a	valid	approach	 to	
responding	to	the	unexpected.
6)	Aleatory	uncertainty	occurs	because	of	natural,	unpredictable	variation	in	a	system	and	cannot	be	decreased	through	scientific	research.	Risk	
analysts	distinguish	between	aleatory	and	epistemic	uncertainty,	the	latter	arising	owing	to	a	lack	of	knowledge	about	system	behaviour.	Epistemic	
uncertainty	can	thus	be	reduced	by	more	scientific	research	[IRGC,	2005:	28].	
Hurricane Katrina 
- Failure to respond adequately owing to the huge and unexpected scale of the destruction. 
Although	Hurricane	Katrina	itself	was	not	an	unexpected	event	–	meteorologists	had	been	
closely	 tracking	 the	 storm’s	 evolution	 for	 a	week	 and	New	Orleans	 is	 on	 a	 hurricane-
prone	part	of	the	Gulf	coast	–	the	extent	of	devastation	caused	was	much	greater	than	
anyone	had	imagined	possible.	Eighty	percent	of	New	Orleans	was	flooded,	over	1,800	
people	died,	oil	platforms	were	damaged,	oil	refineries	had	to	be	closed	and	over	1	million	
hectares	of	forest	land	were	destroyed.	Human,	economic	and	environmental	costs	were	
extremely	high,	making	Katrina	the	costliest	hurricane	in	US	history.
Faced	with	the	extent	of	this	devastation,	however,	federal	responders	seemed	unable	to	make	the	switch	to	crisis	
mode,	instead	treating	Katrina	as	if	it	were	a	“normal”	hurricane.	People	in	charge	assessed	the	problem	they	were	
facing	by	referring	to	events	from	the	past,	underestimating	its	scope	and	scale,	and	they	failed	to	shift	their	frames	
of	reference	until	it	was	too	late.	
For	example,	many	Department	of	Homeland	Security	(DHS)	officials	saw	the	designation	of	“Incident	of	National	
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Significance”,	which	would	have	expanded	the	federal	response,	as	reserved	for	terrorist	attacks.	This	delayed	the	
declaration	of	Katrina	as	such	an	incident	until	a	day	after	landfall,	when	much	of	New	Orleans	was	already	flooded,	
slowing	down	emergency	and	rescue	efforts	[Moynihan,	2008].
The Millennium Bug
- Success (building redundancy and resilience) or overblown fear?
The	“Millennium	Bug”	(Y2K	or	Year	2000	bug)	was	the	possible	failure	of	computers	to	deal	with	date-related	data	
between	December	31,	1999	and	January	1,	2000.	Many	risk	analysts	predicted	that	the	consequences	could	be	
huge,	but	potential	damages	were	impossible	to	assess.	
Companies	and	organisations	around	the	world	checked	and	upgraded	their	computer	systems.	The	US	government	
is	 one	 of	 those	which	 took	 the	matter	 extremely	 seriously,	 passing	 the	Year	 2000	 Information	 and	Readiness	
Disclosure	Act,	whereby	 it	worked	with	 the	private	sector	 to	ensure	readiness	and	promoted	plans	with	 internal	
continuity	in	the	event	of	information	technology	related	failures.	However,	when	the	year	2000	came,	no	country	
experienced	any	problems	regarded	as	worth	reporting.	So	had	the	steps	taken	to	reduce	risk	worked?	Or	was	the	
problem	imaginary	to	begin	with	(over-estimation	and	over-reaction	leading	to	over-zealous	risk	management)?	
Actions	 taken	 to	 remedy	 possible	 Y2K	 problems	 did	 have	 some	 benefits.	 With	 many	
businesses	 installing	 computer	 backup	 systems	 for	 critical	 files,	 preparation	 for	 Y2K	
had	a	significant	effect	on	 the	computer	 industry	and	on	contingency	planning,	 forcing	
senior	management	to	consider	how	they	would	operate	their	businesses	in	the	event	of	a	
business	disruption	[Cumming,	2002].	It	has	also	been	suggested	that	on	September	11,	
2001,	the	New	York	infrastructure	(including	subways,	phone	services	and	financial	and	
banking	systems)		was		able		to		continue		operation		because		of		the		decentralisation	of
infrastructures,	the	creation	of	multiple	sites	for	backup	data	and	contingency	plans	established	in	1999.	
Preventative	management	through	redundancy	and	resilience	building	can	be	an	effective	risk	mitigation	strategy	
for	risks	with	aleatory	uncertainty.
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Need for early warning systems (A1)
Understanding: Assessing risks
Need to acquire and 
develop knowledge
What to achieve with 
good risk assessment?
How to achieve good 
risk assessment?
Objective and criteria for 
good risk assessment:
Need to get factual knowledge (A2) Need to get knowledge about perceptions (A3)
Involving stakeholders (A4)
Using formal models (A9)
Assessing potential surprises (A10)
The acceptability of the risk must 
be evaluated (A5)
Misinterpretation of information 
must be avoided (A6)
Complex systems need to be 
understood (A7)
Rapid or fundamental changes in 
systems must be recognised (A8)
Allocation	of	deficits	to	the	left	or	right	side	of	this	chart	may	be	subject	to	interpretation,	but	intends,	here,	to	focus	on	the	main	characteristics	of	
each	deficit.	A10	in	particular	could	be	considered	to	include	elements	of	both	objectives	and	criteria.
Tools/capability to conduct 
adequate risk assessment:
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IV How to work with the risk governance deficits as  
    identified in this report
IRGC	is	suggesting	that	organisations	use	this	report	to	test	or	evaluate	the	structures,	principles	and	processes	
that	govern	the	way	they	identify,	assess	and	manage	risks,	with	a	view	to	understanding	whether	the	procedures	in	
place	are	adapted	to	the	organisation’s	needs.	
There	is	no	order	of	priority	as	to	whether	some	deficits	would	be	more	important	than	others.	In	fact,	some	deficits	
which	may	appear	more	relevant	to	some	sectors	may	be	less	so	for	other	sectors.
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Responding to early warnings (B1)
Designing effective risk 
management strategies (B2)
GOAL
STRATEGY
POLICY
REGULATION
IMPLEMENTATION
Acting: Managing risks
What to achieve with 
good risk management?
How to achieve good 
risk management?
Objective and criteria for 
effective risk management:
Tools/capabilities that decision-
makers must use/develop for 
making good decisions:
Organisational capacity (B9)
Risk management policies must be 
efficient and equitable (B4)
Dealing with dispersed 
responsibilities (B10)
Side effects of risk management 
must be anticipated (B6)
Managing fundamental conflicts (B12)
Time horizons must be 
reconciled (B7)
Developing the capacity to act in 
the event of the unexpected (B13)
Transparency and confidentiality 
must be balanced (B8)
Commons problems and externalities 
must be dealt with (B11)
Allocation	of	deficits	to	the	left	or	right	side	of	this	chart	may	be	subject	to	interpretation,	but	intends,	here,	to	focus	on	the	main	characteristics	of	
each	deficit.	B12	and	B13	in	particular	could	be	considered	to	include	elements	of	both	objectives	and	criteria.
Selecting a 
reasonable range of 
policy options (B3)
Implementing 
and enforcing 
risk management 
decisions (B5)
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With	the	two	charts	below,	we	propose	an	organisation	of	the	deficits	that	decision-makers	could	use	when	they	
conduct	an	assessment	of	how	their	organisation	handles	risk	governance.
Each	chart	identifies	the	deficits	related	to:
●	establishing	the	basic	elements	of	risk	assessment	and	management
●	criteria	for	evaluating	the	quality	of	the	outcome:	what	objective	must	be	achieved
●	instruments	and	capacity	that	need	to	be	developed:	how	to	achieve	the	objective
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IRGC	has	 identified	 the	23	deficits	described	 in	 this	
report	 as	 important	 because	 of	 their	 propensity	 to	
recur	frequently	and	to	have	an	impact	on	the	effective	
governance	 of	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 risk	 types	 in	 many	
varying	 contexts	 and	 circumstances,	 with	 potential	
severe	consequences.	It	is	apparent	that	deficits	are	
interrelated;	that	multiple	deficits	are	often	implicated	
in	 the	 governance	 of	 a	 single	 risk	 issue;	 that	 one	
deficit	may	occur	 in	a	variety	of	different	ways;	and,	
that	 prioritising	 them	 for	 certain	 types	 of	 risks	 or	 in	
certain	sectors	could	be	helpful.
IRGC	chose	deliberately	not	to	prioritise	the	deficits.	
Doing	so	could	inappropriately	divert	decision-makers’	
attention	 from	 some	 deficits	 perhaps	 perceived	 as	
less	important	than	others	but	of	higher	importance	to	
them.	The	list	of	23	deficits	may	be	used	as	a	checklist	
to	evaluate	a	risk	governance	process.	
Diagnosis	 and	 remedy	 of	 deficits	 is	 not	 a	 one-time	
event,	 but	 rather	 an	 ongoing	 process	 of	 finding	
problems	 and	 fixing	 them.	 The	 work	 done	 in	 the	
course	of	this	project	on	risk	governance	deficits	has	
highlighted	the	importance	of	the	interactive processes	
between	 risk	 assessment	 and	 management,	 and	
between	risk	generators	and	those	who	are	affected	
by	risks.	
One	of	 the	 central	 elements	of	 these	 interactions	 is	
the	role	given	to	the	inclusion	of	stakeholders,	and	in	
particular	the	public,	in	the	decision-making	process.	
Stakeholders	are	central	in	assessing	and	evaluating	
the	 risk,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 accepting	 the	 decision	 and	
implementing	 it.	 Deciding	 which	 stakeholders	 to	
involve	and	how	is	often	a	very	difficult	and	delicate	
task.
Interactions	 between	 some	 stakeholders	 –	 industry,	
regulators	 and	 the	 public	 –	 also	 have	 the	 power	 to	
determine	 innovation	 outcomes,	 whether	 through	
encouragement	 or	 constraint.	 As	 highlighted	 in	 the	
introduction	 to	 this	 report,	 the	 inability	 to	 take	 full	
advantage	 of	 the	 benefits	 that	 innovation,	 whether	
technological	 or	 social,	 could	 bring	 to	 society	 is	 an	
important	 potential	 consequence	 of	 risk	 governance	
deficits.	
However,	 sometimes	 discussion	 or	 negotiation	
between	stakeholder	parties	reaches	an	impasse	and	
positions	seem	deadlocked	(such	as	in	the	case	of	GM	
crop	regulation	in	Europe).	One	possible	cause	of	this	
is	that	no	one	can,	or	is	willing	to,	determine	ownership	
of	 the	 risk.	 Often,	 it	 is	 particularly	 challenging	 to	
identify	which	actors	are	responsible for the risk	and	
which	actors	generate	the	risk,	know	about	it,	control	
its	 assessment	 and	 management	 and,	 eventually,	
“own”	the	risk,	thus	receiving	credit	for	its	efficient	and	
fair	management.	The	melamine-tainted	milk	scandal	
in	China	 in	2008	demonstrated	 that	 food	safety	can	
become	 an	 important	 challenge	 in	 globalised	 food	
markets,	with	 responsibility	 for	 the	 risk	being	shifted	
away	 from	 the	 risk	generator	 (Chinese	producers	of	
milk	products)	to	others	(food-safety	regulators	or	the	
general	public).
In	 other	 situations,	 risk	 governance	 may	 falter	 not	
because	of	anything	to	do	with	stakeholder	roles,	but	
rather	because	of	a	 fundamental	 lack of knowledge,	
unknowability	or	ignorance	surrounding	the	risk	issue.	
Making	a	decision	under	such	circumstances	is	a	task	
that	 many	 decision-makers	 face	 regularly,	 and	 the	
examples	of	“policy	ahead	of	science”	are	many.
Particularly	 challenging	 are	 the	 rapidly	 changing	
environments	 within	 which	 risk	 governance	 takes	
place:	 the	many	 important	 changes	occurring	 in	 the	
various	scientific	and	technological	fields	and	the	way	
society	 becomes	 involved	 in	 consumer	 and	 political	
debates,	or	in	economic	and	social	regulation.
What’s	 more,	 in	 risk	 governance	 practice,	 knowing	
what should	 be	 done	 is	 one	 thing	 (and	 this	 in	 itself	
is	not	always	evident),	but	knowing	how it	should	be	
done	and	being	able	to	do	it	are	additional	challenges.	
People	may	 know	what	 the	 goal	 should	 be,	 but	 not	
how	to	achieve	it,	or	they	may	know	how	to	achieve	
it	 but	 are	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 do	 so	 because	 of	
organisational	constraints	or	incompatible	incentives.	
V Conclusion and outlook
P 63
international risk governance councilRisk Governance Deficits
In	conclusion,	 it	 is	 important	to	note	that	IRGC	does	
not	view	the	list	of	deficits	presented	in	this	report	as	
being	either	exhaustive	or	fixed.	There	may	be	some	
degree	of	overlap	between	the	deficits	presented	here	
and,	as	already	noted,	some	are	certainly	interlinked.	
Nevertheless,	IRGC	hopes	that	the	way	in	which	the	
deficits	have	been	described	and	categorised	 in	 the	
report	can	be	useful	to	risk	decision-makers	in	helping	
them	to	identify	deficits	that	are	relevant	to	their	own	
organisations,	 and	 to	 reflect	 upon	how	such	deficits	
can	be	avoided	so	that	trust	is	built	into	how	the	risks	
are	dealt	with	and	in	who	deals	with	them.	
Further	 feedback	 from	 risk	 practitioners	 on	 the	
usefulness	or	relevance	of	this	report	is	welcomed.
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Cluster/sub-cluster Deficit Short description Illustrations
VI Overview
Gathering	and	interpreting	
knowledge
	
	
	
Disputed	or	potentially	biased	
or	subjective	knowledge
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Knowledge	related	to	systems	
and	their	complexity
Knowledge	and	
understanding	are	never	
complete	or	adequate
A1:	Early	warning	systems	
A2:	Factual	knowledge	about	
risks
	
A3:	Perceptions	of	risk,	
including	their	determinants	
and	consequences
A4:	Stakeholder	involvement
A5:	Evaluating	the	
acceptability	of	the	risk
A6:	Misrepresenting	
information	about	risk
A7:	Understanding	complex	
systems
	
	
	
A8:	Recognising	fundamental	
or	rapid	changes	in	systems
A9:	The	use	of	formal	models
A10:	Assessing	potential	
surprises
Missing,	ignoring	or	exaggerating	early	
signals	of	risk
	
The	lack	of	adequate	knowledge	about	
a	hazard,	including	the	probabilities	
of	various	events	and	the	associated	
economic,	human	health,	environmental	
and	societal	consequences
The	lack	of	adequate	knowledge	about	
values,	beliefs	and	interests	and	therefore	
about	how	risks	are	perceived	by	
stakeholders
Failure	to	adequately	identify	and	involve	
relevant	stakeholders	in	risk	assessment,	
in	order	to	improve	information	input	and	
confer	legitimacy	on	the	process
Failure	to	consider	variables	that	influence	
risk	appetite	and	risk	acceptance
The	provision	of	biased,	selective	or	
incomplete	information
A	lack	of	appreciation	or	understanding	of	
the	potentially	multiple	dimensions	of	a	risk	
and	of	how	interconnected	risk	systems	
can	entail	complex	and	sometimes	
unforeseeable	interactions
Failure	to	re-assess	in	a	timely	manner	fast	
and/or	fundamental	changes	occurring	in	
risk	systems
An	over-	or	under-reliance	on		models	and/
or	a	failure	to	recognise	that	models	are	
simplified	approximations	of	reality	and	
thus	can	be	fallible
Failure	to	overcome	cognitive	barriers	
to	imagining	events	outside	of	accepted	
paradigms	(“black	swans”)
	
	
•	 The	subprime	crisis	in	the	
United	States
•	 Tsunami	early	warning	
system	in	South-East	
Asia
•	 Radio-frequency	
electromagnetic	fields
•	 Replacing	one	gasoline	
additive	with	another	
(MTBE)	
•	 Genetically	modified	
foods
•	 Risk	perceptions	of	
nuclear	power
•	 Large	infrastructure	
projects	(dams)	
	
	
•	 Radioactive	waste	
disposal	
•	 The	tobacco	industry	
and	the	risks	of	tobacco	
products
•	 Disposal	of	the	Brent	
Spar	platform
•	 BSE	and	beef	supply	in	
the	United	Kingdom	
	
•	 The	subprime	crisis	in	the	
United	States
•	 Fisheries	depletion	
(Barents	Sea	capelin)	
	
•	 The	HIV/AIDS	epidemic
•	 Potato	blight	and	the	Irish	
Potato	Famine	
•	 Fisheries	depletion	
(Newfoundland	cod)
•	 The	subprime	crisis	in	the	
United	States	
	
•	 9/11	terrorist	attacks
	
	
	
	
A: Assessing and understanding risks
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 B: Managing risks
The	preparation	and	decision	
process	for	risk	management	
strategies	and	policies
Formulating	responses,	
resolving	conflicts	and	
deciding	to	act
Organisational	capacities	for	
responding	and	monitoring
B2:	Designing	effective	risk	
management	strategies
B3:	Considering	a	
reasonable	range	of	risk	
management	options
B4:	Designing	efficient	and	
equitable	risk	management	
policies
	
B6:	Anticipating	side	effects	
of	risk	management
B7:	Reconciling	time	
horizons
B8:	Balancing	transparency	
and	confidentiality
B1:	Responding	to	early	
warnings
B11:	Dealing	with	commons	
problems	and	externalities
	
	
B12:	Managing	conflicts	of	
interests,	beliefs,	values	and	
ideologies
B13:	Acting	in	the	face	of	the	
unexpected
B5:	Implementing	and	
enforcing	risk	management	
decisions
B9:	Organisational	capacity
B10:	Dealing	with	dispersed	
responsibilities
Failure	to	design	risk	management	
strategies	that	adequately	balance	
alternatives
Failure	to	consider	a	reasonable	range	
of	risk	management	options	(and	their	
negative	or	positive	consequences)	in	
order	to	meet	set	objectives
Inappropriate	risk	management	occurs	
when	benefits	and	costs	are	not	balanced	
in	an	efficient	and	equitable	manner
Failure	to	anticipate,	monitor	and	react	
to	the	outcomes	of	a	risk	management	
decision	in	the	case	of	negative	side	
effects
An	inability	to	reconcile	the	time	frame	of	
the	risk	with	the	time	frames	of	decision-
making	and	incentive	schemes
Failure	to	balance	two	of	the	necessary	
requirements	of	decision-making:	
transparency,	which	can	foster	stakeholder	
trust;	and	confidentiality,	which	can	protect	
security	and	maintain	incentives	for	
innovation
Failure	of	managers	to	respond	and	
take	action	when	risk	assessors	have	
determined	from	early	signals	that	a	risk	is	
emerging
	
	
A	lack	of	understanding	of	the	complex	
nature	of	commons	problems	and	
consequently	also	of	the	specific	risk	
management	tools	required	to	address	
them
	
A	conflict	may	be	negotiable	or	
irreconcilable,	and	risk	managers	must	
have	the	capacity	to	distinguish	between	
the	two
	
Insufficient	flexibility	in	the	face	of	
unexpected	risk	situations
Failure	to	muster	the	necessary	will	and	
resources	to	implement	risk	management	
policies	and	decisions
Failure	to	build	or	maintain	an	adequate	
organisational	capacity	to	manage	risk
Failure	of	the	multiple	departments	or	
organisations	responsible	for	a	risk’s	
management	to	act	cohesively
•	 BSE	in	the	United	
Kingdom
•	 United	States’	biofuels	
policy
•	 Protecting	the	safety	of	
workers	
•	 Fisheries	management
•	 Managing	pesticides	
	
	
•	 The	Kyoto	Protocol	
	
	
•	 Monitoring	the	use	of	
clozapine
•	 CFCs	and	ozone	
depletion	
•	 Asbestos
•	 The	Stern	Review	on	the	
Economics	of	Climate	
Change	
•	 Enron
•	 The	subprime	crisis	in	the	
United	States	
	
	
	
•	 Hurricane	Katrina
•	 Fisheries	depletion	(North	
Sea	herring)
•	 BSE	in	the	United	
Kingdom
•	 Regulation	of	the	artificial	
sweetener	saccharin	
	
•	 The	Montreal	Protocol
•	 The	Reduced	Emissions	
from	Deforestation	and	
Forest	Degradation	
scheme	(REDD)	
•	 The	Canadian	asbestos	
industry
•	 The	Israeli-Palestinian	
conflict	
•	 Hurricane	Katrina
•	 The	Millennium	Bug	
	
•	 BSE	in	the	United	
Kingdom
•	 Fisheries	depletion	
(Mediterranean	bluefin	
tuna)	
•	 Hurricane	Katrina
•	 Health-care	workers	
and	the	Toronto	SARS	
outbreak	
•	 Swiss-Italian	blackout
•	 BSE	in	the	United	
Kingdom
•	 Hurricane	Katrina
Cluster/sub-cluster Deficit Short description Illustrations
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EMF: Mobile phones and power lines  
By Leeka Kheifets, John Swanson and Shaiela Kandel
Power-frequency	electric	and	magnetic	fields	(EMFs)	have	been	present	in	industrialised	
countries	 since	 public	 electricity	 supplies	 appeared	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 century,	 while	 the	
increases	 in	 cellular	 communications	 and	 other	 technologies	 emitting	 radio-frequency	
EMFs	have	been	particularly	rapid	over	the	last	decade.	For	power-frequency	EMFs,	the	
conventional	scientific	view	is	that	even	if	there	is	a	risk,	it	would	be	unlikely	to	be	of	major	
significance	for	public	health.	For	radio-frequency	EMFs,	more	reliable	studies	need	to	be	
conducted,		but	most	reviews	to	date	are	broadly		reassuring	and	conclude	that,	based	on	
current	evidence,	there	is	no	great	reason	to	be	concerned	about	health	risks.	Nevertheless,	the	question	of	EMFs	
attracts	 considerable	 public	 concern,	 uncertainties	 surrounding	 the	 scientific	 evidence	 are	 not	 insignificant	 and	
there	are	those	who	contend	that	risks	are	being	underestimated.	These	uncertainties	have	complicated	the	risk	
governance	of	power	and	radio-frequency	EMFs,	and	several	deficits	are	evident	in	the	way	that	risks	related	to	
EMFs	have	been	handled	over	time.
Overview of the risk issue
EMFs	are	physical	fields	produced	by	the	interaction	between	the	charges	of	electrically	charged	objects.	EMFs	
have	varying	frequencies	and	intensities.	High-frequency	fields	that	carry	energy	sufficient	to	break	bonds	between	
molecules	 (such	as	X-rays	and	gamma	rays)	are	called	 ionising	 radiation	and	are	known	 to	be	carcinogenic	 to	
humans.	 Lower-frequency	 EMFs	 are	 non-ionising	 and	 include	 radio	 frequencies	 (e.g.,	 radio,	 television,	mobile	
phones)	and	power	frequencies	(e.g.,	electrical	appliances,	power	lines).	A	great	deal	of	research	has	been	done	on	
the	biological	effects	of	long-term	exposure	to	radio-	and	power-frequency	EMFs;	however,	the	results	are	unclear	
and	controversial.	
Because	 power-frequency	 EMFs	 have	 been	 around	 longer,	 knowledge	 about	 their	 associated	 risks	 is	 more	
developed.	In	this	case,	there	is	some	evidence	(albeit	weak)	that	exposure	to	elevated	levels	of	power-frequency	
EMFs	is	implicated	in	childhood	leukaemia.	The	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	and	the	International	Agency	
for	Research	on	Cancer	(IARC)	thus	classify	extremely	low-frequency	EMFs	as	“possibly	carcinogenic”.	Concerns	
over	health	risks	have	led	to	delays	in	building	power	lines	and	to	increased	costs	of	power	line	installation	(due	to	
costs	of	EMF	mitigation	measures).
For	 radio-frequency	EMFs,	 the	epidemiological	 evidence	of	 health	 effects	 is	 sparse	and	uninformative:	 studies	
of	children	and	of	many	specific	diseases	are	lacking,	exposure	assessment	is	still	immature	and	the	technology	
is	constantly	changing.	Exposure	assessment	is	thus	still	 in	 its	 infancy	and,	while	current	evidence	suggests	no	
obvious	adverse	effects,	knowledge	gaps	and	long	latency	periods	mean	that	adverse	effects	may	yet	be	discovered	
and	that	the	safety	of	radio-frequency	EMFs	cannot	be	assumed.	
Both	parts	of	the	issue	–	power	frequency	and	radio	frequency	–	attract	public	concern.	In	risk	governance	terms;	
therefore,	the	principal	issue	concerning	power-frequency	EMFs	is	how	to	respond	to	weak	and	uncertain	scientific	
evidence	 that	nonetheless	causes	public	concern.	For	 radio-frequency	EMFs,	 it	 is	 the	combination	of	 the	 rapid	
growth	of	new	exposures	over	a	relatively	short	time,	little	scientific	evidence	but	large	potential	consequences,	and	
significant	public	concern	that	may	lead	to	risk	governance	deficits.	
Annex: Case studies (Summaries)
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Risk-handling process
In	the	early	period	of	power-frequency	risk	management,	the	main	deficit	can	be	seen	in	retrospect	as	a	tendency	
by	the	mainstream,	“establishment”	scientific	community	to	manage	the	issue	purely	on	the	basis	of	its	assessment	
of	the	science,	with	limited	regard	for	alternative	scientific	views	(A2)	or	for	the	legitimacy	of	lay	perspectives	(A3),	
and,	consequently,	insufficient	consideration	of	risk	communication	as	a	policy	option	(B3).	To	be	fair,	these	deficits	
should	be	seen	in	the	context	of	the	times.	The	initial	scientific	evidence	was,	objectively,	weak.	It	was	not,	perhaps,	
until	the	late	1990s	that	the	evidence	started	to	accumulate	(although	still	amounting	to	only	a	“possible”	risk),	and	
around	that	time,	the	mainstream	scientific	community	did	change	its	stance	so	as	to	recognise	this.	In	more	recent	
years,	the	main	issue	has	been	selecting	the	appropriate	policy	(B2,	B4),	with	a	risk	that	alarmist	or	unbalanced	
presentations	of	trade-offs	could	skew	the	optimum	outcome	and	encounter	public	opposition.
With	radio-frequency	EMFs,	the	fundamental	vacuum	in	the	scientific	evidence,	largely	an	inevitable	consequence	
of	the	recent	introduction	of	new	or	rapidly	changing	technologies,	prompts	a	debate	about	early	warnings	(A1,	B1).	
A	clear	distinction	should	be	made	between	evidence	of	the	absence	of	an	effect	and	the	absence	of	evidence	of	an	
effect	–	for	radio-frequency	EMFs,	this	distinction	is	sometimes	intentionally	or	unintentionally	obscured	(A6).	In	risk	
governance	terms,	the	major	problem	is	how	to	decide	upon	what	constitutes	the	“correct”	course	of	action,	given	
that	this	new	technology	cannot	be	expected	to	manifest	any	early	warnings	until	years	after	it	is	introduced.		
Both	the	power-frequency	and	radio-frequency	EMF	issues	have	exhibited	two	further	common	problems.	One	is	
that,	even	when	decision-makers	are	favourable	towards	the	inclusion	of	a	wide	variety	of	interests	and	groups	in	
the	risk	governance	process,	there	is	uncertainty	as	to	what	weight	to	give	small	but	vocal	groups,	or	groups	with	
largely	local	concerns	(A4).
			
The	other	is	that,	almost	inevitably,	different	groups	have	represented	the	science	to	their	best	advantage,	sometimes	
to	the	point	of	distortion	(A6).	An	example	from	one	side	would	be	the	highlighting	of	a	single,	seemingly	positive,	
experimental	 study,	 without	 considering	 the	weight	 of	 evidence	 from	 the	 totality	 of	 relevant	 studies.	 Examples	
from	the	other	side	would	be	references	to	numerous	negative	studies	when	many	of	them	may	not	be	especially	
relevant	to	human	health,	may	not	have	had	the	resolving	power	to	detect	an	effect	or	may	have	relied	on	over-
simplistic	arguments	(based	on	crude	energy	considerations)	for	the	impossibility	of	any	effects.
Likewise,	in	the	area	of	policies	rather	than	science,	those	resistant	to	the	introduction	of	certain	policy	measures	
have	sometimes	tended	to	overstate	the	possible	adverse	consequences	or	side	effects	of	policy	implementation	
(B3);	or,	 conversely,	 those	advocating	certain	policy	options	may	 fail	 to	 recognise	 that	 these	policies	can	have	
consequences	(B6).	To	give	examples,	 for	power-frequency	EMFs,	where	one	major	source	 is	 the	high-voltage	
power	 line,	 there	 are	 a	 set	 of	 inter-related	 issues	 about	 land	 use	 and	 land	 values	 adjacent	 to	 such	 lines:	 the	
different	 economic	 interests	 of	 nearby	 residents	 versus	 those	 of	 society	 as	 a	whole,	 the	 availability	 of	 land	 to	
meet	broader	societal	objectives,	etc.	The	consequences	that	any	EMF	mitigation	measures	could	have	for	these	
wider	issues	must	be	considered.	This	may	not	be	appreciated	by	the	proponents	but,	equally,	may	be	overstated	
by	the	opponents	of	such	measures.	Similar	 issues	apply	to,	for	example,	cell-phone	base	stations	and,	in	both	
cases,	there	are	issues	of	equity	(B4)	between	those	experiencing	the	exposure	and	receiving	some	benefit,	those	
experiencing	the	exposure	and	not	receiving	direct	benefit,	and	society	as	a	whole.	Radio-frequency	EMFs	and,	
particularly,	cellular	communications	have	an	undeniably	enormous	 impact	on	societies.	They	have	a	downside	
(e.g.,	contributing	to	collisions	if	used	when	driving),	but	there	is	broad	agreement	that	the	overall	effect	is	positive,	
through	improved	communication	generally	as	well	as	specifics	such	as	expediting	help	in	medical	emergencies.	It	
would	be	hard	to	justify	restricting	those	benefits,	but	there	is	dispute	as	to	the	extent	to	which	various	precautionary	
measures	would	in	fact	limit	the	use	of,	and	benefit	from,	these	technologies.		
Once	some	jurisdictions	have	taken	action,	there	is	understandable	pressure	on	others	to	take	the	same	or	further	
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action.	 No	 regulator	 or,	 even	 less,	 politician,	 wants	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 lagging	 behind	 in	 public	 protection.	 This	
can	 lead	 to	a	 “race	 to	 the	bottom”	where	 the	measures	 taken	can	become	disconnected	 from	scientific	 reality.	
This	 is	exacerbated	when	stricter	 limits	are	adopted	 in	some	countries	but	are	not	enforced	(B5),	and	are	 then	
misrepresented	in	other	countries	as	examples	of	superior	protection.	On	the	other	hand,	a	long	latency	for	cancer	
and	other	diseases	coupled	with	the	short-term	horizon	of	decision-makers	can	lead	to	a	systemic	bias	for	taking	
no	action	(B7).
We	conclude	that	risk	management	of	EMFs	has	certainly	not	been	perfect,	but	 for	power-frequency	EMFs	risk	
management	has	evolved	and	can	be	largely	considered	a	success.	Lessons	from	the	power-frequency	experience	
can	benefit	risk	governance	of	radio-frequency	EMFs	and	other	emerging	technologies.
The response to Hurricane Katrina  
By Donald Moynihan
Hurricane	Katrina	made	landfall	on	the	coast	of	Louisiana	on	Monday	August	27,	2005.	It	
was	the	largest	natural	disaster	in	the	United	States	(US)	in	living	memory,	affecting	92,000	
square	miles	and	destroying	much	of	 the	city	of	New	Orleans.	Over	1,800	people	died	
and	tens	of	thousands	were	left	homeless	and	without	basic	supplies.	The	destruction	that	
resulted,	although	primarily	caused	by	the	hurricane	itself,	was	also	a	result	of	the	collapse	
of	man-made	 levees	 that	were	supposed	 to	protect	 the	city	of	New	Orleans.	The	direct	
costs		of		repairs		and		reconstruction		plus	the		damage	caused		to	the	national	economic
infrastructure,	 including	disruptions	 to	 the	oil	supply	and	to	 the	export	of	grains,	are	estimated	at	approximately	
US$110	billion,	making	Katrina	the	costliest	hurricane	in	the	history	of	the	US.	Significant	failures	in	risk	governance,	
both	in	the	preparation	for	and	in	the	response	to	the	hurricane,	contributed	to	the	high	human	and	economic	costs	
of	Hurricane	Katrina;	however,	in	this	case	study,	we	concentrate	mainly	on	the	response.	For	this	reason,	most	of	
the	deficits	described	in	this	summary	and	the	associated	case	study	are	deficits	of	risk	management	(cluster	B).
Overview of the risk issue
The	city	of	New	Orleans,	with	a	population	of	approximately	455,000	(in	2005,	pre-Katrina),	is	the	largest	city	in	
Louisiana	and	one	of	the	oldest	cities	in	the	US.	Situated	in	the	Mississippi	River	Delta,	much	of	the	city	is	below	
sea	level	(average	elevation	is	-0.5m)	and	therefore	very	susceptible	to	flooding.	
Although	Louisiana	and	Mississippi	together	account	for	only	2%	of	US	gross	domestic	product,	storm	damage	to	
that	region	of	the	Gulf	coast	has	the	potential	to	cause	substantial	economic	harm	for	more	than	just	the	affected	
regions.	This	is	because	of	the	economic	importance	of	the	port	of	New	Orleans	(one	of	the	largest	and	busiest	
ports	in	the	country)	and	of	the	energy	infrastructure	in	the	Gulf	region,	which	produces	6.5%	of	domestic	crude	oil	
consumption	and	16%	of	natural	gas	consumption	[CRS,	2005].
This	area	of	the	US	coast	has	always	been	at	risk	from	hurricanes;	however,	coastal	erosion	in	Louisiana	over	the	
course	of	the	20th	century	has	made	the	New	Orleans	area	even	more	susceptible	to	storm	surges.	Since	the	Flood	
Control	Act	of	1965,	flood	walls	and	man-made	levees	have	been	built	to	try	to	protect	the	city	and	surrounding	
region.
Risk-handling process
The	consequences	of	a	major	hurricane	had	long	been	anticipated	for	New	Orleans.	Indeed,	the	threat	of	hurricane	
disaster	even	had	its	own	name	–	“the	New	Orleans	scenario”	–	and	in	the	years	prior	to	Katrina,	Federal	Emergency	
Management	Agency	(FEMA)	staff	 ranked	the	New	Orleans	scenario	as	being	one	of	 the	most	critical	potential	
disasters	facing	the	US.		
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7)		The	Lake	Pontchartrain	and	Vicinity,	Louisiana	Hurricane	Protection	Project	in	the	Flood	Control	Act	of	1965	was	an	incomplete	project	already	
more	than	40	years	in	the	making	when	Katrina	hit	[GAO,	2005].
a) Failure to respond to the threat
Despite	 the	 risks	and	 the	gravity	of	potential	 consequences,	however,	 the	 level	of	preparation	and	 the	 funding	
devoted	to	hurricane	protection	and	response	in	New	Orleans	prior	to	Katrina	was	far	from	adequate.	FEMA	had	a	
hard	time	finding	the	money	to	run	simulations	and	devise	plans	for	responding	to	a	hurricane	disaster,	while	the	
design	and	construction	of	the	New	Orleans	system	for	hurricane	protection7		was	flawed,	safety	having	been	put	
second	to	cost	reduction	(B2,	B1)	[ILIT,	2006].
In	the	days	leading	up	to	Katrina’s	landfall	in	New	Orleans,	the	National	Hurricane	Center	and	National	Weather	
Service	issued	multiple	forecasts	and	hurricane	watches.	By	Friday	August	24,	the	tropical	depression	that	would	
become	Hurricane	Katrina	had	become	serious	enough	that	the	governors	of	Mississippi	and	Louisiana	declared	
states	of	emergency.	National	Weather	Service	forecasts	changed	predictions,	first	saying	that	the	hurricane	was	
heading	 to	New	Orleans	at	 11	a.m.	 on	Friday.	By	4	 p.m.	 the	 storm	was	predicted	 to	 hit	 the	Mississippi	 coast.	
By	4	a.m.	on	Saturday	New	Orleans	was	again	expected	to	be	hit.	On	that	day,	voluntary	evacuations	began	in	
Louisiana,	President	Bush	declared	a	state	of	emergency	and	FEMA	and	state	emergency	responders	began	24-
hour	operations.	By	7	p.m.,	 the	National	Weather	Service	warned	that	 levees	could	be	topped	 in	New	Orleans,	
causing	catastrophic	flooding.	Still,	no	mandatory	evacuation	was	ordered	for	New	Orleans.	This	did	not	come	until	
9:30	a.m.	on	Sunday	(B1).	Katrina	made	landfall	at	6:10	a.m.	on	Monday.
At	the	federal	level,	too,	responders	lacked	urgency	and	treated	Katrina	as	if	it	were	a	normal	storm.	It	seemed	that	
they	were	taken	by	surprise	because	no	one	had	imagined	that	the	impact	of	a	hurricane	could	be	so	extreme	(A10).	
Reports	of	levee	breaches	in	New	Orleans	on	the	day	of	landfall	were	treated	with	scepticism	by	the	Department	of	
Homeland	Security	(of	which	FEMA	is	a	part),	which	did	not	use	resources	on	the	ground	in	New	Orleans	to	verify	
the	extent	of	the	flooding.	This	failure	to	understand	the	scope	and	scale	of	the	disaster	and	the	numerous	complex	
systems	affected	by	it	(A7)	contributed	to	the	delay	in	staging	an	appropriate	response.
b) Failure to adequately respond to the damage caused
But	even	as	 the	needs	created	by	Katrina	became	clear,	 the	sheer	scope	of	 the	disaster	challenged	an	all-out	
response	effort.	A	catastrophe	so	 large	 requires	more	of	everything,	especially	 resources	and	 responders,	and	
the	 size	 of	 this	 disaster	made	 even	 extraordinary	 efforts	 insufficient.	Again	 and	 again,	 for	 evacuation,	medical	
response,	search	and	rescue,	and	temporary	shelters,	government	efforts	were	unprecedented.	The	evacuation	of	
New	Orleans	was	the	largest	evacuation	of	a	US	city	in	such	a	short	period.	Efforts	to	shelter	the	homeless	were	
also	extraordinary.	The	Department	of	Defense	produced	the	largest	domestic	military	deployment	since	the	civil	
war,	and	the	National	Guard	deployment	of	50,000	troops	was	the	largest	in	US	history,	but	these	efforts	fell	short	
of	needs,	often	dramatically.	A	catastrophe	of	this	scale	not	having	been	expected,	there	was	simply	not	enough	
capacity	to	respond	(B13).
The	Katrina	network	was	so	large	that	there	was	a	failure	to	fully	comprehend	all	of	the	actors	actually	involved	
(partly	because	of	a	large	voluntary	component),	the	skills	they	offered	and	how	to	use	these	capacities	[House	
Report,	 2006:	 302].	 The	way	 that	 responsibilities	 were	 dispersed	 between	 federal,	 state	 and	 local	 responders	
further	complicated	response	efforts	in	this	case,	because	the	normal	“pull”	approach	used	in	US	crisis	response	
(where	a	gradual	expansion	of	government	involvement	occurs	as	local	and	then	state	responders	need	help)	was	
inappropriate	for	the	situation.	Despite	local	and	state	capacity	being	immediately	overwhelmed,	federal	responders	
waited	 for	 requests	 for	 aid	 instead	 of	 taking	 a	more	 aggressive	 “push”	 approach.	New	 policies	 outlined	 in	 the	
National	Response	Plan	that	aimed	to	formalise	the	distribution	of	responsibilities	and	lay	out	rules	for	coordination	
instead	led	to	confusion	[Senate	Report,	2006].	Such	confusion	complicated	efforts	to	foster	a	central	command	in	
the	field,	where	three	major	federal	operational	commands	ended	up	competing	in	an	uncoordinated	manner:	the	
Joint	Field	Office	and	Federal	Coordinating	Officer,	the	Principal	Federal	Official,	and	the	Joint	Task	Force	Katrina	
(B10).	
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Following	the	crisis,	both	the	Senate	and	House	reports	investigating	the	inadequate	response	by	federal	agencies	
identified	serious	problems	related	to	organisational	capacity	(B9).	The	post-9/11	shift	towards	the	terrorism	threat	
had	led	to	a	neglect	of	natural	disasters	and	resulted	in	FEMA	growing	critically	weak	as	it	was	stripped	of	resources,	
responsibilities	and	direct	White	House	access.	Understaffed,	and	with	weak	 leadership	and	reduced	 influence,	
FEMA	was	not	in	a	position	to	successfully	carry	out	its	traditional	role	of	acting	as	a	coordinator,	orchestrating	the	
capacities	of	the	federal	government	and	working	with	state	responders	[Senate	Report	2006;	House	Report,	2006].	
Planning,	training	and	operations	during	the	response	to	Katrina	were	also	hampered	by	poor	state	capacity	in	the	
form	of	the	understaffed	Louisiana	Office	of	Homeland	Security	and	Emergency	Preparedness,	the	underpaid	New	
Orleans	Police	Department	and	the	New	Orleans	Office	of	Emergency	Preparedness,	which	had	a	staff	of	only	
three	people	(B9).
In	conclusion,	it	is	clear	that	better	coordination	among	the	network	of	responders	(B10),	a	greater	sense	of	urgency	
(A7)	and	more	successful	management	of	 related	 risk	 factors,	both	 in	 terms	of	prevention	and	 response	 (A10,	
B1,	B2,	B9,	B13),	would	have	minimised	some	of	the	losses	caused	by	Katrina.	Nevertheless,	any	consideration	
of	Katrina	must	acknowledge	 that	 the	 impact	of	Katrina	was	great	not	primarily	because	of	human	 failures,	but	
because	of	the	size	and	scope	of	the	task.		
Fisheries depletion and collapse 
By Kjellrun Hiis Hauge, Belinda Cleeland and Douglas Clyde Wilson
The	scope	of	human	dependence	on	marine	life	is	significant,	both	in	terms	of	the	nutritional	
value	 provided	 by	 fish	 and	 other	 seafood	 to	 populations	 (especially	 in	 the	 developing	
world)	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 level	 of	 economic	 security	 the	 fishing	 industry	 provides	 for	
coastal	communities.	Marine	biodiversity,	in	itself,	also	offers	tangible	benefits	to	society	via	
revenues	earned	from	tourism	as	well	as	by	providing	useful	ecosystem	services,	such	as	
the	maintenance	of	water	quality	[Stokstad,	2006].	Currently,	however,	about	25%	of	world	
fish			stocks		are		overexploited		or		fully		depleted,		and		overcapacity		in		fishing		fleets		is
the	 norm	 rather	 than	 the	 exception	 [FAO,	 2007:	 29].	 Indeed,	many	 experts	 agree	 that	 the	 exploitation	 limit	 of	
marine	resources	has	been	reached,	if	not	exceeded,	and	that	the	overcapacity	of	fishing	fleets,	excessive	fishing	
quotas,	illegal	fishing	practices	and	the	generally	poor	management	of	most	fisheries	are	some	of	the	major	causes	
[Rebufat,	2007:	5-6]8.		
Overview of the risk issue
The	depletion	and	collapse	of	fisheries	pose	many	potential	risks	to	global	food	security,	economic	security,	coastal	
settlements,	coastal	water	quality,	biological	diversity	and	ecosystem	stability.	Not	only	do	fish	provide	more	than	
20%	of	the	animal	protein	consumed	by	2.6	billion	people	in	developing	countries	(up	to	50%	for	some	nations),	but	
the	fishing	industry	is	also	an	important	source	of	income,	especially	in	developing	countries.	Coastal	settlements	
that	depend	on	the	fishing	industry	for	food	and	income	can	be	devastated	by	fishery	collapses,	causing	loss	of	
cultural	value,	too.	Such	risks	to	human	societies	are	at	least	matched	by	risks	to	marine	ecosystems,	as	overfishing	
may	bring	about	changes	in	trophic	relationships,	in	the	genetic	make-up	of	populations	or	in	fish	behaviour	(e.g.,	
migratory	patterns).	Loss	of	biodiversity	in	coastal	waters	can	make	these	waters	more	susceptible	to	algal	blooms	
and	 oxygen	 depletion,	 and	 some	 types	 of	 fishing	 (e.g.,	 intensive	 trawling)	 may	 also	 directly	 damage	 marine	
habitats.
Unfortunately,	the	nature	of	fisheries	as	a	common	pool	resource	(meaning	that	it	is	difficult	to	exclude	users	and	
that	exploitation	by	one	user	reduces	the	resource	availability	for	others)	makes	devising	an	effective	governance	
regime	particularly	difficult.	In	many	cases,	especially	in	long-distance	fisheries	and	in	developing	countries,	fish	
8)		Other	causes	of	the	depletion	of	global	fish	stocks	include	habitat	destruction,	pollution,	climate	change	and	invasive	species.	In	many	instances,	
it	can	be	quite	difficult	to	determine	the	main	causes	of	the	depletion	of	fish	stocks.
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are	effectively	an	open-access	resource,	meaning	that	they	can	be	caught	by	anyone.	In	such	a	situation,	each	
individual	user	tries	to	extract	as	much	of	the	resource	as	possible	in	order	to	obtain	the	maximum	personal	benefit	
before	the	resource	is	exhausted.	With	no	incentive	to	conserve	the	resource,	the	natural	outcome	is	overfishing	of	
fish	stocks	and	eventual	collapse	of	fisheries.	To	overcome	this	problem,	a	governance	regime	must	find	a	way	to	
restrict	access	to	the	resource	and	to	create	incentives	for	users	of	the	resource	to	conserve	it	and	invest	in	it	rather	
than	overexploiting	it	[Ostrom	et	al.,	1999:	279].	Governance	regimes	must	be	tailored	to	the	specific	circumstances	
of	 the	 fishery	 in	 question	 and	must	 overcome	 numerous	 obstacles	 such	 as:	 coordination	 of	 large	 numbers	 of	
stakeholders;	difficulties	in	accurately	measuring	fish	stocks;	the	migratory	nature	of	fish	stocks;	different	impacts	
from	different	fishing	technologies;	evaluating	the	impacts	of	exogenous	factors	on	fish	populations;	or	coping	with	
the	large	size	and	scale	of	the	resource	system.
Regulation	at	the	international	level	to	try	to	solve	the	commons	problem	of	fisheries	has	been	evolving	for	at	least	
the	past	50	years	(since	the	first	UN	Conference	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	in	1956).	Regional	and	national	efforts,	
too,	provide	reasons	to	be	optimistic	about	 the	future,	as	new	initiatives	adopt	ecosystem-based	approaches	to	
fisheries	management	and	learn	from	the	successes	and	failures	of	the	past.	Below,	we	review	some	of	these	past	
successes	and	failures	and	point	out	where	risk	governance	deficits	have	been	most	evident	in	these	examples	of	
fisheries	governance.
Risk-handling process
Fisheries	management	is	particularly	susceptible	to	knowledge-based	governance	deficits	(cluster	A).	First	of	all,	it	
involves	complex	systems	which	may	not	be	well	understood	(A7).	Scientific	information	in	this	domain	often	comes	
with	a	significant	degree	of	associated	uncertainty	because	of	the	complexity	of	marine	ecosystems	and	problems	
defining	scope	and	scale	(for	example,	should	a	fish	be	regulated	on	a	species	basis?	A	population	basis?	Or	an	
ecosystem	basis?).	Scientific	knowledge	about	the	life	cycles	of	many	fish	species	is	limited,	as	is	knowledge	of	
how	the	oceans	and	marine	ecosystems	respond	to	pressures,	and	thus	also	how	fish	stocks	will	react	to	pressures,	
both	human	and	environmental	 (A2)	 [Richards	and	Maguire,	1998].	 In	 the	case	of	 the	Atlanto-Scandian	herring	
fishery	 in	 the	1950s	and	1960s,	 lack	of	 this	 kind	of	 knowledge	 led	 to	overly	optimistic	assumptions	about	how	
quickly	depleted	fish	stocks	could	be	rebuilt	(the	origin	of	this	idea	being	that	a	single	herring	can	produce	hundreds	
of	thousands	of	eggs).	Thus,	when	sudden	improvements	in	fishing	technologies	significantly	increased	the	size	
of	herring	catches	–	mechanical	winches	made	it	possible	to	use	bigger	boats	and	sonar	made	it	easier	to	locate	
shoals	of	fish	–	fishery	managers	did	not	grasp	how	fast	and	fundamental	a	change	this	constituted	for	the	overall	
risk	system	(A8).	No	new	regulations	were	introduced	to	compensate	for	faster	extraction	rates,	with	the	result	that	
the	fishery	collapsed	in	the	late	1960s.		
Indeed,	there	is	even	a	degree	of	uncertainty	involved	in	measuring	and	assessing	existing	fish	stocks	[Pattersen	
et	al.,	2001;	Reeves	and	Pastoors,	2007].	For	example,	errors	in	the	calculation	of	fish	stocks	in	the	Northern	cod	
fishery	(off	eastern	Canada)	between	the	late	1960s	and	the	late	1980s	played	a	key	role	in	the	eventual	collapse	
of	what	had	once	been	considered	one	of	the	greatest	fisheries	in	the	world.	In	this	case,	the	government	had	been	
employing	mathematical	models	to	set	total	allowable	catches.	However,	while	the	model	was	a	convenient	tool	
for	policymakers,	it	also	had	several	design	flaws	which	caused	it	to	overestimate	cod	populations	by	as	much	as	
100%.	Over-reliance	on	the	results	of	this	model	led	to	quotas	being	set	too	high	and,	eventually,	to	the	collapse	and	
closure	of	the	fishery	in	1992	(A9).	The	cod	stock	has	still	not	recovered	sufficiently	to	allow	the	fishery	to	reopen.
Of	course,	having	access	 to	reliable	knowledge	about	fish	stocks	 is	not	sufficient	 in	 itself	 for	good	governance,	
since	 the	knowledge	 that	goes	 into	 risk	assessment	must	be	complemented,	when	necessary,	by	action	 taken	
during	the	risk	management	phase	(cluster	B).	In	the	case	of	the	North	Sea	herring	fishery	in	the	1960s,	managers	
were	aware	of	early	warning	signs	that	fish	stocks	were	unhealthily	low	(rapid	declines	in	spawning	stock	biomass	
and	catches	composed	of	80%	juvenile	fish	had	been	consistently	observed).	Unfortunately,	a	failure	to	respond	
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9)		An	important	reason	for	the	success	was	the	support	from	the	fishing	industry.	This	support	was	partly	due	to	the	memory	of	the	earlier	collapse,	
but	perhaps	more	importantly,	the	number	of	fishing	vessels	and	companies	involved	in	the	fishery	is	small,	and	the	fleet	has	lately	been	well	enough	
capitalized	to	benefit	from	long-term	planning..
to	these	early	warnings	(B1)	led	to	the	severe	collapse	of	the	fishery	in	1975-76	and	its	closure	in	1978.	However,	
in	this	case,	a	 lesson	was	learned	from	this	previous	failure,	as	when	the	fishery	was	finally	reopened	(after	19	
years)	efforts	were	made	to	improve	the	management	of	fish	stocks	[CEFAS,	1999].	In	1995,	when	early	warning	
signs	once	again	showed	that	fish	stocks	were	becoming	dangerously	low,	quick	and	drastic	action	was	taken	to	
avoid	another	collapse.	By	2003,	the	stock	had	recovered	without	requiring	even	temporary	closures	of	the	fishery	
[Simmonds,	2007]9.	
The	fact	that	fisheries	are	common	pool	resources	also	means	that	their	management	is	prone	to	risk	governance	
deficits	related	to	strategies	for	dealing	with	commons	problems	and	externalities	(B11).	In	this	case	it	is	not	that	no	
strategy	is	determined,	but	rather	that	the	strategy	has	many	imperfections	that	are	difficult	to	resolve	because	fish	
stocks	often	traverse	the	jurisdictions	of	multiple	states	or	international	waters.	Responsibilities	for	managing	fish	
stocks	are	thus	also	dispersed,	not	always	in	a	clear	manner,	between	many	different	actors	at	both	international	
and	national	levels	(B10).	This	sometimes	makes	the	implementation	and	enforcement	of	risk	management	policies	
more	 difficult,	 as	 has	 been	observed,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	Mediterranean,	where	 bluefin	 tuna	 stocks	 are	 fished	
by	at	 least	11	different	coastal	states.	Regional	management	organisations,	such	as	the	EU	or	the	International	
Commission	for	the	Conservation	of	Atlantic	Tuna,	have	thus	far	been	unable	to	coordinate	control	and	enforcement	
activities	at	the	level	required	to	combat	the	currently	very	high	levels	of	overfishing	and	make	sure	that	all	of	these	
states	respect	their	tuna	fishing	quotas.	As	a	result,	the	EU	recently	launched	a	Joint	Deployment	Plan	(in	March	
2008)	in	an	effort	to	step	up	enforcement	efforts	[CFCA,	2009].
Risk governance of genetically modified crops in Europe 
By Joyce Tait
The	development	of	genetically	modified	(GM)	crops	and	the	global	disparities	that	exist	in	
the	way	they	are	regulated	provide	a	good	example	of	how	deficits	in	the	risk	governance	
process	can		lead	to	negative	consequences	such	as:	opportunities	and	jobs	lost,	companies	
and	 countries	 disadvantaged,	 and	 regulatory	 time	 and	 resources	 wasted.	 From	 the	
perspective	of	industry	and	risk	regulators,	the	European	regulatory	system	for	GM	crops	
is	seen	as	a	failure	of	evidence-based	risk	governance	–	it	is	the	most	onerous	regulatory	
system		in		existence	for	a	commercially-traded		product,		despite		a		lack		of		evidence		of	
health	 or	 environment-related	 risks.	The	European	 regulations	are	 seen	by	 some	as	an	attempt	 to	 erect	 trade	
barriers	against	 commodity	crops	produced	using	seed	developed	 largely	by	American	companies.	Others	see	
the	current	situation	as	a	triumph	of	“David	and	Goliath”	proportions	where,	since	the	mid-1990s,	environmental,	
consumer	and	third	world	advocacy	groups	have	increasingly	dominated	European	policymaking	on	chemicals	and	
pesticides	as	well	as	GM	crops.	Many	farmers	in	developed	and	developing	countries	would	like	to	grow	GM	crops	
but	are	worried	about	their	ability	to	sell	the	resulting	produce	to	European	markets.
Overview of the risk issue
GM	 crops	 are	 created	 through	 genetic	 engineering	 to	 express	 desirable	 traits,	 such	 as	 pesticide	 or	 herbicide	
resistance	or	increased	quantities	of	vitamins	or	amino	acids.	This	is	done	by	identifying	and	isolating	a	gene	that	
governs	 the	desired	 trait	 in	another	organism,	 then	 inserting	 this	gene	 into	 the	genome	of	 the	crop	 in	question.	
For	example,	the	US	company	Monsanto	markets	GM	“Roundup	Ready”	soybean	seeds,	which	have	been	made	
herbicide	resistant	by	inserting	a	herbicide	resistance	gene	from	a	bacterium.	
When	GM	crops	were	being	developed	in	the	1980s,	the	risks	for	human	health	or	the	environment	were	uncertain	
and	the	development	of	the	technology	was	accompanied	by	major	investments	in	risk-related	research.	Potential	
risks	 from	GM	crops	and	 foods	 included:	 creation	or	 transfer	of	allergens,	development	of	antibiotic	 resistance	
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in	micro-organisms,	cross-breeding	between	GM	crops	and	wild	plants	or	other	crops	(including	the	potential	 to	
produce	herbicide	resistant	weeds),	evolution	of	pesticide-resistant	insects,	cross-contamination	of	non-GM	crops	
or	unexpected	effects	on	biodiversity.	Some	of	these	risks	may	be	inherently	low,	others	may	be	minimised	with	
good	 regulation	or	 through	 technological	options	 to	 reduce	 risks.	There	are	also	economic	and	social	 risks,	 for	
example	from	the	monopolisation	of	world	food	markets	by	multinational	companies	or,	in	the	case	of	third	world	
farmers,	either	their	dependence	on	expensive	GM	seeds	or,	alternatively,	their	inability	to	get	access	to	GM	seeds	
which	could	transform	their	farming	systems.
GM	crops	can	also	offer	substantial	potential	benefits	such	as:	higher	yields,	greater	drought	tolerance	and	more	
efficient	use	of	water,	decreased	use	of	pesticides	(leading	to	reduced	health	and	environmental	risks),	improved	
nutritional	content	and	better	storage	life.
Risk-handling process
Knowledge	about	physical	facts	(A2)	was	initially	a	major	issue	in	the	risk	governance	of	GM	crops.	There	was	little	
concrete	evidence	of	either	hazards	or	safety,	but	governments	had	to	decide	what	was	the	appropriate	approach	
to	regulation.	Given	the	scientific	uncertainty	about	the	risks	of	GM	crops,	the	EU	acted	in	a	precautionary	manner,	
building	a	new	regulatory	system	to	examine	each	crop	on	a	case-by-case	basis	–	a	“process-based”	approach.	
The	US,	by	contrast,	adopted	a	“product-based”	approach	using	existing	regulations	for	pesticides,	food	and	feed	
[Tait	and	Levidow,	1992].	Companies	developing	GM	crops	 in	Europe	 initially	collaborated	willingly	with	 the	EU	
approach,	partly	because	they	saw	it	as	a	means	of	reassuring	the	public	and	partly	because	they	expected	the	
regulatory	 system	 to	become	 less	precautionary	as	more	 information	about	GM	crop	safety	became	available.	
However,	increasing	evidence	of	the	safety	of	GM	crops	had	little	impact	on	the	evolution	of	EU	regulatory	systems,	
which	became	more	onerous	over	time	(A2).	Public	opposition	led	to	a	de facto moratorium	on	GM	crop	development	
in	the	EU	between	1998	and	2004,	and	the	revision	of	the	regulatory	regime	in	2003	(Regulations	EC	1829/2003	
and	1830/2003)	actually	led	to	a	more	precautionary	set	of	rules,	rather	than	the	expected	reduction	in	the	degree	
of	precaution.	Basing	the	European	regulatory	system	more	on	political	lobbying	and	less	on	evidence	of	risk	in	the	
conventional	sense	has	disadvantaged	European	companies	developing	GM	crops	and	discouraged	 innovation	
(B2).
The	actions	of	agrochemical	companies	developing	GM	crops	provide	several	examples	of	risk	governance	deficits.	
In	the	early	stages	of	development,	they	paid	too	little	attention	to	the	values,	interests	and	perceptions	of	potential	
consumers	of	their	product	(A3)	[Chataway	and	Tait,	1993].	They	were	aware	of	the	potential	of	GM	crops	to	arouse	
public	concern	about	health	and	environmental	risks.	They	were	also	informed	in	the	late	1980s	that	emphasising	
the	ability	of	GM	crops	to	reduce	pesticide	use	could	influence	the	public	debate	in	their	favour.	However,	companies	
were	in	the	ambiguous	position	of	knowing	that	GM	crops	would	undermine	their	insecticide	and	fungicide	product	
ranges,	and	knowing	also	that	failure	to	develop	GM	crops	would	undermine	their	competitive	position	in	the	long	
term.
Companies	did	consult	with	some	stakeholders	in	NGOs,	but	there	was	a	lack	of	broad	public	engagement	(A4)	
and	they	optimistically	expected	any	opposition	to	be	short-lived.	Their	actions	in	buying	up	seed	companies	(as	
a	 route	 to	market	 for	 their	GM	product)	and	proposing	 to	develop	genetic-use	 restriction	 technologies	 (GURTs)	
fuelled	growing	public	opposition.	(GURTs	prevent	GM	crops	from	developing	viable	seed	or	cross-breeding	with	
other	plants	and	competing	with	non-GM	species	in	the	wild,	but	the	technology	was	also	interpreted	as	allowing	
companies	to	protect	their	investments	by	preventing	farmers	from	saving	GM	seed	to	produce	crops	the	following	
season).	 The	 values	 of	 some	 sectors	 of	 society	 were	 against	 large	 corporations	 controlling	 the	 world’s	 food	
production	systems	and	taking	actions	that	were	claimed	to	disadvantage	small	farmers	in	developing	countries.	
Companies	and	anti-GM	advocacy	groups	contributed	to	this	failure	of	risk	governance	in	that,	in	public	debates	on	
the	risks	of	GM	crops,	both	sides	misrepresented	the	available	knowledge	(A6)	and	advocacy	groups	were	more	
effective	than	industry	in	influencing	policy	processes.
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More	effective	and	earlier	public	engagement	by	companies	and	policymakers	might	have	been	able	to	dilute	the	
influence	of	the	more	strident	anti-GM	advocacy	groups,	resulting	 in	a	more	tractable	outcome.	However,	many	
anti-GM	advocates	were	ideologically	motivated	[Tait,	2001]	and	were	unlikely	to	be	influenced	by	evidence-based	
argument,	 so	 that	 an	 amicable	 resolution	 to	 the	 debate	 over	GM	crop	 regulation	was	unlikely.	Regulators	 had	
the	opportunity	 to	decide	whether	 such	 ideologically-motivated	opposition	should	dominate	decision-making	 for	
society	as	a	whole	and	they	chose	to	respond	to	prevailing	European	political	pressures	(B12).	The	precautionary	
regulatory	regime	in	the	EU,	in	comparison	to	that	of	the	US,	is	less	evidence-based	and	more	driven	by	political	
and	advocacy	group	 influences	 than	by	 formal	approaches	 to	 risk	governance.	The	outcome	 is	 inefficient	 (B4),	
providing	an	example	of	using	scarce	 resources	 for	unimportant	 risks	and	of	 regulation	based	on	 inappropriate	
analyses	of	costs,	benefits,	and	other	social	and	environmental	impacts.
Although	 the	 companies	 developing	 GM	 crops	 could	 have	 acted	 differently	 and	 perhaps	 improved	 the	 risk	
governance	process,	given	their	internal	and	external	decision	environments	and	the	ideological	opposition	they	
were	facing,	the	industry	did	not	hold	the	key	to	making	a	meaningful	difference.	Policymakers	and	regulators	could	
have	changed	the	course	of	the	GM	crop	experience	in	Europe	but,	in	the	light	of	the	political	constraints	they	were	
facing,	it	is	unrealistic	to	have	expected	them	to	take	a	different	approach.	However,	the	“lessons	learned”	in	this	
case	are	not	only	of	historical	interest.	The	shadow	of	this	GM	crop	experience,	in	Europe	and	in	many	other	parts	
of	the	world,	hangs	over	future	scientific	developments	in	food	production	and	in	many	other	areas.	New	regulatory	
and	risk	governance	approaches	need	to	be	better	adapted	to	the	opportunities	presented	by	21st-century	science,	
and	to	be	robust,	flexible	and	democratic	in	the	face	of	current	societal	pressures	while	continuing	to	ensure	safety	
for	people	and	the	environment.
The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic in the UK 
By Belinda Cleeland
The	 emergence	 of	 Bovine	 Spongiform	 Encephalopathy	 (BSE)	 in	 the	UK	 and	 the	 early	
handling	 of	 the	 epidemic	 in	 British	 cattle	 in	 the	 late	 1980s-early	 1990s,	 especially	
in	regard	to	the	risks	posed	by	BSE	to	humans,	is	an	example	of	inadequate	risk	governance.	
During	the	worst	stages	of	the	epidemic,	between	1988	and	2001,	nearly	180,000	cattle	
were	infected	in	the	UK	and	4.4	million	were	slaughtered	as	a	precaution.	As	of	September	
2009,	165	people	had	died	in	Britain	from	new	variant	Creutzfeldt-Jacob	disease	(vCJD),	
the	human	form	of	BSE.	Overall,	governmental	measures	taken	to	try	to	halt	the	epidemic	
cost	approximately	4.2	billion	pounds,	plus	25	million	pounds	for	the	inquiry	that	followed	and	1.15	billion	in	economic	
losses	for	the	affected	industries.	Although	the	UK	epidemic	is	now	over,	the	problem	of	BSE	has	not	disappeared	
and	many	countries	now	have	BSE	legislation	and	risk	management	measures	in	place.
Overview of the risk issue
BSE,	commonly	known	as	mad	cow	disease,	is	a	transmissible,	neurodegenerative	disease	affecting	cattle.	The	
disease	has	a	long	incubation	period	ranging	from	30	months	to	eight	years,	with	the	infectious	agent	thought	to	
be	a	specific	type	of	misfolded	protein,	called	a	prion.	These	malformed	prions	cause	other	native	prion	proteins	
in	the	brain	to	misfold	and	aggregate,	leading	to	a	spongy	degeneration	of	the	brain	and	spinal	cord.	Transmission	
between	cattle	occurs	via	the	consumption	of	contaminated	meat	and	bonemeal	in	cattle	feed,	and	BSE	is	fatal,	with	
no	known	cure	or	treatment.	It	is	now	believed	that	BSE	may	be	transmitted	to	humans	who	consume	infected	beef	
or	come	into	contact	with	other	products	derived	from	the	nervous	tissues	of	infected	cattle	[WHO,	2002].
At	 the	time	of	 the	outbreak,	 the	novelty	of	 the	disease	meant	 that	 there	was	no	knowledge	about	 its	pathology,	
and	so	decisions	had	to	be	made	on	the	basis	of	guesswork	and	analogy	with	scrapie,	a	well-studied	spongiform	
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encephalopathy	of	sheep,	which	is	known	to	be	non-transmissible	to	other	species	[Dressel,	2000].	It	was	thus	not	
expected	that	this	disease	would	prove	zoonotic.	There	was	also	no	diagnostic	test	to	identify	infected	animals	that	
had	not	yet	shown	clinical	signs	of	the	disease,	which	made	removing	infected	cattle	from	the	food	chain	next	to	
impossible,	short	of	slaughtering	the	entire	British	herd.
While	BSE	was	first	identified	in	the	UK,	it	quickly	spread	to	at	least	28	other	countries	in	Europe,	Asia,	the	Middle	
East	and	North	America.	Half	of	these	countries	have	identified	only	a	handful	of	cases;	however,	many	Western	
European	 countries	 have	 reported	hundreds	of	 cases	 (Portugal,	 Ireland	and	France	were	worst	 affected),	with	
the	number	of	cases	in	the	UK	nearing	200,000	[OIE,	2007].	Apart	from	the	obvious	impact	on	animal	and	human	
health,	BSE	has	also	had	a	 significant	 impact	on	consumer	 confidence	 in	 the	meat	 industry	and	 its	worldwide	
trade;	government	regulatory	practices;	animal	feed	manufacturing	processes;	and,	at	least	in	the	UK,	government	
reputation	and	public	trust.
Risk-handling process10
BSE	was	first	diagnosed	by	the	UK	State	Veterinary	Service	(SVS)	in	late	1986,	although	given	the	disease’s	long	
incubation	period	it	is	thought	that	cattle	in	the	UK	were	probably	first	infected	by	BSE	in	the	1970s.	An	embargo	
within	the	SVS	on	making	information	about	the	disease	public	impeded	the	early	gathering	of	data	on	the	spread	
of	BSE	until	at	least	mid-1987	(B8)	–	the	BSE	Inquiry	later	stated	that	this	embargo	should	not	have	occurred.	
By	 the	end	of	 1987,	 the	UK	Central	Veterinary	Laboratory	had	 concluded	 that	 the	 cause	of	BSE	could	be	 the	
consumption	by	cows	of	meat	and	bonemeal	made	from	animal	carcasses	and	incorporated	in	animal	feed.	This	
conclusion	was	followed	by	a	ban	on	incorporating	ruminant	protein	in	ruminant	feed,	which	resulted	in	an	80%	
reduction	in	the	rate	of	infection	almost	overnight.	Nevertheless,	more	infections	than	expected	continued	to	surface,	
which	was	later	attributed	to	the	government’s	crucial	error	in	allowing	the	feed	trade	a	five	week	grace	period	to	
clear	existing	feed	stocks,	thus	allowing	thousands	more	animals	to	be	infected	(B2,	B5)	[Ashraf,	2000].	Concerns	
about	the	possibility	of	transmission	of	this	disease	to	humans	led	to	the	question	of	whether	cattle	showing	signs	of	
the	disease	should	be	slaughtered	for	human	consumption.	At	this	stage,	the	Department	of	Health	(DH)11		should	
have	been	asked	 to	collaborate	with	 the	Ministry	 for	Agriculture,	Fisheries	and	Food	(MAFF)	 in	considering	 the	
implications	of	BSE	for	human	health.	However,	this	did	not	occur	until	March	1988	(B10).	
Once	contacted,	the	Chief	Medical	Officer	at	DH	responded	by	setting	up	an	expert	working	party	(chaired	by	Sir	
Richard	Southwood)	to	advise	on	the	implications	of	BSE	–	this	group	advised	in	June	1988	that	animals	showing	
signs	of	BSE	should	be	destroyed.	As	a	result,	a	compulsory	slaughter	and	compensation	scheme	was	put	in	place	
in	August	1988.	However,	MAFF	had	given	the	same	advice	to	its	minister	prior	to	March	1988	–	the	lack	of	prompt	
and	adequate	collaboration	between	the	two	departments,	MAFF	and	DH,	delayed	implementation	of	this	crucial	
safety	measure	for	months	(B5,	B10).
In	 February	 1989,	 the	 Southwood	 Report,	 produced	 by	 the	 working	 party,	 was	 submitted	 to	 government	 and	
subsequently	published.	The	report	concluded	that	the	risk	of	BSE	transmission	to	humans	was	remote	and	that	
“it	was	most	unlikely	that	BSE	would	have	any	implications	for	human	health”.	In	following	years,	this	report	was	
repeatedly	cited	as	constituting	a	scientific	appraisal	that	risks	to	humans	from	BSE	were	remote.	In	fact,	the	report	
did	warn	that	if	its	assessment	were	incorrect,	the	implications	would	be	very	serious,	but	this	warning	was	not	given	
much	attention	(A6).	
Failure	to	subject	the	entire	report	to	an	adequate	review	led	to	its	shortcomings	being	completely	overlooked,	to	
factual	information	being	distorted	or	ignored,	and	to	the	degree	of	certainty	surrounding	the	risks	of	BSE	to	human	
health	being	overstated	in	the	public	domain	(A6).	Not	only	was	the	public	repeatedly	reassured	that	it	was	safe	to	
10)		Unless	otherwise	noted,	the	following	information	is	based	upon	facts	contained	in	The BSE Inquiry: The Report. The Inquiry into BSE and vCJD 
in the United Kingdom	[BSE	Inquiry,	2000].
11)		Note	that,	until	late	1988	when	the	Transfer	of	Functions	(Health	and	Social	Security)	Order	1988	came	into	force,	the	UK	Department	of	Health	
was	known	as	the	Department	of	Health	and	Social	Services.	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	it	is	referred	to	only	as	DH	in	this	document.
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eat	beef,	it	was	given	the	impression	that	BSE	was	not	transmissible	to	humans,	which	was	not	known	for	certain	
and	turned	out	to	be	false.	In	reality,	a	lack	of	knowledge	about	the	epidemiology	and	pathology	of	this	novel	disease	
made	it	impossible	to	confidently	assess	the	risks	to	human	health	(A2).	Even	when,	in	1989,	MAFF	and	DH	banned	
the	use	in	human	food	of	categories	of	cattle	offal	most	likely	to	be	infectious	(SBO,	specified	bovine	offal),	this	ban	
was	presented	to	the	public	in	terms	that	underplayed	its	importance	as	a	public	health	measure	(A6,	B2).	
Along	 with	 the	 ruminant	 feed	 ban,	 the	 human	 SBO	 ban	 was	 probably	 the	 most	 important	 policy	 regulation	
implemented	during	the	outbreak.	However,	it	was	implemented	too	late	and	not	sufficiently	enforced,	as	shown	by	
unannounced	visits	to	abattoirs	in	1995,	which	found	that	48%	were	not	complying	with	the	SBO	regulations	(B5)	
[van	Zwanenberg	and	Millstone,	2002].	When	a	cat	was	found	to	have	contracted	a	previously	unknown	spongiform	
encephalopathy	 in	 1990,	 the	most	 likely	 explanation	was	 that	 it	 had	 consumed	 infected	 pet	 food	 –	 this	 raised	
concerns	that	BSE	was	indeed	transmissible	and	could	“jump”	species	into	humans.	Nevertheless,	at	this	point,	
no	precautionary	action	was	taken	(B1).	Transmissibility	was	eventually	confirmed	as	the	first	cases	of	vCJD	were	
diagnosed	in	the	mid-1990s,	and	consumption	of	beef	infected	with	BSE	was	deemed	to	be	the	cause	[Dressel,	
2000].
Overall,	the	handling	of	the	BSE	outbreak	was	far	from	optimal,	especially	in	terms	of	risk	management.	The	BSE	
Inquiry,	opened	in	1998,	was	set	up	to	review	the	adequacy	of	the	government’s	response	to	the	disease	and	to	
draw	lessons	from	what	went	right	and	what	went	wrong.	The	final	report	has	over	20	pages	devoted	to	“Lessons	
to	be	learned”	from	the	experience.
Even	since	the	UK	epidemic	died	down	in	the	early	2000s,	BSE	has	persisted	as	a	serious	concern	for	the	beef	
industry	worldwide	and	for	public	and	animal	health.	In	the	UK,	cases	of	BSE	continue	to	be	diagnosed,	albeit	at	
the	much	reduced	rate	of	fewer	than	four	per	week	(cf.	850	per	week	in	1992)	[DEFRA,	2008].	Other	countries,	too,	
continue	to	discover	new	BSE	cases	with	one	being	diagnosed,	for	example,	in	Canada	in	November	2008.	BSE-
related	legislation	and	risk	management	measures,	such	as	feed	bans	and	guidelines	for	culling,	thus	remain	in	
place	in	many	countries	(for	example	in	the	EU,	see	[Europa,	2003]).	The	World	Organisation	for	Animal	Health	has	
developed	criteria	to	classify	countries	according	to	their	risk	status	for	BSE	–	negligible,	controlled	or	undetermined	
–	with	each	country’s	status	being	reviewed	periodically	[OIE,	2008].	Nonetheless,	trade	embargoes	on	beef	continue	
to	be	a	sensitive	issue	between	some	countries	(notably	between	South	Korea,	the	US	and	Canada	in	recent	times).	
Indeed,	the	International	Trade	Commission	released	a	report	in	2008	estimating	that	trade	restrictions	resulting	
from	BSE	had	cost	the	cattle	industry	US$11	billion	from	2004	to	2007	[ITC,	2008].
The subprime crisis of 2007-08 in the United States 
In the course of this report, the case of the US subprime crisis of 2007-08 has been used to 
illustrate several risk governance deficits. The following text is a brief overview of the context 
in which the crisis unfolded. It does not intend to represent a comprehensive analysis, but 
only to put in perspective the examples given in the report. IRGC acknowledges the fact 
that analyses, views and opinions of experts on financial risks may differ.
The	subprime	crisis	is	the	most	recent	example	of	a	financial	crisis.	Such	crises	occur	with	some	regularity	and,	while	
many	are	limited	to	a	localised	market	or	sector,	some				are				systemic		and	affect	other	markets	and	sectors	(e.g.,	
the	Asian	financial	crisis	in	1997).	The	subprime	crisis	has	led	to	a	global	credit	squeeze	and	severe	recessions	
in	many	countries	around	the	world.	Many	have	called	it	the	worst	depression	since	the	Great	Depression	of	the	
1930s.
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Overview of the risk issue
A	period	of	historically-low	 interest	 rates,	 starting	 in	 the	early	2000s,	enabled	 large	numbers	of	US	consumers	
to	obtain	mortgages	for	 the	first	 time.	At	 the	same	time,	more	 lenders	decided	to	offer	mortgages	to	higher	risk	
borrowers.	Circumstances	 combined	 to	 create	a	housing	market	 bubble.	Therefore,	 central	 to	 the	origin	 of	 the	
subprime	crisis	in	the	US	(here	we	do	not	comment	on	similar	developments	in	e.g.,	the	UK	housing	market)	was	the	
sale	of	mortgages	to	people	who	were	too	weak	financially	to	have	any	realistic	chance	of	repaying	them.	By	their	
very	nature,	subprime	mortgages	were	sold	to	people	with	a	high	risk	profile.	Borrowers	ran	the	risk	of	defaulting	
and	eviction	from	their	repossessed	home.	Lenders,	mostly	banks,	risked	not	being	repaid.	Loan	guarantors	risked	
having	to	pay	out	on	the	guarantees	they	issued	to	underwrite	the	lenders.	However,	few	people	believed	there	was	
risk	as	there	was	wide	belief	that	home	prices	could	not	fall.
The	systemic	nature	of	the	crisis	derived	from	the	pooling	by	financial	institutions	of	the	mortgages	into	mortgage-
backed	securities	 that	were	 then	sold	on	 the	open	market.	These	were	 then	 repackaged	 in	evermore	complex	
financial	products	 traded	 in	 international	financial	markets.	This	 transferred	the	guarantors’	and	 lenders’	risks	to	
other	banks	and	financial	institutions,	including	pension	funds,	provided	financial	institutions	around	the	world	with	
the	opportunity	to	invest	in	the	US	housing	market,	and	increased	the	money	available	in	the	US	to	support	the	
purchase	of	homes.	Mirroring	the	extent	to	which	these	derivative	securities	had	been	traded	globally,	the	fall	in	US	
housing	prices	in	2007	precipitated	both	a	global	financial	crisis	in	which	banks	in	several	countries	collapsed	and	
a	credit	squeeze	that	triggered	a	global	recession.	
Many	 other	 factors	 were	 influential.	 For	 example,	 incentive	 schemes	 (not	 least	 those	 influencing	 lenders	 and	
securities’	traders)	encouraged	behaviours	that	further	increased	the	risk;	actions	(and	inaction)	by	regulators	were	
inadequate	 to	 the	 need	 to	manage	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 collapse	 in	 the	 system;	 and	 ratings	 agencies	were	 unable	 to	
adequately	assess	the	risk	of	the	traded	financial	products.
Starting	in	late	2006,	the	US	housing	bubble	began	to	deflate,	as	the	building	boom	had	led	to	a	surplus	of	unsold	
houses,	causing	property	prices	to	fall.	This	undermined	the	many	mortgage-holders	who	relied	on	an	increased	
valuation	of	their	home	when	renegotiating	the	terms	of	their	mortgage.	Unable	to	refinance	the	mortgages,	they	
instead	began	to	default.	In	turn,	this	resulted	in	investor	losses	on	the	asset-backed	securities	markets.	By	mid-
June	2007,	two	hedge	funds	owned	by	Bear	Stearns	were	in	financial	trouble.	The	hedge	funds	tried	to	sell	some	
of	their	subprime	bonds,	but	there	were	no	buyers.	Investor	confidence	had	fallen	and	there	was	no	liquidity	in	the	
market.	In	the	end,	Bear	Stearns	had	to	inject	USD	3.2bn	to	support	the	hedge	funds.
More	financial	institutions	started	having	problems	and	had	to	reassess	the	value	of	their	investments.	This	led	to	a	
sequence	of	huge	write-offs.	Aside	from	a	lot	of	subprime	lenders	declaring	bankruptcy,	it	emerged	that	many	large	
banks	and	hedge	funds	all	over	the	world	had	subprime	mortgage-backed	securities	as	part	of	their	portfolios,	and	
therefore	had	also	suffered	large	losses.	
The	repercussions	of	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis	have	been	serious	and	widespread.	The	world	banking	system	
lost	a	lot	of	its	capital,	trust	in	the	system	fell,	and	markets	have	become	more	risk	averse.	Many	countries	followed	
the	US	into	recession.	Many	governments	have	intervened:	the	US	government	alone	has	provided	over	$1	trillion	
dollars	of	support	to	financial	institutions,	including	the	insurance	giant	American	International	Group.	
Risk-handling process
Several	risk	governance	deficits	can	be	observed	in	this	case.
It	has	been	argued	that	the	causes	of	the	subprime	crisis	can	be	traced	back	at	least	as	far	as	the	Great	Depression	
of	the	1930s	[Eichengreen,	2008].	Risk	governance	deficits	have	thus	occurred	over	a	long	period	of	time	and,	in	
most	cases,	the	negative	consequences	arising	from	these	deficits	have	accumulated	over	many	years	and	thus	
have	not	been	immediately	apparent.
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An	analysis	of	the	causes	of	the	Great	Depression	led	to	the	passing	of	the	Glass-Steagall	Act	in	the	US	in	1933,	
bringing	about	banking	 reforms	 that	separated	 investment	and	commercial	banking	and	subjected	 the	financial	
services	industry	to	stricter	regulation.	As	time	passed,	however,	policy	began	to	focus	more	on	the	advantages	
of	liberalising	financial	markets,	which	led	to	deregulation	and	finally	the	repeal	of	the	Glass-Steagall	Act	in	1999	
[Eichengreen,	2008].	This	destroyed	the	divide	between	commercial	and	investment	banking,	allowing	commercial	
banks	 to	compete	with	 investment	banks	 in	some	areas	and	pushing	 investment	banks	 to	create	new	products	
(such	as	mortgage-backed	securities)	and	to	undertake	riskier	activities.
These	changes	to	regulation	were	not,	in	themselves,	a	bad	thing;	indeed,	they	made	many	people	better	off.	Rather,	
the	problem	was	that	policymakers	had	failed	to	anticipate	the	speed	and	extent	to	which	the	existing	regulatory	
regime	became	inadequate	(as	it	was	designed	for	a	segmented	industry)	(B6),	and,	additionally,	there	was	also	
a	general	failure	to	recognise	just	how	fundamentally	the	system	would	change	as	a	result	of	more	deregulation	
(A8).	As	a	result,	updating	the	supervision	and	regulation	of	the	financial	sector	was	not	adequately	prioritised	and	
financial	innovation	ran	far	ahead	of	financial	regulation.	
Equally	 influential	 was	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 perception	 amongst	 all	 of	 the	 principal	 actors	 involved	 (borrowers,	
lenders,	loan	guarantors,	banks,	financial	institutions,	etc)	that	house	prices	would	rise	inexorably	(A3),	meaning	
that	evaluations	of	the	acceptability	of	what	were	well-known	risks	were	based	on	overly	optimistic	profit	forecasts	
(A5).	It	was	in	this	context	that	the	level	of	subprime	lending	grew	and	became	a	problem.	
Ineffective	risk	management	was	evident	even	at	the	lowest	level	–	that	of	the	agents	selling	the	subprime	mortgage	
loans	–	since	these	agents,	who	fell	outside	federal	banking	regulations,	had	no	incentive	to	develop	a	proper	risk	
management	strategy	(B2).	The	default	risk	involved	in	the	loan	did	not	affect	their	commission,	and	so	they	willingly	
sold	mortgages	to	even	the	least	credit-worthy	clients.	This	was	equally	the	case	when	banks	were	the	originators	
of	 the	 loans,	because	 the	banks’	ability	 to	 immediately	 remove	 the	mortgage	 from	 their	books	by	 reselling	 it	 to	
an	intermediary	(which	would	then	go	on	to	securitise	it)	removed	all	incentive	to	focus	on	risk	management	and	
monitor	their	exposure	[de	la	Dehesa,	2007].
Once	sold,	 the	process	of	securitisation	 led	to	these	subprime	mortgages	being	pooled	with	thousands	of	other	
loans	and	broken	down	into	financial	products	such	as	collateralised	debt	obligations,	which	could	then	be	sold	to	
investors.	These	products	were	so	complex	that	it	was	difficult,	or	even	impossible,	for	investors	to	fully	understand	
the	 real	 risks	 of	 the	 securities	 they	were	 buying	 (A7).	 Instead,	 investors	were	 guided	 by	 the	 ratings	 agencies.	
However,	not	only	were	the	ratings	agencies	also	faced	with	increasing	complexity	in	the	information	provided	to	
them	by	originators	of	the	mortgage	loans,	but	they	also	had	an	unresolved	conflict	of	interest	(B12)	–	they	were	
paid	by	the	issuer	of	the	financial	product,	not	the	buyer.	Therefore,	it	was	in	their	interests	to	give	triple	A	ratings.	
Apart	from	the	opacity	of	the	financial	products	themselves,	they	were	sold	over	the	counter	and	were	not	traded	or	
quoted	in	organised	markets,	adding	to	the	lack	of	transparency	in	the	securitisation	process	(B8).
Amidst	this	opacity	and	complexity	financial	models	were	seen	as	being	able	to	help	convince	investors	and	lenders	
that	 their	 actions	were	 ‘safe’.	However,	 an	over-reliance	on	mathematical	models	 (A9)	 led	many	 institutions	 to	
miscalculate	 risk,	since	such	models,	 “as	complex	as	 they	have	become,	are	still	 too	simple	 to	capture	 the	 full	
array	of	governing	variables	that	drive	global	economic	reality”	[Alan	Greenspan,	cited	in	Shiller,	2008:	42].	The	
novelty	of	various	financial	products	and	loan	schemes	made	modelling	difficult	(due	to	a	lack	of	historical	data)	and	
meant	that	models	had	never	been	‘tested’	by	the	experience	of	a	recession	or	a	slump	in	housing	values.	Market	
conditions	did	not	match	those	experienced	historically,	and	so	the	predictive	power	of	models	was	weak	–	but	most	
stakeholders	failed	to	recognise	this	[Zandi,	2009:	107-110].
On	the	whole,	it	seemed	that	market	participants	and	regulators	all	failed	to	see	the	looming	crisis.	Nevertheless,	
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there	were	some	observers	who	voiced	concerns	about	abusive	behaviour	on	 the	subprime	mortgage	markets;	
simplistic	risk	models;	the	US	housing	‘bubble’;	and	inadequate	regulation	long	before	the	crisis	occurred.	These	
early	warnings	were	not	acted	upon	(A1)	due	to	inadequate	regulatory	structures,	supreme	confidence	in	the	US	
housing	and	global	financial	markets	 (reflected	 in	 the	statement	 in	September	2007	by	Federal	Reserve	Board	
chairman	Ben	Bernanke	that	“markets	do	tend	to	self-correct”	 [Federal	Reserve	Board,	2007])	and	the	drive	for	
short-term	profits	and	bonuses	paid	as	a	result	of	incentive	schemes.
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Ambiguity: Giving	rise	to	several	meaningful	and	legitimate	interpretations	of	accepted	risk	assessment	results.	
Ambiguity	can	be	 interpretive	 (where	different	 interpretations	of	an	 identical	assessment	 result	are	possible)	or	
normative	(where	different	concepts	of	criteria	or	yardsticks	that	help	to	determine	what	can	be	regarded	as	tolerable	
can	be	used)	[IRGC,	2005].
Complexity: Refers	 to	 the	difficulty	of	 identifying	and	quantifying	causal	 links	between	a	multitude	of	potential	
causal	agents	and	specific	observed	effects	[IRGC,	2005].
Efficiency:	The	ratio	of	the	effective	or	useful	output	to	the	total	input	in	any	system.
Emerging risk: A	new	risk,	or	a	familiar	risk	in	a	new	or	unfamiliar	context	(re-emerging).	These	risks	may	also	be	
changing	(in	nature)	rapidly.
Externalities: Externalities	 are	 implicated	 in	 commons	 problems	 and	 occur	 when	 an	 economic	 activity	 incurs	
external	costs	(negative	externalities)	or	external	benefits	(positive	externalities)	to	stakeholders	who	did	not	directly	
participate	in	the	activity.	For	example,	the	economic	activity	of	factories	can	release	pollutants	into	waterways	or	
produce	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	which	contribute	to	climate	change	–	these	negative	impacts	impose	a	cost	
on	society,	which	 is	not	borne	by	 the	 factories;	 it	 is	an	external	cost.	Emissions	 trading	schemes	are	a	method	
of	removing	externalities	related	to	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	as	they	 impose	an	 internal	cost	on	firms	for	 the	
greenhouse	gas	they	release.
	
Framing: The	initial	analysis	of	a	risk	problem	looking	at	what	the	major	actors,	e.g.,	governments,	companies,	the	
scientific	community	and	the	general	public,	select	as	risks	and	what	types	of	problems	they	label	as	risk	problems.	
This	defines	the	scope	of	subsequent	work	[IRGC,	2005].
Hazard: A	source	of	potential	harm	or	a	situation	with	the	potential	 to	cause	loss	[Australian/New	Zealand	Risk	
Management	Standard,	cited	in	IRGC,	2005].
Knowledge: The	Concise	Oxford	English	Dictionary	defines	knowledge	as:	(i)	information	and	skills	acquired	through	
experience	or	education;	the	sum	of	what	is	known	(ii)	awareness	or	familiarity	gained	by	experience	[OED,	2008].	
The	classical	definition	of	knowledge,	as	 formulated	by	Plato,	 is	 “justified	 true	belief”.	However,	epistemologists	
continue	to	debate	the	meaning	of	“knowledge”	and,	as	such,	there	is	no	agreed-upon	definition.
Organisational capacity (assets, skills, capabilities): The	 ability	 of	 organisations	 and	 individuals	 within	
organisations	to	fulfil	their	role	in	the	risk	governance	process	[IRGC,	2005].
(Risk) Mitigation:	Measures	to	reduce	the	impact	of	a	realised	risk	[IRGC,	2005].
(Risk) Perceptions:	The	outcome	of	the	processing,	assimilation	and	evaluation	of	personal	experiences,	values	
or	information	about	risk	by	individuals	or	groups	in	society	[IRGC,	2005].
Risk: An	uncertain	(generally	adverse)	consequence	of	an	event	or	an	activity	with	regard	to	something	that	humans	
value	[definition	originally	in	Kates	et	al.,	1985:	21].	Such	consequences	can	be	positive	or	negative,	depending	on	
the	values	that	people	associate	with	them	[IRGC,	2005].
Glossary
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Risk appetite:	The	amount	and	type	of	risk	that	an	organisation	is	prepared	to	pursue,	retain	or	take	[ISO,	2009].
Risk assessment:	 The	 task	 of	 identifying	 and	 exploring,	 preferably	 in	 quantified	 terms,	 the	 types,	 intensities	
and	 likelihood	of	 the	 (normally	 undesired)	 consequences	 related	 to	 a	 risk.	Risk	 assessment	 comprises	 hazard	
identification	and	estimation,	exposure	and	vulnerability	assessment,	and	risk	estimation	[IRGC,	2005].
Risk attitude: An	organisation’s	approach	to	assess	and	eventually	pursue,	retain,	take	or	turn	away	from	risk	[ISO,	
2009].
Risk governance:	The	identification,	assessment,	management	and	communication	of	risks	in	a	broad	context.	
It	includes	the	totality	of	actors,	rules,	conventions,	processes	and	mechanisms	concerned	with	how	relevant	risk	
information	is	collected,	analysed	and	communicated,	and	how	and	by	whom	management	decisions	are	taken.
Risk governance deficit: A	 deficiency	 or	 failure	 in	 the	 identification,	 framing,	 assessment,	 management	 or	
communication	of	the	risk	issue	or	in	how	it	is	being	addressed.	Governance	deficits	are	common.	They	can	be	
found	throughout	the	risk	handling	process	and	limit	its	effectiveness.	They	are	actual	and	potential	shortcomings,	
and	can	be	remedied	or	mitigated.	
Risk management: The	creation	and	evaluation	of	options	for	initiating	or	changing	human	activities	or	(natural	or	
artificial)	structures	with	the	objective	of	increasing	the	net	benefit	to	human	society	and	preventing	harm	to	humans	
and	what	they	value;	and	the	implementation	of	chosen	options	and	the	monitoring	of	their	effectiveness	[IRGC,	
2005].
Risk tolerance: An	 organisation’s	 or	 stakeholder’s	 readiness	 to	 bear	 the	 risk	 after	 risk	 treatment	 (process	 to	
modify	the	risk)	in	order	to	achieve	its	objectives.	(Note:	Risk	tolerance	can	be	influenced	by	legal	or	regulatory	
requirements)	[ISO,	2009].
Systemic risk: Risks	affecting	the	systems	on	which	society	depends.	The	term	“systemic”	was	assigned	by	the	
OECD	in	2003	and	denotes	the	embeddedness	of	any	risk	to	human	health	and	the	environment	in	a	larger	context	
of	social,	financial	and	economic	consequences	and	increased	interdependencies	both	across	risks	and	between	
their	various	backgrounds	[IRGC,	2005].	Systemic	risks	are	characterised	by	complexity,	uncertainty	and	ambiguity.	
Most	often,	they	are	also	trans-boundary.		
Stakeholders (in risk issues):	Socially	organised	groups	that	are	or	will	be	affected	by	the	outcome	of	the	event	or	
the	activity	from	which	the	risk	originates	and/or	by	the	risk	management	options	taken	to	counter	the	risks	[IRGC,	
2005].
Securitisation (in the financial sector):	The	creation	of	asset-backed	securities	where	debt	obligations	(such	as	
mortgages)	are	pooled,	with	the	resulting	pool	then	being	subdivided	into	portions	that	can	be	sold	as	securities	on	
the	secondary	market.
Uncertainty: A	state	of	knowledge	in	which	the	likelihood	of	any	adverse	effect,	or	the	effects	themselves,	cannot	
be	precisely	described.	(Note:	This	is	different	from	ignorance	about	the	effects	or	their	likelihood)	[IRGC,	2005].
Vulnerability:	The	extent	 to	which	 the	 target	can	experience	harm	or	damage	as	a	 result	of	 the	exposure	 (for	
example:	immune	system	of	target	population,	vulnerable	groups,	structural	deficiencies	in	buildings,	etc.)	[IRGC,	
2005].
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